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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
This thesis examines the agricultural labour process on commercial farms in post-apartheid 
South Africa with a particular focus on systems of labour control on these farms. 
Considerable literature exists about the labour process in capitalist society but the capitalist 
labour process does not exist in any pure form. Rather, different labour processes exist and 
the specific form they take depends on spatial and temporal conditions. Additionally, labour 
processes are often economic sector-specific. Because of variation in capitalist labour 
processes, differences in systems of labour control (or labour control regimes) also arise. 
Historically, up until the end of apartheid in 1994, the labour control regime on commercial 
farms in South Africa was marked by a paternalistic despotism of a racialised kind. This in 
part reflected the fact that commercial farms were simultaneously sites of both economic 
production and social reproduction and, further, they were very privatised agrarian spaces 
largely unregulated (specifically with regard to labour) by the state. Since the end of 
apartheid, commercial farms have been subjected to multiple pressures. Notably, the South 
African state has strongly intervened in labour relations on commercial farms, and 
commercial farms have been subjected to ongoing neo-liberal restructuring. This has led to 
the prospects of changes in the prevailing labour control system on commercial farms. In this 
context, the thesis pursues the following key objective: to understand changes and 
continuities in the labour process on commercial farms – and particularly labour control 
systems – subsequent to the end of apartheid in South Africa. It does so with reference to four 
farms in Eastern Cape and KwaZulu-Natal Provinces.  
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CHAPTER ONE:  
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
The South African agricultural sector consists of 12.76 million hectares of cultivated land, of 
which 10.45 million hectares (or 85%) is used for commercial agricultural purposes 
(AGRISETA 2010: 3), making commercial agriculture a significant employer of labour in 
South Africa. The commercial farming sector in South Africa is also a very diverse sector 
comprising of – broadly speaking – field crop husbandry, horticulture and animal production, 
with numerous sub-sectors (such as citrus) (Vink and Van Rooyen 2009). Since the end of 
apartheid in 1994, there have been a number of changes to commercial farming including 
with specific relation to the labour process, labour control and labour conditions on farms. 
The thesis addresses these changes as well as continuities.  
 
This introductory chapter is divided into the following three sections. The next section 
(section two) details the research problem and thesis objective, including the theoretical 
framework which informs this study. The third section discusses the research methodology 
used for the study, including the specific research techniques adopted and the challenges I 
faced while conducting the study. The fourth and final section gives a synopsis of the core 
chapters of the thesis. 
 
1.2 RESEARCH PROBLEM AND THESIS OBJECTIVE 
Historically, commercial agriculture in South Africa has been characterized by the fact that 
farms were both sites of economic production and sites of social reproduction. More 
specifically, farm workers and their families lived on the farms and the farmer was in large 
part directly responsible for ensuring the social reproduction of workers and their families. 
This led to a distinctive kind of labour process and especially labour control on commercial 
farms which was also deeply shaped by the system of racial domination existing at the time. 
Since 1994, the post-apartheid state (led by the ruling party, the African National Congress) 
has sought to address the legacy of racial domination through historical redress, including 
incorporating farm labour into a nation-wide system of labour regulation and enhancing the 
tenure rights of farm workers and dwellers. At the same time, the new South Africa emerged 
2 
  
at the height of neo-liberal restructuring globally and in many ways the South African 
political economy (including questions around labour rights) has been structured along neo-
liberal lines over the past two decades. The historical redress thrust along with the neo-liberal 
trajectory has resulted in a complicated and tension-riddled process of labour restructuring on 
commercial farms in South Africa. 
 
The theoretical foundation that underpins this study on the agricultural labour process in 
South Africa is labour process theory. This theory, in relation to capitalism, is generally used 
to understand the means by which human labour is harnessed in the creation of commodities 
for capital accumulation (Marshall 1998), and therefore speaks to managerial strategies of 
organising, controlling and coordinating labour. The analysis of the labour process in 
contemporary capitalism, which emerged out of the seminal work of Harry Braverman, led to 
a number of controversies about the labour process (called the ‘labour process debate’) with 
regard for instance to the restructuring of skills and worker resistance. One of the critical 
arguments emerging out of the labour process debate is that managerial control takes on 
different forms historically and, even at one moment in time, it is open to variation in terms 
of for example the location of workers within the labour market (given the existence of 
labour market segmentation). This means that the capitalist labour process, in which 
managerial control is of great significance, is subject to variation both historically and 
spatially.  
 
This variation is particularly critical to the thesis. Labour process theory has largely focused 
on work places in which the site of social reproduction is spatially removed from the work 
place. In other words, economic production and social reproduction are spatially separated. 
Commercial farms, as indicated, are vastly different from this, and thus any attempt to draw 
on labour process theory must be sensitive to the specificities of commercial farms in South 
Africa. Labour control on commercial farms in South Africa has taken on its particular 
character because of the close and indeed intimate linkage between production and 
reproduction and because of the racialised makeup of pre-1994 South Africa. This involved a 
privatised and personalised form of managerial control sometimes referred to as racial 
paternalistic despotism. With changes to labour legislation since 1994, particularly the 
entrenching of labour rights for farm workers (which involves a formalisation of labour 
relations) and with heightened competition in agriculture under neo-liberal conditions, 
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changes in the labour process are taking place on commercial farms in South Africa. But the 
changes may be sector specific and also specific to particular categories of workers.  
 
The thesis examines the changes as well as the continuities pertaining to labour, the labour 
process and labour control on commercial farms in South Africa. It does this through a study 
of specific farms in the provinces of KwaZulu-Natal and the Eastern Cape. The key objective 
of the thesis therefore is as follows: to understand changes and continuities in the labour 
process on commercial farms (with a specific focus on labour control systems) subsequent to 
the end of apartheid in South Africa. This is done with reference to studied farms in the 
Eastern Cape and KwaZulu-Natal. This involves identifying a possible shift from a 
paternalistic, personalised and despotic labour control system under apartheid to a post-
paternalistic and more impersonal and structural labour control system in post-apartheid 
South Africa. To pursue this main objective, the following secondary objectives are 
considered: 
a) to understand the labour process that existed on commercial farms prior to the end of 
apartheid;  
b) to examine the effects on the agricultural labour process of post-1994 labour legislation 
and its implementation;  
c) to examine the effects on the agricultural labour process of neo-liberal restructuring;  
d) to identify any changes in the relationship between sites of economic production and sites 
of social reproduction with respect to commercial farms; and 
e) to determine variations in shifts of the agricultural labour process generally and labour 
control specifically in relation to different categories of farm workers. 
 
1.3 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
In this section, I outline the research methodology used for the study, including research 
design, data collection and analysis methods, as well as research challenges. 
 
1.3.1 Research Design 
A research design refers to a solid research plan or strategy (Babbie and Mouton 2001). 
Given my thesis objective, which entails changes over time, the most appropriate strategy for 
my research is a ‘longitudinal research design’ as it collects data about two or more points in 
time (Ruane 2005), therefore allowing for a broad understanding of changes in the labour 
process before and after 1994. Investigating the labour process on the specific farms studied 
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both during and after apartheid did not take place directly, in the sense of an already-existing 
study of the selected farms during apartheid being drawn upon. Nevertheless, for historical 
comparative purposes, I was able to capture (broadly speaking) the agricultural labour 
process on commercial farms in apartheid South Africa based on the available (admittedly 
limited) secondary literature and primary documents as well as probing historical events on 
the studied farms.  
 
In terms of internal and external validity of the thesis study, I note the following. First of all, 
external validity refers to the generalizability of study results beyond the farms studied. The 
farms studied were selected through non-random purposive sampling, primarily on the basis 
of accessibility to the farms. Commercial farms in South Africa are notoriously difficult to 
study because they are privatised spaces controlled by farm owners and managers and the 
latter normally refuse studies to be undertaken on their farms particularly with respect to the 
sensitive topic of labour and labour conditions. I therefore make no claim that the results 
emanating from my thesis study are in any way statistically representative of commercial 
farms in South Africa, particularly also given the variation between agricultural sub-sectors. 
However, the results are at least illustrative of possible changes and continuities in 
agricultural labour processes and labour control systems. Internal validity refers to causal 
analysis, where causal relationships are detected and elaborated (insofar as they exist). In this 
regard, I remain hesitant about adopting a notion of causality in this study. While it may be 
possible to speak of the labour process as the dependent variable, and for example neo-liberal 
restructuring and new labour legislation as independent or mediating variables, I would prefer 
to consider the independent variables not as causes but as conditions. More specifically, neo-
liberal restructuring and labour legislation (and other factors, including managerial responses) 
are the conditions in terms of which changes and continuities to the agricultural labour 
process can be understood.  
 
1.3.2 Research Techniques 
The study was qualitative in character as I sought to investigate and examine qualitative shifts 
in social processes on commercial farms, notably the labour process. Qualitative research 
provides in-depth and nuanced descriptions and understandings of events and practices and 
facilitates the gaining of insight into the how and why of events and practices (and processes 
more broadly) without reducing these insights to a causal relationship. In this context, I 
conducted in-depth interviews (see Appendix 1 and Appendix 2,) with a total of 19 
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respondents (see Table 1.1) initially between 18
th
 and 30
th
 April 2013, and I then re-entered 
the field briefly on 10
th
 October 2013. 
 
My units of analysis were farm workers and farm managers on the four commercial farms. 
The studied farms were Woodburns Estate, Oak Leaf Farm and Varnam Farm, and one pack 
house (Carisbrooke Valley Citrus) in KwaZulu-Natal and the Eastern Cape.  
 
Table 1.1: Studied Farms: Subsectors and Respondents  
Farm Location Main 
Production 
Owners/ 
Managers 
Farm Workers Tot. 
 Full-Time/ 
Permanent 
Seasonal/ 
Casual 
M F M F M F 
Carisbrooke 
Valley Citrus 
Nokweja, 
Ixopo 
Citrus 
(Processing) 
1 0 0 4 0 0        5 
Woodburns 
Estate 
Nokweja, 
Ixopo 
Citrus, 
Sugarcane, 
Timber 
1 0 3 0 0 0        4 
Oak Leaf Alexandria, 
Eastern Cape 
Dairy 2 0 3 0 0 0        5 
Varnam 
Farm 
Grahamstown, 
Eastern Cape 
Vegetables 1 0 2 1 1 0        5 
Total (No.)   5 0 8 5 1 0      19 
 
The farms to be selected for the research were initially farms based in a particular agricultural 
sub-sector, namely, citrus (including agro-processing). However, because of difficulties and 
challenges involved in accessing citrus farms and agro-processing units, I had to diversify the 
study across sub-sectors. Thus, one of the farms is a fruit and vegetable farm, while another is 
a dairy farm. Once on the farm, farm worker respondents were randomly selected (so as to 
avoid farmers selecting ‘ideal’ candidates for inquiry); however, I attempted to obtain a 
representative sample, i.e. a range of seasonal, permanent, male, and female workers (see 
Table 1.1). In the end, the studying of different sub-sectors (as well as the studying of 
different categories of farm workers) had the advantage of facilitating the identification and 
understanding of variations in the labour process and managerial control in commercial 
agriculture in South Africa.  
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The specific research techniques used for the thesis are as follows:  
a) Five farm managers/owners were interviewed; three were managers only – one Black 
male, two White males – and two (White males) managed and owned, or co-owned, the 
farms. The two managers/owners (Woodburns and Oak Leaf) were born on the farm and 
acquired their basic agricultural and managerial skills from the farm itself, though they also 
had formal qualifications in agriculture. The manager of the pack house (Carisbrooke Valley 
Citrus) had a variety of managerial experience including in a saw mill, manufacturing 
company and farming. The other farm manager (Varnam Farm) had a Diploma in Tourism 
Management, but was trained agriculturally through his brother who works on another farm 
in the area. All four farms were family-owned commercial farms. 
 
Fourteen farm workers were interviewed in this study; there were nine (eight permanently 
employed, one casually employed) Black males and five (one permanently employed, four 
‘semi-permanently’ employed) Black females. All were South African citizens. Their on-
farm residency ranged from being born on the farm and having started working in the field in 
their early teenage years, to those who were not born on the farm but had worked (and lived) 
there for more than 20 years, and to those who only worked on the farm but lived in close 
proximity to the farm. Those born on the farm indicated having been employed by an elder 
family member (typically the father), who then passed down the business to his successors 
(usually the sons). The recruitment, especially with older staff, thus typically took this shape: 
I was hired by ‘Mnumzane’, the father of this house…that was before he started using the 
boys as managers and stuff. (Farm Worker, Woodburns Estate, 19/04/2013) 
I used to work in the main house and now I work in the farm workshop (Farm Worker, 
Woodburns Estate, 19/04/2013) 
The level of education of workers ranged from Standard 3 to Matriculation with no post-
Matriculation qualifications; and worker experience largely stemming from the years worked 
on the farm or other farms where they were previously employed. All farm workers 
interviewed where chosen by me without any undue influence or interference from the farm 
owner and/or manager.  
 
b) I also attended a meeting held on 25th May 2013 in Grahamstown (in the Eastern 
Cape), hosted by the East Cape Agricultural Research Project (ECARP), which involved 
primarily farm workers in the citrus sub-sector. Those present were: 5 ECARP staff, 2 
representatives from an international donor, 1 Citrus Grower Association (CGA) 
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representative, 1 FruitSA representative and 16 (13 male, 3 female) farm workers. The 
workers came from areas near Grahamstown such as Langkloof, Fort Beaufort, Adelaide and 
Dunbrody. 
 
c) Thirdly, on 14th June 2013, I was afforded an in-depth interview (see Appendix 3) 
with a Land Rights Facilitator from ECARP. ECARP has an on-going research programme 
on labour and land on commercial farms in the Eastern Cape. They also constantly interact 
with farm workers who form part of the 67 farm committees established by ECARP in the 
Eastern Cape Province.  
 
d) Finally, I attended a conference (titled ‘Land, Race and Nation in South Africa’) in 
Cape Town from 19
th
 to 21
st
 June 2013. This was a non-academic conference, which 
advocated social mobilization for landless people, farm workers and dwellers in South Africa. 
During this time, I engaged with farm workers on a social level and also attended meeting 
sessions. 
 
Data collected through these research techniques were recorded and transcribed. I carefully 
and systematically categorised and structured the data thematically based on my existing 
understanding of the agricultural labour process in South Africa and the reoccurring issues 
which arose during the fieldwork. This thematic arrangement is expressed in the format of 
my two empirical chapters, namely, chapters four and five.   
 
1.3.3 Research Challenges and Ethics  
I faced various challenges while conducting the research for thesis, including transport to the 
farms which were in remote areas. But there were particular challenges I encountered during 
the field work which I needed to address. These were: 
a) Given that commercial farmers in South Africa tend to inhibit research on farms, I 
was aware that access to the field would be difficult. To gain access, I needed to go through 
the key ‘gate keepers’ which, in the case of commercial farms, is the farm owner or manager. 
But, even before approaching gate-keepers, I needed to establish rapport with individuals 
who could direct me to gate-keepers who may be willing to allow farm access. In the case of 
KwaZulu-Natal, this individual was a small commercial farm owner in Ixopo who I knew; 
and, for the Eastern Cape, it was a farm agent. Each of these two contacts gave me a list of 
farmers and contacted them on my behalf about the study. I then briefed the identified gate-
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keepers on the study and liaised with them for interviews before engaging in the field work. 
However, even after such arrangements, access did not necessarily occur. For instance, one 
farmer made an appointment that he did not honour, while others wanted to know exactly 
what they were getting themselves into (such as requesting that “no political questions” were 
to be asked). In the end, out of the ten farms that were approached, I successfully gained 
access to the four farms which form the basis of the fieldwork.  
b) When conducting my in-depth interviews, I used a digital tape recorder to preserve 
information. One of the respondents (a farm manager/owner who I do not identify in the 
following quotation), however, was not willing to be recorded, saying that: 
I don’t know who will be listening to my voice…I don’t know where this will end up, you 
know, with all this legislation talk (19/04/2013). 
As a result, extensive notes were taken in the course of this interview and these notes were 
written up immediately after the interview.  
c) The language barrier was a challenge in the Eastern Cape as all farm workers there 
only spoke isiXhosa. I am a Zulu speaker, so I was able to communicate with farm workers in 
KwaZulu-Natal, as well as translate and transcribe the KwaZulu-Natal interviews into 
English. Although isiXhosa and isiZulu have some similarities, I had to employ a Xhosa-
speaker to accompany me in the field and to translate interview questions with farm workers. 
She was also paid to transcribe the Xhosa interviews once completed. 
d) Getting a cross-section of workers on farms (based particularly on the 
permanent/seasonal distinction) was difficult because interviewing seasonal workers was 
awkward. Seasonal workers are typically paid by the rate at which they work (for example, 
pickers may have to fill ten crates of oranges for a certain wage), so I met responses such as: 
If you pay me the equivalent of what umlungu [the manager] would pay me for the day, I would 
agree (30/04/2013). 
Indeed, some seasonal workers were not willing to stop or slow down during their work to 
answer my questions. In this regard, the ECARP meeting and the ‘Land, Race and Nation’ 
conference helped to fill certain gaps in evidence. For instance, the meeting hosted by 
ECARP had male and female workers who were seasonal, casual and permanent employees. 
After the meeting, I was able to have impromptu interviews with them and ask questions 
relating to my research. 
 
In terms of ethics, it is important to abide by standards of professionalism and honesty in 
social research, particularly in gaining the trust of interviewees. In the process of collecting 
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evidence for the thesis, all relevant ethical considerations were taken into account. 
Participants had the full details of the study explained to them before they agreed to 
participate. They were also assured that should they wish to withdraw from the research 
interview, they could do so at any time. Anonymity and confidentiality were guaranteed 
unless individuals consented to be quoted. In the end, I have not used names in the quotations 
from the field appearing later in the thesis, though the owners and managers of the four 
studied farms permitted me to use the names of their farms. I also made it clear that my 
presence on the farm had no bearing on the formulation or implementation of South African 
labour legislation, and that no harm to interviewees would arise from the research.  
 
1.4 THESIS OUTLINE 
I now briefly outline the structure of the thesis.  
 
Chapter two, which theoretically frames the thesis, gives an overview of theories pertaining 
to the labour process in capitalism. In doing so, it looks at themes such as the organisation 
and division of labour and the management and supervision of labour. Furthermore, the 
chapter examines the labour process in agriculture from a global perspective, and this 
discussion shows and highlights the specificities of the agricultural labour process and the 
particular form of labour control often embedded in this labour process – sometimes 
encapsulated under the notion of a traditional master-servant relationship which is said to be 
behind the times of modern industrial labour relations.   
 
The following chapter (chapter three) specifically looks at the labour process in commercial 
agriculture in South Africa. It outlines the history of commercial farming in the country and 
the labour relations that arose from a racially-based and largely coercive labour market. 
Commercial agriculture in South Africa was historically state-subsidised and heavily state-
regulated but, under the influence of neo-liberal restructuring, it has become increasingly de-
regulated (or re-regulated) – at least in relation to commodity markets – from the 1980s and 
particularly subsequent to 1994. Simultaneously, though, it became subject to increasing state 
regulation with regard specifically to labour relations. This tension-riddled post-apartheid 
restructuring has had important implications for the agricultural labour process with shifts in 
the form of labour control on farms. 
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Chapters four and five are based on the field work I conducted for the thesis. Chapter four 
sketches the geographic areas of Ixopo (in KwaZulu-Natal), and Zuney and Belmont Valley 
(in the Eastern Cape) and provides details about the four farms studied. Additionally, the 
chapter focuses broadly on the relationships between management and workers in light of the 
introduction of new labour legislation (particularly the state’s sectoral determination for 
agriculture) and the responses of farm owners/managers in complying to this legislation (or 
violating it) given the traditional paternalistic micro-welfare system which existed on 
commercial farms historically. Chapter five provides a more detailed overview of the labour 
processes on the studied farms and this is broken down thematically by reference to for 
example management styles (including supervision and coordination of tasks), recruitment 
and selection, and working and living arrangements on the farms. In so doing, I seek to show 
the complexities and unevenness of post-apartheid management-labour restructuring (and 
labour control systems) on commercial farms and highlight variation across the farms 
studied. It would seem that, twenty years after the end of apartheid, changes in the 
agricultural labour process in South Africa are still ‘in transition’ such that a completely new 
and coherent labour process is not apparent.  
 
The final chapter, chapter six, provides an overall synthesis of the thesis, drawing together 
theory and evidence in offering overall conclusions which address the main objective of the 
thesis. 
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CHAPTER TWO: 
LABOUR PROCESS AND COMMERCIAL AGRICULTURE 
 
 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter discusses the theoretical framework underpinning the thesis, namely, labour 
process theory. In using labour process theory, the more particular focus is on the question of 
managerial control within the labour process with specific reference to agriculture. Modern-
day labour process theory arose from the seminal work in the 1970s of Harry Braverman, 
whose work led to what is called the labour process debate. This debate raised a range of 
critical themes pertinent to the labour process under capitalism including labour control 
regimes.   
 
The chapter is divided into two main sections. The first section outlines labour process theory 
and, in doing so, shows the linkages between the labour process, the labour market and social 
class in capitalism. I discuss a range of labour process themes, such as skills, mechanisation 
and remuneration, but the main emphasis is on labour control systems. There is however no 
one capitalist labour process, such that the labour process does not exist in any pure form. 
Rather, there are labour processes which vary across time and space, and also between 
economic sectors or branches of production. In this context, in section two, I discuss the 
labour process in capitalist agriculture or on commercial farms. I highlight the specificities of 
the capitalist agricultural labour process, notably the spatial connection between sites of 
economic production and social reproduction on-farm, and indicate the ways in which this 
production-reproduction nexus impacts on the type of labour control regime often found in 
capitalist or commercial agriculture.  
 
2.2 LABOUR PROCESS (AND LABOUR MARKET) 
The system of production and the social relationships that are affixed to the production 
process under capitalism are understood as the labour process. Production methods, 
employment relations, working conditions and wages are – in the end – all central to the 
labour process. In the capitalist labour process, under the control of management and using 
the instruments of production, the worker transforms raw materials into products for 
exchange on commodity markets.  
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The labour process in capitalism presupposes an employment contract which governs the 
conditions of sale of the capacity to perform work (known as labour power) by the labourer 
and its purchase by the employer (Braverman 1974). Therefore, the emergence and very 
existence of the labour process under capitalism necessitates a labour market transaction 
involving some degree of consensus around employment and working conditions. This 
agreement invariably benefits the employer (or capitalist) as the labour process is geared 
towards the maximisation of profit and thereby capital accumulation. The labour power sold 
on the labour market is transformed into actual concrete labour in the labour process thereby 
creating value for accumulation purposes.  
 
For the worker, the employment contractual arrangement is the result of the social conditions 
of capitalism that leave him or her with no other way to pursue a livelihood, as the worker 
“lacks independent access to means of subsistence” (Littler 1982: 21) because of previous 
dispossession of these means of livelihood through the historical development of capitalism. 
This by necessity leads to a precarious position for all workers under capitalism, such that 
employment and work becomes the fundamental and only basis for life. The working class is 
“that class which, possessing nothing but its power to labour, sells that power to the capitalist 
in return for subsistence” (Braverman 1974: 378, Marx 2000) but without any guarantee that 
work and therefore subsistence will be forthcoming or, once attained, will be secure and 
permanent. 
 
The capitalist employer enters into the employment contract with the worker in order to 
expand capital and to secure surplus profit, and this requires that the employer maximise the 
transformation of labour capacity into concrete labour by extracting more work from the 
labourer or increasing worker efficiency. The employer of course converts some capital into 
wages in order to purchase the labour power and expand his or her unit of capital. The labour 
process is thus set into motion by the exchange of labour power for wages, and the 
employment relationship is characterised by every-day negotiations around the ways in which 
labour power should be expended and successfully transformed into actual work. In this 
sense, labour power becomes consumed in the labour process, under the control of the 
employer or delegated managers.  
 
For purposes of analytical distinction, it is clearly possible to demarcate the labour market 
from the labour process under capitalism. But, in practice, they are intertwined and mutually 
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dependent. The labour market, as a central concept in the analysis of capitalism, refers to the 
exchange or transaction focusing on the capacity to labour. It is distinct from the labour 
process which is located within the production process and where labour power is exerted. 
Labour power, therefore, has value in the ‘market’ where it can be bought and sold (as if it 
were a commodity), and it becomes transformed into labour in the workplace – through the 
labour process.  
 
The distinction between the sale of labour power (in and through labour markets) and its 
consumption (in the labour process) allows for the assessment of the role of labour markets 
vis-à-vis production processes, including the ways in which labour markets involve the 
segmentation of labourers into different categories of workers with different market 
capacities (Edwards 1979), leading to a differentiated workforce. This segmentation leads to 
the possibility that the categorisation, recruitment and employment of differentiated labour 
(Davis and Marquis 2005) is utilised in facilitating controls over labour (such as divide-and-
rule strategies) within the workplace itself. Thus labour market segmentation theory 
(Loveridge and Mok 1979, Wilkinson 1981, Rubery and Wilkinson 1994) holds that, in terms 
of its structure, the labour market is not homogenous and undifferentiated (as there are 
privileged and non-privileged segments). The labour market is experienced differently by 
different categories of workers, and this has knock-on effects for work and relationships 
within the workplace, i.e. how workers slot into and experience the labour process.  
 
Drawing on the work of Marx, Braverman (1974) notes historical changes in the organization 
of labour under capitalism. For instance, he identifies a strong trend towards specialisation 
and de-skilling. Initially, the capitalist labour process entailed multi-skilled artisans involved 
in the production of entire products or commodities (from start to finish) with the artisan 
therefore performing a range of diverse tasks and often under minimum managerial 
supervision. Later, through processes of specialization and a deepening division of labour, the 
separation of specific operations or tasks took place as these became assigned to different – in 
large part, semi-skilled or unskilled – workers under stricter forms of managerial control in 
terms of the pace and quality of work undertaken. And, as Braverman stresses, the process of 
mechanisation (including assembly line and continual flow production) further facilitated de-
skilling, notably during the 20
th
 century under Fordism. Thus, work techniques, routines and 
procedures in the work place are significantly dependent upon the manner in which the 
capitalist organises and structures a specific labour process.  
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The organization and the division of labour in capitalist society refer to the means by which 
work is differentiated in the workplace as well as the specialization or otherwise of workers 
in performing tasks and roles in the process of production. Marxist scholars (notably labour 
process theorists such as Braverman) tend to be extremely critical of the division of labour, 
arguing that increasing specialisation of tasks leads to workers with undeveloped skill sets 
with concomitant high levels of work alienation and dissatisfaction. This critical approach 
goes contrary to the thoughts of other sociologists (such as Emile Durkheim) who argue that 
the division of labour is, in fact, a necessary and important element in the production process 
(and capitalist society in general) as every worker has a role to play and collectively 
contributes to increasing production to the benefit of all. 
 
In offering a critique of the division of labour, labour process theorists highlight in particular 
the division between the functions of control and execution. As the division of labour became 
more specialized under capitalism, control over the labour process increasingly became the 
prerogative of a particular structure within the workplace, namely, management. The function 
of management always existed (notably, the function of control), but this became eventually 
embedded in a particular structure called management. A process of subordination therefore 
took place over time, and workers lost all control of the labour process and became reduced 
to mere executors of tasks within the workplace. There are, however, important variations in 
the forms of managerial control in existence, which are detailed later. In this regard, there is 
no pure labour process in existence, but labour processes which are contingent on historical 
and spatial conditions.  
 
2.2.1 Social Class 
The existence of social classes is inherent to capitalism and the capitalist system of 
production, and is intimately linked to the labour process. As Carter (1995:51) notes, 
“analysis of the labour process is both informed by a structural analysis of class and helps to 
shape it”. Effectively, capitalism is built on a fundamental distinction between capitalists and 
workers, with the former owning the means of production and the latter having no such 
ownership (but only their labour power to sell). On the one hand, capitalists want to expand 
value and thus create surplus value and, given that labour is the source of all value, to 
ultimately cheapen the cost of labour. On the other hand, workers – at least in the short term – 
seek decent work and wages to live comfortably and, as a result, any improvement in their 
lives cuts into capitalist profit. Thus, a degree of antagonism is built into the relationship 
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between capitalist and worker (Spencer 2000). As Marx (1887:161) put it: “Hence it is that in 
the history of capitalist production, the determination of what is a working day, presents itself 
as the result of a struggle, a struggle between collective capital, i.e., the class of capitalists, 
and collective labour, i.e., the working-class.” 
 
At the same time, there is a relationship of mutual dependence which implies a degree of 
cooperation, or the potential for cooperation, between the two antagonistic classes. For 
instance, it is not in the interest of capitalists to undercut the social reproduction of labour 
power by paying ‘starvation wages’. Labour capacity needs to be reproduced, replenished and 
revitalized, and therefore there is a threshold beyond which the extraction of labour becomes 
detrimental to the interests of both capitalist and worker. What takes place within the labour 
process, including the strategies of labour control in place, often impacts on the quality and 
extent of the reproduction of the workforce. For example, working labourers ‘to the bones’ so 
to speak through harsh labour controls may not be conducive to replenishing the capacity to 
labour on an ongoing basis.  
 
The class relationship between capitalist and worker is regularly if not invariably mediated in 
some form by the state, as the state intervenes in different ways – it does this more so in 
direct relation to the labour market than the labour process as such, though interventions in 
the former have implications for the latter (Friedland 1994). The state leans towards the 
interests of capitalists and capitalism, but it does at times introduce labour policies and 
legislation of a social protectionist kind to moderate the power of capital over labour. It 
certainly never challenges in any fundamental sense the legitimacy and declared fairness of 
the employment relationship and its protectionist stance has been undermined under neo-
liberal restructuring. Employers’ associations and trade unions also play a significant role in 
mediating the capital-labour relationship (Friedland 1994). Besides the fact that the capitalist-
worker relationship in the production process is a power relationship and hence has a marked 
political dimension to it, the politics of the relationship is further reinforced by the role and 
functions of the state and the representatives of capital and workers. In this context, Buroway 
(1979: 8) claims that “there are distinctive political and ideological apparatuses of production 
which regulate productive relations”.  
 
Clearly, in identifying social classes historically within capitalist society, Marx (Braverman 
1974, Carter 1995, Grint 1998, Marx 2000) categorizes social class in relational terms. The 
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two main classes are understood – structurally – by the character of their relationship to the 
means of production (either ownership or non-ownership) and this by definition implies a 
distinct relationship between the two classes – of antagonism and cooperation, though 
Marxists tend to stress the former dimension (of conflict). Classes are examined in terms of 
the economy and specifically the production process, as production is the heart of the 
capitalist economy. Nicos Poulantzas (1973, 17 in Carter 1995:37), in this respect, claims that 
“the economic sphere is determined by the process of production, and the place of their 
agents, their distribution into social classes, is determined by the relations of production”. 
Because of ownership, the capitalist has decisive power over the physical means of 
production, capital investment, resource reallocation and labour power. 
 
The dualist conception of social class is insufficient for making sense of the class system 
particularly under contemporary capitalism. Two points are important here, focusing on both 
the capitalist class and the working class. The capitalist class is characterized by ownership of 
the means of production as well as by conceptualizing and controlling the production (and 
labour) process. In the past, ownership and conceptualization/control were embodied in a 
single capitalist. But the development of capitalism has witnessed the separation of 
ownership from conceptualization and control, such that the typical modern-day capitalist is 
marked by ownership only. Conceptualisation and control (as managerial functions) have 
become embodied in a particular structure known as management, with managers regularly 
not having any ownership of the means of production. Like the labourer, managers are also 
employees and enter into employment contracts with the owner. The difference though is that 
managers exercise the function of control of the labour process, as control of production – 
through a lengthy historical process of dispossession and subordination – has been taken 
away from workers. This is because as “so long as the workers control the labour process 
itself, they will thwart efforts to realize the full potential of their labour power” (Braverman 
1974:100). Workers therefore execute without any function of control. At the same time, the 
structure of management is internally differentiated, from senior managers to supervisors 
such that the character and extent of control varies within management. This raises complex 
questions about the class position of management in capitalism but it also suggests that there 
are different labour control strategies in place across specific management structures. 
 
In the case of workers, though all workers do not have ownership and are subject to the 
controls of management, there is internal differentiation within the working class (sub-
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classes) or even different classes of workers. There are different criteria for distinguishing 
between groups of workers, but market capacity is particularly important – in relation to the 
labour market, different groups bring different sets of skills, knowledge and experience to the 
market and are slotted into production processes on this basis. This relates back to the notion 
of labour market segmentation. Some segments of the workforce for instance possess 
qualifications and credentials that are inaccessible to the majority of the working class, 
therefore leading to a distinction between skilled and unskilled workers.  There are also other 
distinctions within the working class worthy of note, particularly in the face of neo-liberal 
restructuring. Of critical significance is the difference between standard employment (full-
time and permanent) and non-standard employment (such as part-time, temporary and 
casual). Historically there is considerable variation across and within economic sectors with 
respect to the extent to which these two categories of employment are evident. But, under 
neo-liberalism, it is generally recognized that standard (or typical) employment has been 
under attack through a process of casualisation whereby atypical forms of employment are on 
the rise. Insofar as standard employment entails higher wages and greater benefits compared 
to non-standard employment, this leads to further differentiation within the working class. As 
well, depending on variations across time and space, such differences may be overlain with 
social identities such as race, gender, ethnicity and nationality. Additionally, the forms of 
labour control prevalent often vary across these internal differentiations.  
 
2.2.2 Labour Process Themes 
Before focusing on the key labour process theme for this thesis, namely labour control, I 
briefly consider a number of other themes which I touch upon later in the thesis. These 
themes – in order of presentation, are skills, mechanization, gender (and social identity more 
broadly), remuneration and resistance.    
 
Historically, with the original rise of capitalism, multi-skilled or highly-skilled artisans 
existed and they had significant control over the labour process in terms of both 
conceptualization and execution. In efforts to restructure the production process, capitalists 
sought to increasingly subordinate workers (including artisans) to the dictates of the 
managerial function. This involved deepening the division of labour in the formation of a less 
skilled labour force, setting off what labour process theorists refer to as the process of de-
skilling. The ‘collective worker’ emerged with groupings of labourers all contributing in 
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different ways, by means of specialized tasks, to the production of specific commodities 
(Rinehart 2001).  
 
This claim about de-skilling has not gone unchallenged. For instance, it is argued that the 
typical worker under early capitalism was in fact not the skilled artisan; indeed, a large 
mainly unskilled labour force emerged with the introduction of the factory system. The 
counter-claim also indicates that, along with de-skilling as a general tendency, new sets of 
required skills have emerged particularly with regard to the development of sophisticated 
technologies and the increasing dominance of new economic sectors such as the service 
sector (involving social, interpersonal and care skills) (Meiskins 1994, Thompson 2010). 
Also, Braverman tends to ignore the significance of tacit skills in the workplace. Zimbalist 
(1979, in Jaros 2005) argues that the history of skills under capitalism is cyclical in nature, 
with changing patterns of deskilling and re-skilling over time. It seems clear though that there 
are different skills-regimes across time and space (Clarke and Winch 2004). For instance, the 
Asian tiger economies developed by shifting from a low-skill regime to a high-skill regime, 
and some economic sectors are marked by lower-skill regimes than others. And variation in 
skill remains as an important signifier for labour market segmentation and stratification.  
 
Technological innovation and mechanization has been part and parcel of the process of 
capitalist development and plays an important role in shaping the organization of labour at 
work and in re-constituting the labour process, including forms of labour control. Its effect on 
labour is evident from Braverman’s work when he highlights the question: “In what way does 
a machine supplement man’s muscles, mental processes, judgment and degree of control?” 
(Braverman 1974: 187). In this regard, it is clear that technological change is intimately 
related to processes of de-skilling and re-skilling. Forms of technology under capitalism have 
undergone numerous shifts, including assembly-line production under the influence of the 
Ford Motor Company, and now information technology-controlled machinery. There are 
numerous questions about the impact of technology, including the relationship between 
technological change and levels of employment given that machinery is seen as labour-saving 
devices. But it is clear that technology and its introduction is not always positioned as neutral; 
more specifically, technological innovation is not simply – or certainly not always – about 
maximizing economies of scale and efficiencies. Sometimes technology is more directly 
political, with technology used as a means of control over (and surveillance of) the workforce 
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or to limit the reliance on a labour force which is highly truculent and volatile. The presence 
of technology across economic sectors, and even within, is open to considerable variation.  
 
Traditionally, the industrialized worker under capitalism has been thought of as a male 
worker, with women (because of patriarchy) assigned to the process of social reproduction 
within the domestic sphere as unpaid labourers. Women of course work directly within the 
labour process of the capitalist economy, though a gendered division of labour is readily 
apparent based on labour market segmentation. This gendered division is part of a wider issue 
pertaining to the linkages between social identities (not just gender, but also for example race 
and ethnicity) and work, with labour markets often being racialised and ethnicised. In this 
respect, certain segments are often feminized, racialised and ethnicised (and normally, these 
are less privileged segments). This differentiation along lines of social identity is related to 
both skills and technology. Skills are regularly socially constructed for instance through 
patriarchal ideologies, and male workers (sometimes through male-dominated trade unions) 
defend their privileged positions based on claims about the masculine character of certain 
skill sets. Likewise, certain technologies and technology per se is often linked to masculinity, 
such that women workers (because of their feminine qualities) are seen as suitable to 
particular technologies found within work spheres linked to tasks associated with the 
domestic sphere (such as the textile and clothing industry).  
 
Overall, women are marginalised from mainstream economic production. This trend is 
seemingly justified by Braverman who bases his analyses on male notions of ‘skill’ 
(Meiksins 1994). The ‘gendering of labour’, as indicated, is socially constructed and serves to 
degrade ‘female’ skills, while ‘male’ skills are accorded higher status. Witz (1986:15) 
explains that: 
Control over women’s labour is exercised in a variety of historically specific institutional 
contexts such as the household and the labour market. Within the household, male control over 
women’s labour power is clearly more direct…. In the labour market, however, patterns of 
male domination assume more opaque and arguably less direct forms. 
Patriarchal control was initially maintained by denying women access into economically 
productive activities effectively limiting them to unpaid, domestic work in the sphere of 
social reproduction. But, by the beginning of the 1980s, women’s participation in the formal, 
public arena had increased (Glasner 1987) as they were increasingly incorporated into the 
labour market but on unequal and uneven terms (Podmore and Spencer 1986), including less 
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earnings for the same work performed by males (as they were not seen as the primary 
breadwinner) (Crowley 2013).  The sexual division of labour may at times be connected to 
labour control, but it is not reducible to managerial strategies focused on for instance divide-
and-rule. At times, though, the employment of women is justified by management on the 
basis of their more complacent and compliant character compared to male workers.  
 
Wages are defined as “the amount of money which the capitalist pays for a certain period of 
work or for a certain amount of work” (Marx 2000: 14). The relationship between wages and 
labour is an exploitative one, insofar as the capitalist extracts unpaid labour from working 
people in the creation of surplus value (Rinehart 2001). In order for the capitalist to remain 
ahead of his competitors, or to remain afloat in the face of competition, he has to continue 
extracting labour from workers at a rate which maximizes productivity and profitability. This 
could entail focusing on absolute surplus value, for instance by increasing the length of the 
working week or increasing the pace of work while technology remains constant; or even by 
converting from hourly wage rates to piece-rate wages or (at least in part) to wages-in-kind. 
Alternatively, it could involve maximizing relative surplus value. One way of doing this is by 
shifting increasingly from variable capital (labour) to constant capital (machinery) for, as 
Marx (2000:36) argues, “the productive force of labour is increased above all by a greater 
division of labour and by a more general introduction and constant improvement of 
machinery”. The overall cost of production per unit produced is thereby decreased by the 
increase in the scale and intensity of production. Either way, capitalists constantly seek ways 
and means of reducing labour costs as a proportion of total production costs or ensuring that 
the real costs of labour do not increase over time.  
 
Wages though are critical to workers and their families.  As Marx (2000:6) argues:  
The labourer’s cost of production consists of the sum of the means of subsistence (or their price 
in money) which on the average are requisite to enable him to work, to maintain him in his 
capacity for work, and to replace him in his departure, by reason of age, sickness, or death, with 
another labourer that is to say, to propagate the working class in required numbers. 
This is effectively all the capitalist wants, namely, the reproduction of the workforce to 
ensure long-term profitability. But this should not undermine the importance of wages for 
workers. Indeed, wages are the most contentious dimension of the employment contract and 
considerable industrial conflict exists because of disputes over wages and related issues. 
Since the rise and consolidation of neo-liberalism the worldwide trend has been a fall in real 
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wages for workers (even amongst privileged labour market segments), or increases 
disproportional to rises in capitalist profits.  
 
The cost of labour (in the form of wages) compared to the overall cost of production varies 
across economic sectors. Some sectors, and these are often labour-intensive, are historically 
based on a low-wage regime. These low-wage sectors find it difficult to make significant 
upward adjustments in wages because the very structure of production critically depends on 
this regime. Further, in the context of neo-liberalisation and the opening up of the global 
trade regime, sectors which are highly dependent on imports for production inputs and are 
export-focused become subject to indeterminate fluctuations in global commodity prices. 
When these fluctuations are detrimental, it is not unusual that the cost of labour is cut to 
absorb the effects of increased costs (of other production inputs) or of reduced profits. And 
central to this are often methods and strategies of labour control.  
 
The last theme is that of worker resistance. The labour process under capitalism, though 
controlled by the capitalist, is contested terrain (Edwards 1979) because of the conflicting 
interests between capitalists and workers around for instance wages.  Ultimately, the power 
of workers is their collective power (as embodied in their existence as the ‘collective worker’ 
or socialized collective labourer). By working together and enduring the same conditions of 
work and control under the capitalist or manager, workers potentially form a cooperative 
grouping, with common interests. It is this collective labour that allows them to express a 
unified and organized resistance to management and capitalists alike, which is regularly 
manifested in the formation and activities of trade unions. At times, capitalists (or their 
delegated managers) deploy strategies which seek to divide the workforce to inhibit worker 
unity and mobilisation. But the relationship between capitalist and worker, in terms of tension 
and conflict, is regularly mediated by the state in the form of corporatist or tripartite 
arrangements, involving capital, labour the state. In this sense, conflict becomes 
institutionalized and moderated through formalized rules of engagement based on collective 
bargaining.  
 
The workplace is always a ground for disputes and it is almost inevitable that resistance 
(either passive or aggressive) will be an integral part of any space that produces commodities, 
involving what Storey (1985) refers to as the dialectical interplay between labour resistance 
and managerial control. Indeed, on occasion, new managerial strategies of control or 
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modified strategies emerge in direct response to a phase or period of heightened worker 
resistance or to inhibit the emergence of heightened resistance. These strategies may entail a 
complex mix of outright coercion, enacting compliance and consensus-building (Buroway 
1979). But inevitable as resistance may be as a general trend, there is significant variation in 
the extent, scale, duration and very form of resistance. Indeed, some economic sectors are 
almost devoid of a trade union presence or are comparatively ‘thin’ with regard to union 
organization. This may arise for different reasons, including the banning of trade unions or 
difficulties in organizing within a particular sector. In this respect, a common distinction 
made is between ‘unorganised’ forms of action (such as absenteeism) and ‘organised’ forms 
of action (such as strikes, often but not always by established unions) (Klerck 2008). 
 
2.2.3 Management and Labour Control 
The central theme of this thesis, with regard to the labour process, is managerial control. 
Though there are a variety of managerial functions, labour control is central to the 
management function. This is not to suggest that control over labour emanates purely from 
within the labour process, as it also arises because of labour market conditions. For instance, 
at times of high unemployment, employed workers are unlikely to engage in activities which 
may lead to dismissal and hence they may readily consent to the forms of labour control 
which exist. Once a particular labour control regime is in place, its continued existence 
depends on a variety of mechanisms which cannot be reduced to managerial coercion. Thus 
although control in the labour process is governed by relations of domination and 
subordination, it is difficult for the capitalist to treat labour as if it were a commodity (which 
would be tantamount to reducing the worker under capitalism to a slave-like condition). 
Because of this, even when it comes to labour control systems, “the capitalist(s) must to some 
degree seek a cooperative relationship with labour” (Littler 1982: 32, see also Spencer 2000). 
In this way, compliance and consent on the part of the worker also play an important part in 
ensuring the reproduction of labour control systems (Storey 1985). Hence, workers may be 
complicit in their own exploitation and subordination. This also implies that control over 
workers is not necessarily at the expense of cooperation with workers. Any consent from 
workers may, as Buroway (1979) argues, mask an underlying antagonism, with workers 
simply playing by the rules of the game to maximize their own specific interests.   
 
Some form of managerial control is critical by virtue of the very character of what the 
capitalist purchases on the labour market. Workers sell their capacity to labour and the actual 
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labour expended during the labour process by workers cannot be determined or predicted by 
management in and through the recruitment, selection and hiring process. Labour has the 
quality of indeterminateness and labour power must be converted into actual labour in a 
manner which maximises productivity and profitability (Thompson 2010). For this reason, 
systems of effective labour control must be erected and implemented in the labour process 
(Littler 1982, Davis and Marquis 2005). To emphasise a point made earlier, this function of 
management has increasingly been placed in the hands of the structure of (non-owning, 
salaried) management.  
 
In focusing on labour controls, the thesis is not speaking directly to the (economic) relation of 
exploitation (the fact that workers produce surplus value) or to the fact that this relation 
remains hidden and mystified; it speaks rather to the (political) relation of domination and 
subordination in the workplace through labour controls. In fact, these two relations are two 
dimensions or moments of the same overriding social relations of production (Poulantzas 
1975, Carchedi 1977). Management advances the interests of capital (namely capital 
accumulation) by carrying out the delegated managerial functions, including controlling 
labour. And, to reiterate, managerial control systems are often resisted and sometimes 
subverted by worker resistance and struggles. Alternatively, management and workers may 
reach an implicit compromise with regard to labour control systems and the employment 
contract, as in the Keynesian deal whereby workers received social protection but at the 
expense of almost unbridled management control of the labour process.  
 
It is critical to recognize the absence of any overarching, monolithic, coherent and systematic 
system of labour control and that labour control systems are not necessarily consciously and 
explicitly devised as strategies by management to subordinate labour (based on some 
conspiratorial theory). Sometimes labour control systems (or labour control regimes) are 
marked by inconsistencies and tensions, and sometimes a particular system of control arises 
as a by-product or unintended consequence of some other factor. As well, a diverse range of 
labour control strategies and tactics are identified in the labour process literature and – even 
from the perspective of management – there is no one best way to control labour (Spencer 
2000, Thompson and Broek 2010). At the same time, management is hierarchically organized 
from senior managers down to supervisors, such that there are layers and circuits of control 
(Storey 1985); with the former responsible for overall control and supervisors responsible for 
very limited and specific control functions.  
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There is a diversity of control strategies. Historically, early forms of labour control were 
based on simple hierarchies of control (with very minimal layers of management) of a very 
direct and personal character. This gave way, as a general trend, to more structured, indirect 
and impersonal forms of control. This includes bureaucratic control based on complex 
hierarchical arrangements of management in which management was bound by set rules and 
regulations, and control based on technology which initially took the form of assembly-line 
and continual flow production systems which controlled the character and pace of work. 
Technological control has become highly sophisticated because of information technology 
leading to surveillance as a key element of labour controls today. This shift from personal to 
structured labour control regimes is a broad tendency only and both regimes in fact continue 
to exist. For instance, it is not unusual to find direct and personal labour regimes in place in 
certain branches of production or in smaller enterprises within a particular branch. 
Additionally both regimes can exist in one workplace and be applied selectively to different 
segments or categories of the labour force (with less privileged workers subject to direct and 
personal control regimes). At the same time, it must be recognized that the two control 
regimes identified are ideal-typical types and, in practice, there may be hybrids in existence; 
or, perhaps, a particular economic sector or firm may be undergoing a complicated transition 
from one form of labour regime to another. This last point is of critical significance to the 
thesis, as it examines possible shifts in labour control regimes on commercial farms in South 
Africa during the extended period of transition away from apartheid.  
 
2.3 LABOUR PROCESS IN AGRICULTURE 
In the context of the previous section, in which I examined the labour process in capitalist 
society with a particular focus on systems of labour control, this section looks more 
specifically at the labour process in commercial agriculture. This sets the context for the even 
more specific analysis of commercial agriculture in South Africa in the following chapter. I 
do not claim that there is one capitalist agricultural labour process across time and space; 
nevertheless I seek to identify and discuss some of the key issues pertinent to labour in 
commercial agriculture.  
 
Pfeffer (in Mize 2006, see also Sachikonye 1987) identifies three systems of agricultural 
production: i) the family farm (i.e. subsistence farming), ii) sharecropping and iii) 
agribusiness (i.e. commercial farming). Commercial farming, like all capitalist enterprises, is 
diverse, from small family-owned commercial farms without hired labour to large estates and 
25 
  
plantations owned by multi-national corporations and with a vast labour force, to agro-
processing ventures. In the end, though, they all entail capitalist methods of production and 
are geared towards producing commodities exclusively for profit. There is a particular 
uniqueness to commercial farming which differentiates it from other (but not all) economic 
sectors, namely, the integration of working and living spaces on-site. In other words, the site 
of economic production (and the labour process) and the site of social reproduction (the 
domestic sphere) are not spatially separated as they exist together. This has led to an 
employment relationship which moves beyond the typical waged employment contract and it 
also impacts on and defines the specificity of the agricultural labour process. This section 
unpacks and elaborates upon this specificity with particular focus on the labour control 
regime.   
 
2.3.1 Employment, Working, Living and Women on Farms 
Commercial agriculture has increasingly adopted an agro-industrial model of farming as part 
of the broader restructuring of the global agricultural production and trade regime. This has 
led to an increasing concentration of land holdings as well as centralisation in land 
ownership, with many smaller mainly family-owned and -run farms going into liquidation.  
Along with this has been increasing technological innovation and mechanisation in capitalist 
agriculture (Parry et al. 2005), though this trend is uneven across agricultural sub-sectors 
(with for instance, mechanisation more prevalent in the field crop sub-sector and less 
common in vegetable and mixed livestock/cash crop farms) ((Hall and Mogyorody 2007). 
The character of the labour force on commercial farms is often specific to sub-sectors, in part 
depending on levels and kinds of technological change. 
 
In many agricultural sub-sectors, though, the organisation of labour is characterised by small 
numbers of permanent (or core) employees and large numbers of seasonal and causal workers 
employed for periods where labour demand is high, such as planting and harvesting 
(Wilkinson 1981, Friedland 1994). Contemporary agricultural industry has a pronounced 
differentiated or segmented labour market based on categories of employment – from the 
comparatively privileged permanent workers who regularly live on the farm, to casual and 
seasonal (and sometimes migrant) workers who may have temporary residence on-farm and 
normally work on a piece-rate system. A process of casualisaton of labour is in fact taking 
place under neo-liberal conditions, with commercial farmers increasingly reliant on casual 
rather than permanent labourers.  
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Remuneration of labour in commercial agriculture takes on a variety of forms, dependent 
quite often on the category of employment. Core employees regularly receive payment by set 
wages. Non-core employees may receive payment by time-rates (which are paid daily or for 
work done over a longer period of time) or by piece-rates (which are measured by the unit of 
area in which work is done) (Ramachandran 2012). Payment received is not necessarily 
entirely in the form of money or cash, as there is also payment-in-kind or a combination of 
both of these. Payment-in-kind is particularly prevalent amongst non-core labourers, and 
refers to payment in the form of basic goods or commodities. 
 
There is also a marked tendency to employ foreign nationals (such as Mexican citizens in the 
United States of America) as agricultural labourers. In fact, it is estimated that, in the early 
2000s, 81% of field crop workers in the United States were foreign-born (Oxfam 2004). And 
adolescent (and even child) farm workers are prominent, many of whom travel great 
distances to secure temporary agricultural employment. Employing these more vulnerable 
groups entails an attempt at reducing labour costs (Farm Systems Management Series 1997). 
Indeed, the evidence suggests that agricultural landholders seek explicitly the benefits of 
employing the most marginalised workers to labour in their fields. These workers find 
themselves marginalized from wider society, and working for poverty wages under very 
hazardous and difficult conditions (Oxfam 2004). 
 
The employment of vulnerable groupings as agricultural labourers has at times been formally 
institutionalised by governments. For instance, the Bracero Programme was a labour 
agreement from 1942 to 1964 between the United States and Mexican governments which 
facilitated the free flow of cheap agricultural labour to the United States. The programme 
demonstrates how forms of labour control exist beyond a specific farm and include sector-
wide regulation of labour on even a national basis. With respect to agricultural labour and the 
labour process, this programme sought to accomplish two objectives: to maintain control over 
labour and to ensure a steady oversupply of labourers (Friedland 1994, Mize 2006) and 
thereby reduce labour costs.  
 
The externalisation of labour is also prevalent within capitalist agriculture. This entails the 
use of labour brokers as a method of recruiting and organising farm workers. Instead of the 
farm labourer being directly employed by the capitalist farmer, the labour broker (as a third-
party) employs the worker and, in this way, the capitalist farmer often by-passes existing 
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labour legislation regulating agricultural labour. It is not uncommon in countries such as the 
United States to witness the transportation of workers – sometimes daily – to farm worksites 
in overcrowded, poorly-maintained vehicles provided by the farm labour contractors (Oxfam 
2004). This externalisation of the labour force through labour broking heightens the 
insecurity, vulnerability and exploitation of the agricultural labour force, with labour brokers 
regularly paying labourers at wage-rates well below any minimum wage existing in the 
agricultural sector (or not paying them for extended periods). At times, labour brokers recruit 
foreign migrants outside the national boundaries and, in this way, they are replacing the 
traditional social networks used in the past to locate available farm employment.  
 
The commercial farm, as indicated, is typically a site of both economic production and social 
reproduction, and this has an impact on the agricultural employment contract. Access to a 
house (or some other sort of accommodation) is typically attached to the employment 
agreement. Housing on farms is generally available for workers who are employed full-time 
in year-round positions (Oxfam 2004). Seasonal workers tend to reside permanently in one 
location off-farm or temporarily on-farm in a labour compound or camp. Housing thus 
becomes a marker of employment status, with permanent workers having access to better 
housing conditions. However, even for these core employees, sub-standard housing is often a 
problem for workers and their families, along with unsanitary facilities such as the 
unavailability of fresh and clean water. As the NGO Oxfam indicates: “Farm workers are 
among the worst-housed groups [in the United States]…because of their poverty, farm 
workers suffer from the entire gamut of housing problems: low ownership rates, 
overcrowding and substandard housing quality” (Oxfam 2004: 29). 
 
It is not uncommon to read descriptions of the working and living conditions of farm workers 
and their families as if they worked and lived under conditions of modern-day slavery. 
Workers on agro-industrial farms and in the agro-processing industry for instance are 
normally subject to hazardous working conditions and unfair labour management practices 
(GRACE Communications Foundation 2013). But, under more extreme conditions, the 
Coalition of Immokalee Farmworkers (2012: 2) reveals that farm workers work against their 
will for minimal or no pay at all, even facing conditions that meet the stringent legal 
standards for prosecution under modern-day slavery statutes. For example, based on an 
investigation, the state of Florida in the United States was dubbed ‘ground zero for modern-
day slavery’. Limited state-regulated protection on the farms for labourers translates into the 
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persistence of inhumane conditions and poverty wages for farm workers (Oxfam 2004, 
Coalition of Immokalee Farmworkers 2012, GRACE Communications Foundation 2013). 
Instead of diminishing over time, it seems that farm workers’ economic, social and political 
rights may be eroding. In this regard, the working conditions of one group of farm workers 
are noted here, that of tomato pickers in Florida. These labourers often work ten to twelve 
hours per day under gruelling conditions of hard physical labour (including working with 
heavy machinery, pesticide exposure, sun exposure and inadequate sanitary facilities); and 
they earn sub-poverty wages without any benefits whatsoever (Coalition of Immokalee 
Farmworkers 2012).  
 
Farm labour is one of the most dangerous forms of employment as workers suffer higher 
rates of toxic chemical injuries than workers in any other sector of the United States 
economy, with an estimated 300,000 farm workers suffering pesticide poisonings each year 
(Oxfam 2004). The results from this United States-based study by Oxfam are consistent with 
more global studies. For instance, in relation to health and safety, the International Labour 
Organisation (ILO) asserts that workers in agriculture run at least twice the risk of dying on- 
the-job as workers in other sectors (ILO 1997). According to the ILO (1997), farm health and 
safety experts argue that millions of the world’s 1.3 billion agricultural workers are – on an 
annual basis – seriously injured in workplace accidents involving machinery, or poisoned by 
pesticides and other agro-chemicals. Agro-industrial commercial farms employ capital-
intensive farming techniques, labour-saving technologies and synthetic and engineered 
resource inputs (such as fertilizers and pesticides) in order to maximum profits (Farm 
Systems Management Series 1997) but this is done at the risk of causing serious health 
problems for agricultural labourers.  
 
The agricultural industry has a gender-specific character in the organisation of work (Carney 
and Watts 1990). Women farm workers are often employed in the less privileged (seasonal 
and casual) employment categories, as they face discrimination in securing access to more 
desirable (or less undesirable), better paid and stable employment (Oxfam 2004). With the 
piece-rate system of pay in place for seasonal and casual labourers, women need to work 
longer hours to earn the equivalent of the wage-based income of permanent male workers. 
The role that female agricultural workers play in the labour process is largely determined by 
patriarchal ideologies and discourses and they experience the agricultural industry as sub-
citizens because access to work (and residence) is often negotiated through males. While 
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employing labour on a farm typically means employing the whole family, it is the husband 
who ensures access to employment (and, by extension, any small plot of land available 
through the farm owner). 
 
In addition, women have primary responsibility for much of the childcare and most of the 
household chores amongst farm worker families. According to Oxfam (2004), studies also 
indicate that women are more vulnerable than men to the unhealthy and unsafe working 
conditions prevalent in agriculture, and are further subjected to sexual harassment in the 
male-dominated agricultural workplace. The fact that women are frequently supervised by 
men reinforces the barriers presented to women in the realm of agricultural work. The overall 
power of men over women farm workers limits their access to employment on farms, 
increasing the reluctance to report incidences of sexual harassment as ‘gatekeepers’ into the 
farms are unsympathetic labour brokers, farm owners and even husbands. 
 
2.3.2 The Farm Identity and Labour Control   
I now turn to the more central concern of the thesis, namely, the labour control regime on 
commercial farms. In doing so, I speak to the existence of a tension-riddled farm identity that 
speaks to commercial farms as a family (or community) and a profit-centre. Though this 
identity may not be prevalent universally, the existing literature indicates that it does have 
considerable resonance in the agricultural industry. A brief discussion of this identity 
underpins the identification of a particular kind of labour control system existing on capitalist 
farms.  
 
The commercial farm regularly exists and operates as a site of economic production (i.e. 
work) and social reproduction (i.e. residence) and this spatially integrated work-residence 
nexus allows for forms of labour control which extend beyond work and the labour process. 
To work on a farm is not merely to be subject to an employment or labour relationship, as it 
also entails living on the farm and, for the farmer, entails obligations vis-à-vis the sphere of 
social reproduction of farm workers and importantly their families. In this context, at least in 
terms of farmer-driven discourses about the commercial farm, the farm is said to constitute a 
family or community and takes on this identity based on relationships of loyalty between 
farmer and workers (Farm Systems Management Series 1997). In employing a worker, the 
farmer is effectively (at least implicitly) employing the worker’s family or at least can call on 
family members to work on a temporary basis when necessary. Additionally, the farmer is 
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expected to provide for the basic social reproduction needs of the worker and family, for 
instance housing. Because of this setting, it becomes difficult for farm workers to make 
spatial demarcations between work and home as work-related issues (as indicated earlier) 
also relate to the site of social reproduction.   
 
The portrayal though of the farm as a community involves a recognition only of the common 
interest and mutual dependence of owner and worker, and denies the reality of the 
antagonism and conflict between farmer and worker. In the end, particularly given the 
increasingly industrialized character of commercial farming, the primary goal (and abiding 
identity) – as indicated – of commercial farming is productivity and profit even if this means 
undermining the well-being of farm workers and their families. In fact, as shown above, 
commercial farms are notorious globally and historically for their low-wage regime and harsh 
working conditions and for workers and their families living on the very edge of any 
respectable and decent conditions of social reproduction (GRACE Communications 
Foundation 2013). Nevertheless, as I discuss below, the double identity of the commercial 
farm, as a loving family and brute profit-centre, leads to a distinctive type of labour control.  
 
This is linked to the fact that commercial farms exist under private freehold title or tenure and 
are dispersed throughout large swathes of the countryside. The state tends to disclaim 
responsibility for these privatized rural spaces in terms of the provision of basic services and 
facilities, and traditionally farmers themselves have been held responsible for such provision. 
As a result, not only are commercial farms privately-owned spaces but they are also privately 
managed and regulated with minimal state intervention (as if farmers are substitutes for local 
state structures). As sites of economic production and social reproduction, the existence of 
this privatized (and ultimately personalized) space has facilitated the emergence of distinctive 
labour control regimes which speak to the double identity of ‘family’ and ‘profit’. The 
privatised character of authority in commercial agrarian spaces has been labelled as 
“domestic government” by Rutherford (2001) in his examination of commercial farms in 
Zimbabwe in the 1990s. He argues: “The government is ‘domestic’ in two senses: by 
officially promoting ‘the private’ over public domain – the rule of the farmer over that of 
state officials – and by administratively valuing paternalistic relations between … farmers 
and ‘their’ workers” (Rutherford 2001:14). The paternalism which Rutherford speaks to 
relates to the identity of the farm as a family, with farm workers seemingly belonging to the 
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farmer or farm. Of course, at the same time (as Rutherford recognises), the capitalist farm 
exists for profit-maximisation.  
 
Farm relations between the owner or manager and the worker are described as ‘paternalistic’ 
or benevolent (Parry et al. 2005, Riley 2012) in the sense that the farmer takes on the role of a 
parent and the workers as children. As a parent, the farmer adopts a caring attitude toward the 
workers and the workers reciprocate in kind. This is expressed in a range of farm-based 
practices which go beyond the typical employment contract found elsewhere. For instance, 
the farmer may arrange for a worker’s pregnant wife to be taken to the nearest hospital late at 
night, and workers on their day off may fight fires which threaten the farmer’s homestead. 
This farmer-worker relationship also entails discipline when necessary (particularly to ensure 
profit-maximisation) and, hence, linked to paternalism is a despotic form of control 
(combining to form a despotic paternalism). This despotism borders on an autocratic style of 
management by the farmer owner and manager.  
 
This despotic paternalism is made possible by the fact that capitalist farms are privatised 
agrarian spaces often unregulated (or inadequately regulated) by the state. The farms so to 
speak are private fiefdoms ruled as domestic spaces under the authority of the farm owner. 
Paternalism and despotism combine in shifting and uneven ways such that a range of hybrid 
forms of paternalistic despotism exist in practice. Certainly, organisations which monitor 
human rights abuses on capitalist farms tend to highlight the massive power differential 
which exists between owner and labourers and argue that brute discipline rules on 
commercial farms (Oxfam 2004, Coalition of Immokalee Farmworkers 2012). And direct 
farm owner control over both economic production and social reproduction may lead to a 
totalising form of domination bordering on unilateralism and coercion, along with a 
complacent and subservient workforce.  
 
This is often manifested in the practices of farm owners in relation to farm worker 
mobilisation (Griffin, Kahn and Ickowitz 2002). Major difficulties arise in organising farm 
workers and for a variety of reasons, including the dispersal of work sites over vast agrarian 
terrains and the increasing prominence of (highly mobile) seasonal and casual labourers on 
farms (who are notoriously more difficult to organise than permanent workers). There are 
however examples of farm worker movements if not always in the form of a traditional trade 
union, such as the Coalition of Immokalee Farmworkers and its Anti-Slavery Campaign 
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(Coalition of Immokalee Farmworkers 2012). This membership-led farm worker organisation 
attempts to establish a sector-wide code of conduct in order to improve wages and working 
conditions for farm workers. But farm owners and managers are often hostile to such 
organisations, sometimes banning the presence of unions organising on their farms and any 
farm-based collective bargaining as this is seen as interfering with their privatised space; in 
so doing, they often claim that worker organisation is unnecessary as – in paternalistic 
language – the farmer looks after the labourers.  
 
Domestic government or paternalistic despotism, but of a distinctively racialised kind, existed 
historically on South African commercial farms as the crucial labour control regime. This 
regime, as indicated, is privatised and also highly personalised given the character of the 
socio-space constituting commercial or capitalist farms. Management under domestic 
government involves simple hierarchies rather than complex management structures, and 
managerial decisions are often arbitrary rather than systematically ingrained in a more 
structured form of control system. For this thesis, the key question which arises is whether, 
under post-apartheid conditions, there has been a shift in the labour control regime on 
commercial farms in South Africa (to a more structured and impersonal regime) and, if so, it 
would be necessary to identify the underpinnings which mediate any such shift.  
 
2.4 CONCLUSION 
This chapter has focused on the capitalist labour process and, in particular, the capitalist 
agricultural labour process. The understanding of specific labour processes, and changes to 
these processes, cannot be derived from a generic analysis of the capitalist labour process 
(Davis and Marquis 2005). A more general examination, as outlined in this chapter, does 
provide an understanding of general trends in capitalist labour processes but the agricultural 
labour process has its own historical specificities and contemporary conditions of existence. 
In discussing the labour process under capitalism I raised a number of sub-themes (such as 
remuneration and resistance) which were also addressed in the particular discussion of the 
agricultural labour process. But the main focus of the chapter, as with the thesis as whole, 
was the labour control regime and its significance to the labour process. Labour control 
regimes come in different shapes and sizes and they are subject to change over time. In 
focusing on the agricultural labour process I identified a particular kind of labour regime 
regularly found within capitalist agriculture, which I referred to alternatively as domestic 
government and paternalistic despotism. In the following chapter, I examine commercial 
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agriculture in South Africa in which domestic government has prevailed in the past. And I 
examine, based on the prevailing literature, if any shift away from this form of labour regime 
is taking place in South Africa. This is elaborated more following in chapters four and five, 
which focus on my farm case-studies. 
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CHAPTER THREE:  
COMMERCIAL AGRICULTURE IN SOUTH AFRICA 
 
 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter examines South African commercial agriculture with a particular emphasis on 
the agricultural labour process. As such, questions around control of labour in agriculture 
come to the fore particularly in the face of broader changes to the South African economy 
since the end of apartheid. Under apartheid (and even before the beginning of apartheid in 
1948), the racially-based state actively intervened in supporting (almost exclusively white) 
commercial farmers, including a range of legislation, policies and institutional arrangements 
strategically used to protect and further the interests of white farmers. This included policies 
which restricted the movement of blacks to urban areas (therefore ensuring a supply of cheap 
black labour for commercial farms) and agricultural commodity markets and market prices 
which ensured commercial viability and profitability. This is the agricultural past inherited by 
the new government in 1994 and (in many ways) the post-apartheid state has simply 
continued to serve white commercial farmers such that they continue to dominate the South 
African countryside.   
 
This chapter analyses the economic and political conditions under which commercial 
agriculture has been shaped and reproduced in South Africa up until the current setup, with 
labour themes prevailing in the discussion. Section two provides an historical overview of 
white commercial agriculture in South Africa, and details the kind of labour control regime 
which historically existed on commercial farms. The following section examines post-
apartheid commercial farming, looking at de-regulation of a neo-liberal kind with reference 
to commodity markets but also at state regulation of labour. Section four looks at commercial 
farms as a site of economic production and, on this basis, the following section raises 
important questions about possible labour control restructuring on farms under post-apartheid 
conditions. The last section (section six), before the conclusion, discusses commercial farms 
as sites of social reproduction. 
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3.2 THE PAST: SEGREGATION AND APARTHEID 
Agriculture, though geared to the production of food, also shapes social relations and 
landscapes in important ways (Greenberg 2010), including labour relations in the 
countryside. Due to a variety of environmental, historical and economic conditions (including 
water scarcities), the South African agrarian landscape falls short of ideal ground for broad-
based agriculture (Keegan 1988, Marcus 1989). For white agriculture in particular to bear 
fruit, economic accumulation necessitated the “dispossession of the African population and 
their social, economic and political marginalization” (Greenberg 2010: vii). In this regard, 
during the early years of the segregation period (from 1910 to 1948), the South African 
government used legislation such as the notorious 1913 Natives Land Act to force black 
people into designated regions of the country (called ‘reserves’ initially), essentially 
dispossessing ‘the native’ and transferring most of the land into the hands of the country’s 
white minority. The migrant labour and pass law systems, which emerged and became 
consolidated over a number of decades, served to inhibit movement out of the reserves into 
white urban spaces and contributed to the growth of a black rural proletariat on white 
commercial farms. In the context, the agricultural sector in South Africa began to exhibit 
extreme dualism and inequality, with the concept of ‘two agricultures’ sometimes used to 
depict this: white commercial farmers – a modern market-oriented commercial farming sector 
using hired farm workers; and small-scale black farmers in the homelands pursuing 
subsistence farming (but often without much success). 
  
The history of the white agricultural sector in South Africa displays all the standard 
characteristics of ‘accumulation by dispossession’. As Ndlela (2004: 3) so aptly puts it, “the 
process of dispossession and impoverishment was systemically structured and driven by the 
state to ensure dominance by its racial and economic partner, i.e. commercial farming”. This 
history (from 1910 to 1994) is rooted in two main relations. First of all, there has been a 
mutually-beneficial relationship between white farmers and the state. The state obtained 
electoral support from white farmers and, in return, white farmers acquired land and labour 
and the necessary legislation to maintain control over land and labour. Simultaneously, and 
this is the second relationship, there has been almost absolute dependency and subordination 
of the farm worker vis-à-vis the farmer. This relationship has been embedded in a system of 
oppressing and over-exploiting the black labourer as a citizen in his country and as a worker 
on his land. This is a relationship involving ‘racial paternalism’ whereby “[w]hite farmers 
demanded respectful and uncomplaining service from their workers, while workers expected 
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farm owners to provide support and protection of various kinds” (Schirmer 2004: 7). I 
examine these two relationships in turn. 
 
The foundation of the commercial agriculture industry in South Africa is attributed to 
ongoing, forceful and intensive state intervention which reached its peak around 1980 with a 
host of laws, ordinances, statutes and legislation. Besides a guaranteed pool of cheap labour, 
this intervention included heavy subsidization in terms of for instance guaranteed producer 
prices and easy access to significant levels of credit (Marcus 1989, Vink and Kirsten 2000). 
The Land Bank and the Agricultural Credit Board (as parastatals) allowed for loans (and 
thereby capital financing) by which “government sustained its commitment to keeping 
inefficient, uncompetitive farmers on the land” (Schirmer 2004: 6); these loans were at 
interest rates significantly lower than market rates. The state also protected white farmers 
from competitive pressures in product markets (including, in the early years, competitive 
pressures from well-off black peasant farmers). Product sales and prices were state regulated 
through twenty-two commodity-based marketing control boards (for example, for maize) in a 
‘single channel’, fixed-priced monopsony serving in fact to redistribute resources from other 
sectors of the economy to the commercial farming sector (Hall 2009). Hence, viable 
agricultural profit margins were guaranteed through state marketing boards which set annual 
commodity prices and protected farmers from the vagaries of the national and global markets 
(Vink 2004).  
 
State intervention affected all aspects of agriculture including “prices of, access to and use of 
natural resources, finance, capital, labour, local markets, foreign markets and foreign 
exchange, etc” (Vink and Kirsten 2000: 2).  And it was this “elaborate structure of support” 
(Hall 2009: 122) that not only sustained the industry, but was the nucleus for economic 
advantage and profit within the sector. This argument is reiterated by Vink and Kirsten 
(2000) when they argue that, in spite of the deficient environmental character of the country 
for agriculture (such as drought-prone conditions and volatile and erratic rainfalls), South 
African commercial agriculture effectively defied nature and succeeded in producing 
surpluses of all the important staple food commodities over extended periods. 
 
The success of the “commercial farming fraternity” (Vink and Kirsten 2000: 4) and indeed its 
very existence was a product of state support, infrastructure and services. The development 
and consolidation of white agriculture came at a severe cost though for the dispossessed black 
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majority, for both those confined to the reserves (or homelands) where food production 
plummeted and for the super-exploited agricultural workers on white farms. Under 
segregation and later apartheid, the labour composition on farms became deeply stratified 
along racial and gender lines from white male managers to part-time or seasonal black female 
workers. Besides a strictly-defined rural proletariat on white farms, a labour tenant system 
also existed in certain regions of the country as a supposed basis for ensuring mutual benefits 
for farmers and labourers: “Africans were prepared to supply labour in return for land, and 
farmers were willing to accept this” (Schirmer 2004: 8). This system slowly but surely was 
undermined or done way, though unevenly.   
 
Understanding the farmer-worker relationship on white commercial farms in South Africa 
necessitates recognizing the spatial integration of economic production and social 
reproduction on white farms. More specifically, the farm is both a place of employment and 
residence for farm workers and their families. Therefore the labour process on commercial 
farms has always been particularly complex (involving economic, political and social 
arrangements), with obligations ingrained in the labour process normally exceeding the 
standard labour-wage nexus (Schirmer 2004). In most cases, for the farm worker, to lose a 
job is to lose a home as farmers control almost every aspect of farm life “from movement on 
the farm to the labour power of male workers’ wives and children” (Du Toit 1993:316, see 
also Wisborg, Hall, Shirinda and Zamchiya 2013). This arrangement implies that commercial 
farms entail the convergence of questions around labour and land (including tenure rights on 
farms and access to housing). It also provides the foundation for the kind of labour controls 
which have historically existed on white farms; indeed it rationalized the system of control 
involving a kind of privatized despotic paternalism.  
 
The history of labour relations and the character of the labour process on white farms have 
been described by Kritzinger and Vorster (1996) as ‘traditional paternalism’ and, similarly, as 
‘racial paternalism’ (Schirmer 2004) which depicts agricultural workers almost as children 
who are dependent on the farmer as the father figure. This relationship, like a parent-child 
relationship, is governed by a caring ethos but, additionally, by outright discipline 
(despotism) or “unchallengeable authority” (Du Toit 1993:315) on the part of the farmer vis-
à-vis labourers.  Workers are treated as belonging to the farm or even to the farmer, and this 
‘belonging’ is not pure discourse or ideology serving simply to legitimize or mask super-
exploitation and despotism, as it has a real foundation in the material practices of the labour 
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process. In the end, of course, the micro-politics of the farm has been marked by vast power 
differentials (despotism) which ultimately benefits the white land-owner. Nevertheless, there 
is a paternalistic dimension to the farmer-worker relationship with the farm ‘as a family’ and 
with farmers assisting workers in a manner which goes far beyond what owners/managers 
undertake in situations where the site of reproduction is spatially removed from the site of 
production.  
 
Prior to 1994, the agricultural industry fell outside the nation-wide labour legislation and 
hence state regulation of labour regulation was almost non-existent. This meant that white 
farms, as owned under freehold title, were largely privatized spheres of governance – or what 
Rutherford (2001) calls ‘domestic government’. Labour control was left to the whims and 
wishes of owners/managers without any formalities guiding or structuring farmer-labourer 
relations. From the instigation of the (typically verbal) employment contract, decision-
making on farms unilaterally involved the farmer. Klerck and Naidoo (2007: 113, see also 
Klerck 2010) argue that there was a “unilateral managerial style” with no opportunities to 
bargain collectively (or often even individually) in the absence of trade unions. Payment of 
workers was regularly made in-kind (rather than by cash), with the level of labourer earnings 
solely determined by the farmer (irrespective of the grueling nature of agricultural work and 
frequent overtime, especially during the harvesting season). This has prompted historians 
such as Scully (1986) and Ross (1990) (in Du Toit 1993) to point out parallels between the 
conditions of work and life of farm workers and dwellers and those of slave estates.  
 
The world of the farm bound workers and farmers together in a complex and intimate 
relationship, but one heavily weighted in favour of farmers. Clearly, there were massive 
advantages to farmers in maximizing access to and control over full-time labourers (and the 
seasonal work of workers’ families) given their on-site accommodation. The possible benefits 
for workers, however, have been largely ignored. But, for workers and their families, 
dependency, subservience and vulnerability sometimes seemed a small price to pay for 
farmers’ familial obligations that are attached to this relationship, referred to by Solomon and 
Devereaux (2011: 7) as an informal “micro-welfare system”. The ‘micro-welfare system’ was 
a complex and unwritten relationship which amounted to an informal social protection system 
where the farmer substitutes for the state in providing for the basic needs of farm workers and 
dwellers (Solomon and Devereaux 2011). However, as pointed out by Du Toit (1993), the 
farmer’s obligations to his workers became institutionalized in the form of a ‘gift 
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relationship’ and were not formalized or enforced in a contract and, therefore, simply resulted 
from his generosity and goodness (which would also be contingent on various factors). The 
responsibility felt by the farmer towards his workers was therefore embedded in mutual 
obligations of responsibility and respect that embody the paternal relations on farms.  
 
The ‘dop system’ is an illustration of a personalised form of labour control of farms, by 
which farmers went so far as avoiding the payment of wages, or at least paying wages at a 
bare minimum. This system institutionalized the payment of farm workers, especially those 
working on wine farms, with alcohol. In this way, alcohol became a tool of social control on 
farms and played a key role in the recruitment, retention and reproduction of agricultural 
labour (London 1999). Dependence on alcohol necessitated dependence on employment and, 
by extension, the employer. Additionally, farmers gave extended credit to farm labourers for 
basic commodities at the farm store (owned by the farmer), such that labourers were coerced 
into maintaining their farm employment because of the ongoing farm store debt.  
 
Whether this type of labour control continues to exist on white commercial farms in South 
contemporary Africa is explored below (in this chapter) but also forms the crux of the 
following two chapters (chapters four and five).  
 
3.3 POST-APARTHEID SOUTH AFRICA 
To frame this discussion of white commercial farming in post-apartheid South Africa, I 
provide the following key statement: “From being one of the most highly protected and 
regulated sectors in the South African economy, agriculture has experienced almost total 
liberation and state deregulation in the post-apartheid period” (Mather and Greenberg 2003: 
264). In many ways, this is an uncontroversial claim about the influences on commercial 
agriculture which continue to this day. At the same time, though, as will be shown, there has 
in fact been a regulation drive by the state with regard to labour on commercial farms. 
 
Nevertheless, there is no doubt that South African agriculture has been marked by de-
regulation as propelled by neoliberal market forces. This de-regulation entails a shift from 
state regulation to a more society-based regulation hence it is more appropriate to speak about 
re-regulation; and the state itself played a key role in facilitating this shift. Additionally, neo-
liberal restructuring began before the end of apartheid and indeed dates back to the early 
1980s. Certainly, under the post-apartheid state, the pace of this restructuring has quickened, 
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as the state has taken on – broadly speaking – a less interventionist role with regard to 
commercial agriculture (AgriSETA 2010). I say broadly speaking because, with respect to 
labour on commercial farms, the shift has been in the opposite direction – from a de-
centralised society (or farm-based) regulation to more centralised state regulation. Hence, the 
restructuring has involved tension and competing tendencies, and it has impacted on the two 
relationships spoken about earlier, between state and farmer and farmer and worker.  
 
Since democratisation (in 1994), there has been an attempt to formalize agricultural labour 
relations by incorporating the agricultural sector into labour legislation as well as offering 
state-sanctioned social protection for farm workers and dwellers. But ‘de-regulation’ on other 
fronts has proceeded apace. Commodity marketing boards for example have been done away 
with, commodity pricing is now subject to market forces (and no longer unilaterally 
influenced and set by the state) and farmers increasingly borrow money from commercial 
banks at un-subsided market-driven interest rates (Mather and Greenberg 2003). In spite of 
these changes, agriculture has not been high in the list of priorities for the post-apartheid 
government (Greenberg 2010). Continued marginalization of the sector, in relation to other 
sectors, is evident for example in state expenditure on the sector, with budget allocations for 
agriculture lower than they were in the late 1980s (AgriSETA 2010). But, as indicated, 
important changes have taken place, as well as noticeable continuities. 
 
3.3.1 Neo-liberal Changes in Commercial Agriculture 
In preparation for the inevitable post-apartheid dispensation, ‘organized agriculture’ (i.e. 
commercial agriculture) in South Africa began to reposition itself (Bernstein 2013) in the 
years leading to the transformation of South Africa’s political system. It strategically made 
changes intended to safe-guarded the interests of capitalist farming (Ewert and Hamman 
1999, Hall 2009, Bernstein 2013). These changes were driven by more corporatist farming 
enterprises (sometimes integrated into other key sectors of the economy) such that the 
ensuing ‘de-regulation’ (guided by the apartheid state) was to have differential impacts within 
commercial agriculture (with some winners and some losers). The neo-liberal changes 
included the removal of the following: state subsidies, subsidized credit and bail-out 
programmes, state marketing boards, trade protection and other forms of engineered support 
including water provision and access (Hall 2009). Effectively, it led to greater global 
integration of South African agriculture into the global food commodity regime dominated by 
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multi-nationals. Of significance also are the growing agro-processing industries which are 
often driven by retail corporations.  
 
The process of de-regulation and the abolition of the state’s institutional apparatus for 
supporting white farmers did not entail the undermining of the agricultural sector as such but 
sought to place it on firmer ground in the context of global competition. For example, “the 
conversion of the biggest agricultural co-operatives into companies listed on the 
Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) … [enabled]… them to reinvent themselves as private 
agribusiness corporations” (Bernstein 2013: 24). Though the traditional support structures 
were dismantled with the demise of apartheid, the new arrangements were put in place to 
inhibit market distortions through excessive state intervention. In other words, restructuring 
sought to prevent undesirable state interventions or to enable selective interventions under 
specific conditions (Vink and Kirsten 2000). This entailed, as indicated, opening up South 
African agriculture to the global economy of agriculture along neo-liberal ones, on both the 
input (such as seeds and fertilizer) and output (agricultural products) sides. This means that 
commercial farm revenues are now strongly influenced by global conditions (including price 
fluctuations) and exchange rates (O’Laughlin et al. 2013).  
 
This restructuring has had differential impacts between agricultural sub-sectors and within 
sub-sectors. In relation to a particular sub-sector, some farm operations have been able to 
respond favourably to the new arrangements while others have not. In the case of the citrus 
industry, for example, larger operations have remained competitive despite the more porous 
trading of agricultural commodities across borders and they have done so often with 
significant foreign investment. In this respect, Vink and Kirsten (2000) speak about 
favourable conditions for foreign investment in the deciduous food industry as a result of 
deregulation and the liberalisation of agricultural trade. Other citrus farmers have had to 
diversify into other agricultural sub-sectors or convert their production entirely, while some 
have gone bankrupt. In addition, the agricultural sector is extremely diverse, comprising 
several main branches, namely field crop husbandry, horticulture, animal production, dairy 
farming, fish farming, game farming and agro-processing (AgriSETA 2010). Post-apartheid 
changes in commercial farming often have sub-sectoral specificities based on the form and 
extent of integration into the global economy of agriculture, with some sub-sectors for 
instance more heavily dependent on imported inputs such as fertilisers and herbicides. The 
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same is true with respect to labour specifically, with some sub-sectors (such as dairy farming) 
more prone to mechanisation and other labour-saving devices.  
 
Table 3.1: Gross Farming Income, Expenditure and Debt for Selected Items for 1993,
        2002, 2007, 2010 and 2011 
 
Item Year 
2011 2010 2007 2002 1993 
Farming 
units 
(numbers) 
 - - 39 982 45 818 57 980 
Gross 
Farming 
Income 
(GFI) 
131 540 723 122 550 225 79 543 813 53 329 052 19 620 180 
Field Crops 25 544 470 25 505 562 16 002 038 16 476 933 4 771 471 
Horticultural 
Products 
32 345 669 29 552 231 19 014 544 14 228 909 4 493 681 
Animals and 
Animal 
Products 
71 830 353 64 609 979 43 738 602 21 222 618 9 314 413 
Other 
Farming 
Income 
1 820 231 1 882 453 788 627 1 400 592 1 040 616 
Expenditure 147 729 151 132 166 922 54 072 587 45 038 908 16 377 145 
Farming 
Debt 
80 513 050 65 471 423 37 090 712 30 857 891 15 95 001 
Source: Statistics South Africa – Agricultural Survey (1993, 2002, 2007, 2010, 2011) 
 
Based on surveys conducted by Agriculture Statistics South Africa between 1993 and 2002, 
Hall (2009) summarises branch trends for field crops, horticulture and livestock. In these 
years, the field crop branch experienced a real gross farm income increase of 66% with 
considerable increases in areas planted and output for some crops (including sugarcane, 
sunflower and soya) and declines in others (notably maize and wheat). In horticulture (such 
as apples, apricots, grapes, pears, plums, figs and strawberries) farm income increased by 
53% with significant levels of exports. As well, there was a growing domestic demand for 
certain vegetables. Farm income in the livestock branch rose only by 10% in the context of 
significant imports of beef. And consumption of pork and chicken grew by 71%, rapidly 
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making South Africa a net importer of these products (Hall 2009). Such trends indicate the 
variation in effects of neo-liberal restructuring on different branches but, at the same time, 
they also mask the internal reconfiguration of sub-sectors.  
 
In this regard, since the analysis presented by Hall (2009), a comparison of the years 1993, 
2002, 2007, 2010 and 2011 (StatsSA 2007, 2011) illustrate a sectoral decrease in the sheer 
number of farming units, but an increase in gross income (see Table 3.1). A variety of 
reasons could be used for explaining the reduction in farming units, such as the purchasing of 
farms by the state for land redistribution, but a critical reason is the increasing corporatisation 
of South Africa agriculture (implying centralisation of farm ownership) and land 
concentration (which is particularly evident with the emergence and consolidation of game 
farms and reserves). Further increases in mechanisation coupled with the introduction of new 
technologies and farming practices (i.e. automated irrigation, mechanical harvesters, 
trellising) (Ewert and Hamman 1999) – again sub-sector specific – in part explain increases 
in levels of production. The latest analysed year (2011) generally shows a growth in gross 
farming income of 7.3% in commercial agriculture, but with a decline in field crops and 
animal products of 3.6% and 0.2% respectively (StatsSA 2011).  
 
3.3.2 An Endeavour to Formalise Farm Labour Relations 
Studying specifically South African wine farms in post-apartheid South Africa, Ewert and 
Hamman (1999) argue that deregulation and increasing access to export markets have created 
a profoundly new (and beneficial) environment for major players in the wine industry. For 
the 1990s, they note a massive expansion in plantings of grapes, and in domestic sales and 
exports of wines between 1992 and 1996 (Ewert and Hamman 1999). Despite this success, 
though, they go on to argue that workers’ wages and living conditions on wine farms have 
improved very little, if at all, prompting the authors to remark that farm labourers are “not 
sharing in the fruits of globalisation” (Ewert and Hamman 1999: 207). This sub-section 
focuses on labour restructuring on commercial farms in post-apartheid South Africa.  
 
Commercial agriculture in South Africa (still largely dominated by whites) is an important 
employer of labour (Newman 1997) and the sector largely remains labour-intensive – it 
employs eight to nine per cent of the national labour force (O’Laughlin et al. 2013). 
Agricultural records on employment show that the Western Cape is the biggest employer of 
labour on commercial farms (in 2007), but with the majority of employees being casual or 
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seasonal labourers (AGRISETA 2010); the Eastern Cape employs the least number of 
commercial farm employees. There has however been an overall decline in employment since 
1994 and a noticeable move towards more capital-intensive methods of production in some 
sub-sectors (Ewert and Hamman 1999, Hall 2009, Greenberg 2010). The increase in gross 
farming income and overall expenditure (see Table 3.1) and in salaries and wages (see Table 
3.2) is overshadowed by a 5.1% decrease in employment between for instance 2010 and 
2011, with full-time and casual/seasonal employment being reduced by 6% and 4.2% 
respectively. But Table 3.2 also shows, over the 2007 to 2011 period, that insofar as there are 
any increases in the size of the agricultural labour force in South Africa, this is taking place in 
non-standard forms of employment, namely, casual and seasonable labourers (Hall 2009, 
Greenberg 2010).  
 
Table 3.2: Number of Paid Employees, Salaries and Wages 
Year Item 
Full-time Employees Casual and Seasonal Employees 
Number Salaries and Wages 
(Rands) 
Number Salaries and Wages 
(Rands) 
2011 430 848 15 577 443 391 119 
 
2 368 807 
2010 458 380 12 597 744 408 075 2 622 440 
2007 431 664 7 173 389 365 142 1 437 843 
Source: Statistics South Africa – Agricultural Survey (1993, 2002, 2007, 2010, 2011) 
The agricultural sector in South Africa has always been marked by a significant degree of 
casual and seasonal labour, given the very character of commercial agriculture and the annual 
agricultural cycles. But, under conditions of neo-liberalism, there is no doubt that a more 
flexible labour force is being introduced, with even the traditional core permanent 
agricultural labour force being converted to non-standard employment, in many instances as a 
means of cutting labour costs. In other words, casualisation of the agricultural labour force is 
taking place. In addition, externalisation (or the outsourcing of agricultural labour through 
labour brokers) is increasingly prevalent. This externalisation (also called labour contracting) 
refers to the buying and selling of labour power (or capacity) by a third party (broker) who is 
then responsible for bringing workers onto the farm (Ewert and Hamman 1999, du Toit and 
Ally 2003). The employment relationship is not directly between the farmer and the hired 
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labourer; the farmer has a business contract with the labour broker, and the latter effectively 
employs the labourers.  
 
This on-the-farm restructuring of the labour force is taking place simultaneously with 
attempts by the post-apartheid state to protect farm labourers through labour legislation, 
including the Labour Relations Act of 1995 and the Basic Conditions of Employment of 
1996, which both incorporated farm labour into national labour legislation. In this light, the 
post-apartheid state introduced the ‘Sectoral Determination: Farming Sector’ in 2003. Such 
determinations are enacted in economic sectors where no collective bargaining between 
employers and unions exist. By implication, this means that – because of union inactivity in 
the agricultural sector (except in agro-processing and large estates) – farm workers did not 
provide significant input into the new labour regime (Weideman 2004). Nevertheless, this 
particular determination applies to the employment of farm workers in a vast array of 
agricultural activities – that is primary and secondary agriculture, mixed farming, 
horticulture, aqua farming, animal husbandry and field crops (but excludes labourers in the 
forest industry) (Government Gazette 2006). It also defines a farm worker to include 
domestic workers and security guards employed on a farm. The determination, in conjunction 
with the two pieces of legislation, sets the Minimum Wage rate and generally seeks to 
formalize the employment relationship on the farm. It would seem to follow that farmers 
would have to significantly adjust their labour practices in terms of the way in which labour 
is recruited, paid, organized and managed if they were not to act contrary to the legislation.  
 
It may be that on-the-farm neo-liberal restructuring entails an attempt by farmers to by-pass 
or escape the directives emanating from the new legislation. Certainly, there is significant 
tension between increasing state regulation of farm labour (which goes contrary to broad neo-
liberal trends) and farm-level neo-liberal restructuring. But the state’s determination to inhibit 
or counter this farm-level restructuring is clearly thwarted by its own neo-liberal leanings 
(Solomon and Devereaux 2011) and its desire to maintain a globally-competitive agricultural 
industry. This is witnessed for instance by its refusal to ban labour brokers despite repeated 
and vocal calls for this banning by the major trade federation in the country. Thus, while the 
post-apartheid state advocates and pursues protectionism for agricultural labourers, its 
commitment to this is left in doubt as it is caught between two apparently contradictory 
objectives.  
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Even without considering such tensions and contradictions, though, it is questionable to what 
extent the new legislation fundamentally shifts the labour process and labour relations on 
commercial farms. Fourteen years into the new labour regime, Ewert and Hamman 
(1999:202) state that labour relations in South Africa’s commercial agriculture sector can still 
be viewed “as one of ‘neo-paternalism’ – regulated to some extent by state legislation, but 
still imbued in the spirit of paternalism”. More recently, Greenberg (2010:viii) supports this 
thought, claiming that “the paternalist power structure on farms was partially replaced by a 
regulatory regime that established a formal labour relations framework, which sought to 
modernize labour relations on farms” (own emphasis). The existence of the new legislation 
however potentially has significant implications for commercial farms in terms of 
modernizing the labour process and undermining the paternalistic and despotic labour control 
regime of the past, which this thesis seeks to explore.  
 
Besides neo-liberal restructuring by both farmers and the state (as noted above), and though 
the new labour legislation itself seems progressive and protectionist, the actual 
implementation of the legislation – in terms of the sheer capacity of the state – also clearly 
impacts on the form and extent of on-the-ground labour restructuring. More specifically, 
enforcement of the legislation may be problematic because of deficient state resources. The 
state department responsible for enforcement is the Department of Labour (DoL), which has 
approximately 600 labour inspectors monitoring not only all farms in the country but also 
factories, retail outlets, mines and so forth (Solomon and Devereaux 2011: 22). Particularly 
given the significant dispersal of farms throughout the countryside, incapacity exists within 
the DoL with respect to conducting rigorous and consistent labour inspections in the 
agricultural sector. This absence of necessary labour inspector capacity means that the state 
fails ultimately to enforce regulatory protections for workers, thereby allowing for the 
prospect of ongoing labour conditions contrary to the legislation. This must also be 
understood in relation to the massive power differential which exists on commercial farms, 
with farm-level power being almost entirely within the hands of farm owners and managers 
(and in a traditionally despotic manner). In such a context, farm level negotiation and 
bargaining on the part of farm workers is a major challenge in the pursuance of labour 
legislation enforcement. Farm owners also have internalized over a number of decades a 
particular labour-regime mindset (based on despotism) which may make them disinclined or 
resistant to receiving a reformed labour regime in a favourable light.  
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3.4 COMMERCIAL FARMS AS A SITE OF ECONOMIC PRODUCTION 
As noted, commercial farms in South Africa are sites of both economic production and social 
reproduction. This section investigates commercial farms as a site of economic production, 
with a later section (Section 3.6) focusing on social reproduction on farms. In this section, 
and in drawing on the labour process themes discussed in chapter two, I examine the 
organisation of labour on South African commercial farms, including categories of 
employment, work tasks and skills, the gendered division of labour, and remuneration and 
wages. This contributes to a more focused examination of labour control on commercial 
farms (in Section 3.5). 
 
With a more market-oriented agricultural regime, in which farmers are no longer heavily 
supported and subsidized by the state, it follows that production methods would be subject to 
change. There are indeed increasing market pressures on farmers to intensify and increase 
production levels and to remain competitive locally and internationally. In increasing 
production and ensuring ongoing profits, the agricultural sector in South Africa has used 
standard practices found elsewhere (and as theorized about by Karl Marx – Marx 2000). 
These have included replacing labour with machinery where possible (i.e. mechanization and 
capital-intensification), intensifying workloads, and cutting labour costs by maintaining a 
smaller permanent labour force through casualisation of labour (van der Burg 2008). The use 
of increasing mechanisation by farmers involves a substitution of machines for labour while 
supposedly increasing levels of skills; but, in the end, the farmer is able to shed labour while 
increasing productivity.  
 
The question of categories of employment in South African agriculture is critically important. 
Labour market theory regularly speaks about labour market segmentation, notably a 
differentiation between a ‘core’ workforce employed on a full-time permanent basis and non-
standard employment including part-time, temporary, contractual and seasonal labour. 
Sometimes this entails a difference between categories of employment across sectors or work 
organisations but sometimes it relates to a distinction within a sector or organisation. Either 
way, the more privileged segment (the core workforce) normally has more secure 
employment, and higher levels of skills, remuneration and benefits, compared to the non-
standard employment segment. This distinction between labour segments is often overlain 
with distinctions along lines of social identity such as gender and ‘race’. The agricultural 
industry in South Africa has always been marked by significant labour market segmentation, 
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with a core workforce and a multiplicity of non-standard employment notably seasonal 
labourers (e.g. during harvest time) and daily casual labourers. Historically, as Naidoo (2011) 
notes, the bulk of permanent, full-time workers have been black African men, while black 
African women have tended to dominate atypical employment (seasonal, temporary and 
casual); though, in the Western Cape, coloured men and women have also been strongly 
represented in the agricultural labour force. Additionally, quite often, atypical employees 
have been wives (and children) of permanent workers. 
 
Originally the Basic Conditions of Employment Act made a distinction between permanent 
employees and casual and temporary employees as categories of workers, but this distinction 
was subsequently dropped. Currently, any employee who works more than 24 hours per 
month is automatically protected by minimum standards set out in the act (Fourie 2008). 
There is, however, a way of subverting this arrangement. For instance, workers without 
employment contracts (and therefore effectively not recognized officially as employed), or 
workers without any substantive written record tying them to a particular place of work, tend 
to slip through the legislative cracks. And even though the national legislation does not define 
and recognize atypical employment (that is employment that does not conform to the 
standard model of full-time, permanent employment with a single employer), the agricultural 
sector does so at least in practice. Farm owners may in fact fail to register a casual labourer 
even though the labourer works all year round and meets the minimum requirement of 24 
hours of work per month (Ewert and Hamman 1999: 205).  
 
There is a notable shift away from the standard employment relationship on farms in South 
Africa, which is reflective of broader changes in the South African political economy. A 
permanent core workforce still exists but non-standard employment is increasingly prevalent, 
as saving on labour costs is seen by farmers as the easiest and most viable way of limiting 
increases in expenditure. Wage employment on commercial farms therefore remains 
categorized in practice into permanent and casual/seasonal/temporary (i.e. contract-based) 
farm labour (Chambati and Magaramombe 2008), but the number of seasonal and casual 
employees is notoriously difficult to estimate numerically given the fluctuating number of 
workers in this category (AgriSETA 2010). In terms of South African agricultural 
terminology, seasonal workers on farms are normally employed for the duration of a 
particular phase of the agricultural season, often on renewable fixed-term contracts (as many 
of them return year after year), and causal workers are inclusive of all forms of non-standard 
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work (but excluding seasonable labour). Both casual and seasonal farm employees are 
regularly employed at piece-work rates such that they often do not fall under the ambit of the 
new labour legislation. There are also an increasing proportion of foreign nationals employed 
as atypical workers (such as in the Western Cape and near the Zimbabwean border). The 
major fault line amongst the labour force on farms pertaining to skills and remuneration tends 
to be based on the distinction between core and non-standard employees.   
 
The introduction of a national Minimum Wage for farm labourers in terms of the farm 
sectoral determination is seen as important in the shift away from core permanent workers, as 
well as in decreasing the sheer size of the farm labour force. Officially, payment of farm 
workers is regulated by the Minimum Wage as laid out in the determination. In addition, the 
Sectoral Determination regulates the agricultural sector by establishing employment 
regulations and specifying accountability mechanisms (Government Gazette 2006; see also 
Government Gazette 2009, 2012). Agricultural wages are set and revised under the Sectoral 
Determination, with recommendations emanating from the Employment Conditions 
Commission and legislated by the Minister of Labour. Farmers constantly claim that any 
further increase in the Minimum Wage will lead to significant farm bankruptcies, as 
articulated in the context of the farm worker strikes in the Western Cape at the end of 2012 
and the impending wage increase. This indeed may be the case for marginal farming 
operations, particularly as historically the agricultural sector has been dependent on a low-
wage labour regime. Shifting to non-standard employment is one way of countering or at 
least accommodating the Minimum Wage determinations.  
 
There has been, and remains, some controversy and disagreement surrounding the level of 
farm worker wages, as shown during the recent farm worker strikes in the Western Cape. As 
early as 2001, in a study conducted by the Department of Labour (DoL 2001), inconsistencies 
have been noted with regard to wage and remuneration levels as claimed by farm owners and 
farm workers. This was attributed to confusion between take-home wages, remuneration as a 
whole (or the gross wage before deductions) and payments-in-kind. Payments-in-kind are 
officially recognized as a portion of a farm worker’s remuneration but, according to the 
Sectoral Determination, any payments-in-kind to be received by the farm worker should be 
detailed by the farmer in writing before the worker begins working (Government Gazette 
2006). Payments-in-kind is a popular method of compensation for farmers, but it causes 
confusion as “employers and employees understand remuneration in different ways”. For 
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example, in the countrywide research conducted by the Department of Labour, some items 
mentioned by farmers as ‘benefits’ were cited by employees as ‘deductions’ (DoL 2001 
Chapter 6: 45). Farm workers felt that their take-home pay was being compromised by un-
clarity around payments-in-kind. 
 
With regard to work and wages, the gendered character of the agricultural workforce remains 
firmly in place. Overall, as in the past, the gendered division of labour on farms sees the 
allocation of heavy manual tasks to men while women are mainly used, for instance, for the 
picking, sorting and pruning of fruit on a seasonal basis. This gendered labour trend relates to 
the fact that agriculture (beyond being a site of production) is typically also the site of social 
reproduction, with women as the primary agents of social reproduction (O’Hara 1997) and 
hence more likely to be considered for seasonal-casual labour tasks. In addition, and because 
of this gendered division, women have borne the brunt of the repercussions of South Africa’s 
agricultural restructuring process as more burdens have been placed on their shoulders with 
the increasing shift to less secure casual and seasonal work (Greenberg 2004). This is 
sometimes articulated as due to the apparent gender-specific nature of non-standard 
employment tasks (van der Burg 2008, Greenberg 2010) and “blatant gender lines” 
(Kritzinger and Vorster 1996: 339) which characterize women and the female farm worker as 
particularly suitable to such tasks.  
 
In fact, the gendered division of labour overlaps (though not entirely) with the distinction 
between core and non-standard employees. Thus, the tasks typically performed by women are 
viewed as less skilled tasks, justifying (to the farmer) why women are paid less. In this 
regard, the Department of Labour argues that “an indirect cause of gender disparities in wage 
[and remuneration] levels is the nature of contractual relations between employers and 
employees” (DoL 2001 Chapter 6: 44), as women are regularly contracted as casual or 
seasonal labourers and hence do not receive the wages and benefits of the core group of 
labourers. According to the DoL (2001), women are paid less on average precisely because 
they are women and farmers value their labour at a lower level than men. 
 
The status of externalised labourers recruited through labour brokers (and employment 
agencies more broadly) is more complicated, because they are not employed as such by the 
farmer. Labour brokers (as third-parties in the employment relationship) recruit and hire 
particularly non-standard employees on behalf of farmers leading to a ‘triangular 
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employment relationship’ including broker, farmer and labourer. Controlling and managing 
these agricultural workers ultimately becomes the responsibility of the supplier of labour (i.e. 
labour brokers) as opposed to the farmer. Competition to maintain productivity, as well as the 
subverting of the new labour legislation, no doubt has prompted this farmer-driven strategy. 
And it has led to remuneration and benefits for labourers which fall below the minimum 
standards set by the agricultural sector determination. Van der Burg (2008: 6, 7) argues that 
the “the outsourcing of labour to labour brokers is not a phenomenon that will disappear in 
the near future. It has become a new way of doing business” and provides farmers with an 
opportunity to “engage in a different manner with farm workers”.  
 
Hence, while agriculture has been incorporated into national labour legislation in post-
apartheid South Africa, there have been concerted attempts by commercial farmers to 
undermine the applicability and effectiveness of this legislation by for instance labour 
shedding, the conversion of full-time agricultural labourers to casual labourers and the use of 
labour brokers. Insofar as the labour legislation involves restructuring the farmer-worker 
relationship by regulating, impersonalizing and formalizing it, these counter-tendencies may 
simultaneously inhibit the restructuring process. For example, non-standard labourers on 
farms are often managed in a more despotic and personalized manner than full-time workers, 
and labour broking may entail a new form of despotic power vis-à-vis commercial farms. 
Also, given state incapacity in ensuring farmer compliance to labour legislation, doubts may 
be raised about the existence of any significant change away from the despotic and 
paternalistic labour control on South African commercial farms.   
 
3.5 LABOUR CONTROL 
Central to the labour process is labour control (Sachikonye 1987), with the labour process 
under capitalism being characterised by the rise of the managerial function (and the structure 
of management) and management as the embodiment of conceptualisation. Management 
conceptualises and controls; and workers execute pre-assigned tasks as the dominated 
‘partner’ in the labour process. Thus the rise and consolidation of the capitalist labour process 
has involved the formal and real subordination of labour, without workers having any 
meaningful input into key decisions about work organisation and work tasks. The labour 
process is effectively geared towards profit and accumulation. But the labour process takes on 
different and specific forms including across time and space, and also often in relation to the 
economic sector as well categories and identities of workers (for instance, standard versus 
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non-standard employment, or male versus female). The labour process in agriculture in South 
Africa has developed historically in a particular way with specific qualities and features. It is 
regularly argued that the agricultural labour process on commercial farms is un-modern and 
has ‘not kept up with the times’, such that the argument that a master-servant relationship still 
exists on these farms is often made. As noted, the new labour regulatory regime is an attempt 
to formalize and modernize labour relations in the industry (Greenberg 2004). This relates to 
questions pertaining to the labour market and labour market transactions. 
 
The ‘standard’ employment relationship is a legal concept which underpins the operation 
historically of the labour market in countries worldwide. South African labour policies have 
been continuously criticized for having a ‘legislative gap’ by not clearly defining ‘an 
employee’ and thereby resulting in a legal problem of who constitutes an employee and who 
constitutes an independent contractor (van der Burg 2008), with an ‘employee’ recruited 
through a labour broker seemingly falling under the latter category. By extension, this has 
implications for remuneration and benefits, depending on whether a farm labourer is defined 
legally as an employee. A standard employment relationship typically entails full-time and 
permanent employment in a designated workplace with a written employment contract in 
place (van der Burg 2008). Anything short of this, involving externalization, casualisation 
and informalisation, falls outside this definition and would be labeled as ‘atypical’ (non-
standard) employment.  
 
The employment relationship on commercial farms in South Africa, prior to the end of 
apartheid, regularly never met the basic criteria of typical or standard employment, even in 
the case of full-time permanent workers insofar as they effectively fell outside the labour 
legislation existing under apartheid and often did not have proper legally-binding contracts. 
The employment contract for casual and seasonable labourers met none of the criteria for 
standard employment. In the end, the farm was organized and controlled as a local fiefdom, 
with the farm owner visualizing his farm (held under freehold title) as privatized space and 
acting as if he personally ‘owned’ the farm workers and not just the farm property. The post-
apartheid labour legislation seeks to bring an end to these private fiefdoms by formalizing 
labour relations on farm and reconstituting labourers as employees – as subjects – with a set 
of rights as workers.  
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In doing so, the agricultural industry was integrated into pre-existing labour relations 
legislation which did not tailor its objectives to address the historical realities of agricultural 
labour. For instance, it did not take into consideration the following: a) the agricultural sector 
is characterized by a significant amount of casualised employment; b) even in the case of 
full-time, permanent employees, agricultural work is not necessarily continuous and ongoing 
(as even it is subject to seasonal conditions); and c) employment contracts are regularly 
verbal and un-standardized. The legislation potentially was able to address these problems 
but, in not being tailored to the specificities of the agricultural labour force, it facilitated a 
process whereby commercial farmers sought to subvert the formalization of labour relations. 
This was particularly possible for farmers because of the pronounced power differential 
existing between farmer and worker, with farm workers remaining unorganized.  
 
The incorporation of the agricultural sector into existing labour legislation may have been a 
necessary condition for altering labour relations on farms and challenging the despotic labour 
control mechanisms existing. Certainly, though, modified and tailored legislation specific to 
commercial agriculture would have been more appropriate and effective (Lahiff and Cousins 
2005). For farm workers, labour legislation should have a direct and almost immediate 
impact on their wages and working conditions, as well as their capacity to enforce the 
legislation. This though is the case only if the process of policy and legislative 
implementation is understood as unmediated. But it is not. Besides the on-the-farm power 
differentials which invariably moderate the process of implementation (as the legislation is 
contingent on compliance by the farmer), the effects of the legislation is dependent on 
enforcement by the state.  
 
In this vein, Naidoo (2011:6) recently argued that “labour laws focus on conditions and terms 
of service, not on directly changing relationships between farmers and workers”, thus 
insinuating that the incorporation of the agricultural sector into labour legislation in-and-of-
itself does not necessarily impact on the sector’s archaic and privatized labour control system. 
Ewert and Hamman (1999) made a similar point in the late 1990s with respect specifically to 
wine farms, in claiming that power relations on farms are not altered by labour legislation. 
Intriguingly, they further predict that farmers’ decisions, backed up with enforcement by the 
state, to comply with the legislation would either result in a more formal, business-like labour 
control arrangement – which might run the risk of worker alienation or industrial conflict – 
and/or a greater involvement of workers in decision-making (with a consequent loss of the 
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sole managerial prerogative) (Ewert and Hamman 1999: 214). Involving workers in decision-
making processes was haltingly and tentatively attempted on Western Cape farms in the 
1990s, but this has not been a major trend. This thesis explores and analyses the former 
option, of abiding by the legislation – which also entails indirectly subverting its applicability 
(for example, through labour shedding) as well as a degree of straightforward non-
compliance. 
 
Although the existing literature on commercial farms in post-apartheid South Africa remains 
limited, there are suggestions of a shift from the traditional (i.e. paternalistic, despotic and 
privatized) labour control regime towards a post-traditional (or neo-traditional) regime 
without any clarity or clear identification of the form this new regime is taking (Kritzinger 
and Vorster 1996, Ewert and Hamman 1999). It is tempting to argue that ‘the more things 
change, the more they remain the same’ and, on this basis, to merely assert that a master-
servant relationship prevails on commercial farms. Certainly, the historically-entrenched 
paternalism in South African commercial farming has resulted in a lagging behind of the 
agricultural sector in ‘democratizing’ labour relations and labour control (compared to other 
economic sectors in the country) (London 1999) and hence there is considerable catching-up 
to do in modernizing the sector. And indeed farmers presently seem to be resisting the labour 
legislation on a variety of fronts, including the use of labour brokers such that “farmers 
[choose] to remove themselves from direct employment relationships” (DoL 2001: 40). But, 
as this thesis seeks to show, there are changes in labour control taking place, irrespective of 
how obscure and multi-faceted these changes may be.  
 
In terms of bringing about more far-reaching changes, a significant absence within the 
agricultural sector is trade union mobilization and organization. The presence of worker 
organization has always been central to analyses of the labour process, with the labour 
process understood as a site of conflict and as contested terrain between management and 
workers. The sectoral determination in the agricultural sector arose because of the absence of 
union activity and hence of collective bargaining. Repeated attempts to organize workers 
within the agricultural sector – such as the COSATU-affiliated Food and Allied Workers 
Union (FAWU) and other organizations such as NGO-inspired farm worker committees, 
specifically in the Eastern Cape – have not led to significant in-roads into the sector with 
regard to worker organization. Many reasons exist for this, including the pronounced and 
increasing presence of casualised labour on farms (with unions normally organizing amongst 
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full-time employees). At the same time, farmers deliberately make efforts to block workers 
from forming unions (Human Rights Watch 2011b). Another key factor inhibiting trade 
union organization on farms is the union model of organizing which posits a spatial 
separation of economic production and social reproduction. As repeatedly emphasized, no 
such separation exists on commercial farms. I now turn to the question of social reproduction.    
 
3.6 COMMERCIAL FARMS AS A SITE OF SOCIAL REPRODUCTION 
The labour process and labour control more specifically cannot be fully understood without 
discussing commercial farms as a site of social reproduction. Social reproduction is of course 
critical to all economic sectors (Fakier 2010) but, normally, social reproduction is spatially 
separated from economic production such that the employer – beyond providing workers a 
remuneration package – does not feel any further obligation to workers beyond the factory 
floor or office building. In the case of commercial farms historically in South Africa, this is 
not the case. This means that social reproduction on the farm, including access to housing for 
workers, is intertwined with processes of economic production such that the labour control 
regime extends into the sphere of social reproduction. The character and conditions of social 
reproduction for farm workers and families are significantly shaped by agricultural labour 
process relations and – by extension – by the farmer himself.  
 
The close nexus between production and reproduction is closely linked to the paternalistic 
mode of labour control (and indeed the discourse of the farm ‘as a family’). This means that 
labourers are not simply farm workers but they (and their families) are also farm dwellers, 
and this therefore highlights the interconnectedness of labour and land issues with regard to 
commercial farms. Any post-apartheid changes potentially have a bearing on this nexus. This 
nexus is dramatically captured by the following statement by a farm dweller: “What will 
happen after my retirement from work? What will happen with my benefit and land rights? 
Will I be able to continue living on this land? Definitely no, because I am a farm dweller, an 
object” (Extracted from ‘Being a Farm Dweller by S. Mkhize’, AFRA 2007). 
 
The concern expressed by this particular farm worker-dweller is typical of farm workers and 
dwellers in South Africa, both historically (Marcus 1989) and to the present. In the past, farm 
labourers (and their families) were subject to unrestricted eviction from the farm on 
retirement and regularly lost their on-farm accommodation due to loss of employment 
through dismissal or retrenchment. This occurred because of the absence of any kind of 
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tenure rights on farms. With post-apartheid restructuring, and the shedding of labour by 
commercial farmers for a variety of reasons, evictions have continued since 1994. In many 
cases, this did not entail shedding labour, but involved simply removing dwellers (including 
the elderly and sick) who no longer worked on the farm. Farm dwellers in most cases were 
therefore not workers. Often, they were rural families living on a commercial farm and had 
some historical attachment to it; for example, their grandparents were born there or they had 
family graves there (Ndlela 2006).  
 
These post-apartheid evictions have occurred despite the existence of new legislation, in 
particular the Extension of Security of Tenure Act (ESTA) (Act 62 of 1997). The prime 
objective of ESTA was to regulate the relationship between private agricultural landowners 
on the one hand and workers and dwellers on the other hand. This was to include preventing 
illegal evictions, defining and protecting the tenure rights of farm workers and dwellers, and 
possibly making provision for the acquisition of land by farm dwellers. Thus ESTA contains 
provisions aimed at creating and supporting long-term security for vulnerable farm occupants 
and, at the same time, protecting them from unfair eviction (Government Gazette 1997). This 
piece of legislation though does not ban evictions, as it simply sets out the procedure to be 
followed by the farmer in evicting someone from the farm. The widespread prevalence of 
post-apartheid farm evictions has been documented by a number of NGOs, such as the 
Association for Rural Advancement (AFRA) based in KwaZulu-Natal and ECARP in the 
Eastern Cape. These and other organizations argue that the number of illegal dweller 
evictions (and evictions more broadly) have in fact spiked in post-apartheid South Africa 
(Cele 2004), thereby indicating that power differentials on commercial farms leave dwellers 
vulnerable to conditions of insecurity.  
 
The ESTA admittedly does grant permanent tenure rights on a selective basis based on 
specific criteria, and of particular significance are the rights of non-working dwellers 
(unconnected to members of the current labour force) on a specific farm, depending in large 
part on their historical length of stay on the farm (Mostert and Pope 2010). It seems probable 
that, insofar as ESTA has encouraged commercial farmers to minimize the sheer number of 
workers and dwellers residing on their farms, it has contributed to the whittling away of the 
production-reproduction nexus on farms and, as a result, has been part and parcel of the 
process of restructuring the labour control regime on farms. Thus labour and tenure 
legislation have combined, in practice, to outcomes unlikely attended by policy makers.  
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The unintended implications arising from tenure reform are part of a broader shift of 
separating the site of reproduction from the site of production, and this also relates to 
processes of casualisation and externalization on commercial farms (Solomon and Devereaux 
2011). An important trend noted by Greenberg (2004), even before the introduction of new 
labour laws, was a gradual movement of farm labour off the farms or, more specifically, 
living off the farms. For instance, in the past, seasonal workers unconnected in terms of 
kinship to any permanent worker used to live on the farm while they worked, but where 
possible they are now increasingly being transported onto the farms and back to where they 
live on a daily basis, living in a nearby township or informal settlement. This shift has also 
occurred in parallel with the rise of labour brokers in supplying workers – who live off-farm 
– to commercial farmers (Greenberg 2004).  
 
This breaking of the production-reproduction nexus is noted by Greenberg (2004:17), who 
notes that “as work opportunities increasingly become fragmented and work becomes more 
precarious …., the identity of being a farm worker is also fragmented”. This process appears 
to be part of the response by farmers to the new labour legislation, as farmers seek to be 
responsible solely for the social reproduction requirements (for instance, housing) of their 
core workforce and wipe their hands clean (so to speak) of any social reproduction 
responsibilities for casual and seasonal labourers. In essence, it seems to be tit-for-tat: the 
state wishes to regulate labour relations in commercial agriculture in a way consistent with 
other economic sectors, and hence farmers will treat their labourers as mere units of 
production. On the surface, it would seem that labour and tenure legislation combined would 
by necessity enhance the position of farm workers and dwellers, but the evidence suggests 
that – in practice – counter-processes may be taking place which do the contrary. These 
counter-processes may in fact be leading to a shift away from ‘the farm as family’ to the 
‘farm as a business’ pure and simple, and thereby altering the labour control regime 
accordingly. 
 
3.7 CONCLUSION 
This chapter has examined commercial farming in South Africa, with a particular focus on 
post-apartheid South Africa and the labour control regime within commercial agriculture. 
Historically, commercial farming (specifically white commercial farming) was heavily 
subsidised and supported unequivocally by the segregationist and apartheid states in terms of 
commodity markets but labour control was left unregulated by the state. This led to a highly 
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privatised, paternalistic, informal and despotic labour regime. Neo-liberal restructuring, with 
predated the end of apartheid, has brought about a process of state de-regulation (or, more 
correctly, re-regulation) with the withdrawal of significant state support for commercial 
farmers0. At the same time, as a form of historical redress, the post-apartheid state has sought 
to regulate labour relations within commercial agriculture (most notably, though the farm 
sectoral determination) and enhance the remuneration of farm labourers, as well as to provide 
a more secure form of land tenure for farm workers and dwellers. Commercial farms have 
responded to these changes in a variety of ways, including labour shedding, mechanisation, 
farm evictions, causalisation of the labour force and de-linking the production-reproduction 
nexus. In this context, the critical question for this thesis is the way or ways in which state-
led initiatives and farmer-driven restructuring has altered the labour control regime on 
commercial farms. The evidence from this chapter suggests that there may be some changes 
taking place in this regard, although not necessarily in a uniform, coherent and even manner. 
The following two chapters, based on my four farm case studies, seek to investigate the 
character and extent of changes in the labour control regime on commercial farms. 
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CHAPTER FOUR:  
CASE STUDY FARMS – LABOUR LEGISLATION AND FARM 
RESTRUCTURING 
 
 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
This and the following chapter discuss the labour process on commercial farms in South 
Africa with specific reference to the case-study farms in KwaZulu-Natal and Eastern Cape 
provinces. Commercial farms in South Africa have a pronounced reputation of insecurity and 
vulnerability for farm workers (and dwellers); with workers, even under post-apartheid 
conditions, remaining muted and unorganised as a social force for change. At the same time, 
agriculture in South Africa is a very diverse and multifaceted sector such that drawing any 
generalised conclusions from the case-study farms needs to be done with a degree of caution 
and tentativeness.   
 
The current chapter examines the everyday realisation of labour legislation on the 
commercial farms and the social relations which arise from this, including challenges faced 
by farm owners, managers and workers in adhering to the legislation. In doing so, the chapter 
is divided into three main sections. The following section (Section 2) sketches the overall 
backdrop to the farm study areas. Section 3 profiles the key actors (notably farm workers and 
managers) in the study and serves to summarize their individual roles, as well as their 
contribution to the employment relationship. Section 4 speaks to questions about control and 
power on commercial farms, specifically with regard to the implications of existing labour 
legislation and compliance to it. These discussions lay the foundation for the following 
chapter.  
 
4.2 FARM PROFILES 
The South African commercial agricultural sector is a diverse sector, comprising several 
branches (Greenberg 2010). For this study, research was conducted in the field crop 
(specifically horticulture) branch, examining citrus and vegetable growers, as well as the 
dairy farming branch or sub-sector. The farms I studied fall under ‘Type 5: Large 
Commercial Family Farms’ (McConnell and Dillon 1997). These farms are similar to estates; 
however, primary owners are members of a family, as opposed to absentee owners or 
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shareholders. They are either mono-crop farms or mixed farms, organized along commercial 
lines including the use of hired labour, dependency on purchased rather than farm-produced 
inputs and adjusting farming activities according to commercial and market opportunities 
(McConnell and Dillon 1997). The key operating objective of these farms is profit or utility 
maximization through market sales. I outline the studied farms in turn.  
 
4.2.1 KwaZulu-Natal: Ixopo 
Ixopo is a town situated on a branch of the Mkhomazi River in the midlands of KwaZulu-
Natal. Interviews took place in Nokweja located approximately 10km from the main town of 
Ixopo, and it falls under the Sisonke District in the Ingwe Municipality. It forms part of an 
important sugar farming and forestry area which has adopted a ‘variability for sustainability’ 
approach to agriculture. 
This used to be a very big dairy industry, but a couple of years back they diversified and… 
…so…. timber, citrus, cane were introduced. Those are the main ones. Some guys have a few 
animals – beef animals. (Pack House Manager, Carisbrooke Valley Citrus, 18/04/2013) 
The Ixopo district consists of 201 commercial farms and three large timber plantations owned 
by Sappi, Mondi and Timbo. Timber and dairy predominate in the area and sugar is farmed in 
the southern part of the district. Two farms were studied in Ixopo: Woodburns Estate and 
Carisbrooke Valley Citrus Pack House (See Map 4.1 for location of Ixopo). 
 
4.2.1.1 Woodburns Estate 
The Woodburns Estate is a fifth-generation family commercial farm. The original settlers 
arrived in 1857 and the farm in the past was primarily maize and dairy. Presently, Woodburns 
is one of seven growers in the district who are growing sugar cane, timber and citrus for 
commercial purposes. The farm is 1,000ha, of which 350ha is for growing cane, 300ha for 
timber, 80ha for citrus and the rest is unused land. Farmers in the area typically have an 
agreement with a sugar mill (for the sale of sugar cane), citrus pack house (for the sale of 
citrus) and local or community buyers (for the sale of timber). The sugar mills open at the 
beginning of April each year, and more farm labour is needed for the harvesting of the sugar 
cane. Harvesting takes place from April to December; and even further labour is employed at 
the end of March and the start of April to ensure that the cane goes to the mill. The sugar 
cane is first burnt so as to get rid of the leaves, then hacked and transported to the mill.  
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Map 4.1: Ixopo, KwaZulu-Natal 
 
 
Woodburns is very labour-intensive, employing 80 permanent workers and 20 seasonal 
labourers although the use of machinery is extensive: 
We use trailers, all forms for citrus, cane and timber; and tractors of course. We aren’t 
completely mechanised, we rely on labour as much as we rely on machinery. (Farm 
Owner/Manager, Woodburns Estate, 19/04/2013) 
Although there are three sets of agricultural activities (cane, timber and citrus) on the farm, 
the labour that is used for one section may also be used for another: 
Well, the 20 workers that serve as seasonal labourers are generally flexible, so they move 
around the different operations. (Farm Owner/Manager, Woodburns Estate, 19/04/2013) 
The permanent workers are typically labour migrants from other provinces or towns. Some of 
them are housed in compounds located on the Woodburns Estate and in the Carisbrooke area 
(about 5km from the farm). Those workers who live in the compounds usually get a lift home 
on a tractor after work; others have to walk approximately 5km home after a hard day of 
labour. 
About 30 of them stay in the compounds. They’re from areas such as Mzimkhulu, Umtata, 
Highflats and Harding…so they can’t travel every day. (Farm Owner/Manager, Woodburns 
Estate, 19/04/2013) 
Location 1 & 2: 
Research conducted 
in Nokweja rural 
area, Ixopo. 
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Other than these select employees, no other people (that is, family members of workers) live 
in the farm compounds. The compounds are designed for individual employees only, and this 
arrangement in fact forms part of the employment package. As one worker said: 
I guess it [the compound] belongs to me as long as I am working here. (Farm Worker, 
Woodburns Estate, 19/04/2013) 
Workers at the compound use pre-paid electricity which they pay for themselves; they have 
access to running water and have pit latrines in close proximity.  
 
4.2.1.2 Carisbrooke Valley Citrus Pack House 
Carisbrooke Valley Citrus is a pack house in Nokweja, Ixopo (opposite the Woodburns 
Estate). It was established in 2003, and has had two managers since (one in 2003 and another 
in 2008). It provides a service to seven citrus growers within the district, and thus this 
agricultural activity can be explored on primary (production) and secondary (distribution) 
levels.  
 
Fruit is grown on the farms and transported to the pack house where it is then sorted, graded, 
packed and distributed to local and international markets: 
When the season comes, they [the producers] bring the fruit in and they’ve all got a code that 
specifies who the grower is, and that is traceable from their orchard all the way through to the 
overseas market …And back to the orchard, so we need to know where that fruit is coming 
from, so it’s got that traceability for international standards. (Pack House Manager, 
Carisbrooke Valley Citrus, 18/04/2013) 
The pack house though does not interfere in any way with the farm-based citrus operations: 
Basically, I don’t do anything directly with how he grows the fruit on the farm. I will go and 
have a look at the fruit from time to time...in the orchards…and, when his fruit is picked I 
handle the process from there. When the fruit arrives from the farms – the packing process, 
how it’s packed, what’s done with it, how it’s sold, where it’s sold…I deal with that. (Pack 
House Manager, Carisbrooke Valley Citrus, 18/04/2013) 
The pack house employs 10 female employees on a ‘semi-permanent’ basis (i.e. on an 
annually renewable contract) and plus or minus 30 seasonal/casual employees annually. In a 
full season, this number can go up to 120 seasonally-employed workers in the pack house.  
 
The relationship between the pack house and farms is quite significant with regard to the 
process of recruitment and selection. For instance, employees permanently employed in the 
pack house claimed to have been recruited from one of the farms (specifically, Woodburns) 
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and then ‘transferred’ to the pack house. Workers who find themselves losing their 
employment for whatever reason on the farms also seek job refuge in the pack house. 
However, men do not constitute the permanent staff, as Carisbrooke Valley Citrus strictly 
employs women as permanent staff: 
Well basically we employ mainly women…Where we can employ women, we employ 
women. If we need a job that is a bit heavy for a woman, we employ a man. But…there are 
women out there that are a bit stronger. Last year we got some bigger ladies…and they were 
quite happy to do the work, and they did very well. So… to be honest, it’s…the women who 
are more productive, they’re harder workers…I don’t know what it is. But the men just like to 
sit and drink beer if they can…not all of them – I’ve got some good men here that work hard 
and do a good job – but, generally [this is not the case]. (Pack House Manager, Carisbrooke 
Valley Citrus, 18/04/2013) 
All of the employees live in the local community of Nokweja (off the pack house property) 
and walk the 5km distance to and from work daily. This includes seasonal employees who are 
generally recruited from the community. One pack house employee highlights the transport 
problem workers face: 
You see, when it’s off-season we generally walk, but when it’s on-season we find transport. 
Like now, we’re busy preparing to find affordable transport to take us to and from work, 
because we pay for it ourselves. (Pack House Employee, Carisbrooke Valley Citrus, 
18/04/2013) 
This was reiterated by a ‘junior manager’ who also stays in Nokweja: 
When the season starts, we have transport that takes us to work and home (Pack House Junior 
Manager, Carisbrooke Valley Citrus, 18/04/2013). 
Other workers, who are also classified as employees in the pack house, are security guards. 
They help curb and control theft in the pack house. The role of the pack house security guards 
is particularly important as they supplement the supervision of staff if and when the manager 
has to leave the pack house especially during seasonal deadlines: 
From time to time I will take a bin of fruit and put it there and say ‘ok, fill your bags…take 
this home to your kids and your family’. But the general rule is that you can’t take anything 
out. And we just have to put that rule in place to keep it covered, but we help from time to 
time…but they do eat fruit sometimes, they take their chances, but I don’t have issues 
with that. As long as it is not…major stuff they’re stealing…we [as the managers] have to 
control those things. So we have security cameras…, and we have security in the 
evenings…not in the daytime. … …They leave when the staff arrive and they arrive when the 
staff leave. (Pack House Junior Manager, Carisbrooke Valley Citrus, 18/04/2013). 
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4.2.2 Eastern Cape: Alexandria And Grahamstown 
The Eastern Cape is one of the poorest provinces in South Africa and agriculture remains an 
important source of employment and food security in the province. The province lies along 
the south-eastern South African coast and has over 70,000 farm workers employed on 
commercial farms. The Eastern Cape has more livestock than any other South African 
province, producing a quarter of the nation’s milk (Eastern Cape Business 2007). Deciduous 
fruit (in Langkloof), citrus fruit (Addo/Kirkwood) and chicory (Alexandria) are important 
dimensions of the province’s agricultural mix. Indeed, the province is South Africa’s second-
largest producer of citrus fruit. But a feature of recent years has been increasing 
diversification and changes in land-use (for example, to game farming).  
 
The Alexandria and Grahamstown areas, in which I situated my studied farms in the Eastern 
Cape, are both in the Cacadu District Municipality (and either in the Ndlambe Local 
Municipality or the Makana Local Municipality). Two farms were studied: Oak Leaf Farm 
and Varnam Farm (See Map 4.2 for location of these two farms). 
 
Map 4.2: Grahamstown and Alexandria Farm Sites in Eastern Cape  
 
 
 
 
 
Location 4: Varnam 
Fruit and Vegetable 
Farm, Belmont Valley 
(Grahamstown) 
Location 3: Oak Leaf 
Dairy Farm, Zuney 
Area (Alexandria) 
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4.2.2.1 Oak Leaf Farm, Alexandria   
Oak Leaf is a third-generation farm located in the Zuney area, about 30 km from Alexandria 
in the Eastern Cape. It has been operated by the Biggs family since 1980; and in 1986 the 
current farm owner/manager bought his father out of the business. Mr Biggs owns Oak Leaf 
Farm, and co-owns Fern Wood Farm (another dairy farm directly adjacent to Oak Leaf) with 
the state, although it is managed by his brother. The farm is a commercial dairy farm – with 
800 milk cows and 550 heifers on 678ha of land. It is largely mechanized, employing 14 
permanent male staff: 
Milk machines have taken over a lot of labour. That technology hit us long ago, I mean it’s 
been over 30 years already… (Farm Manager/Owner, Oak Leaf Farm, 23/04/2013) 
The labour force has shrunk slightly, but the amount of cows we’re milking has more 
than…probably trebled. So we are using a lot less labour…rather talk about it this way – we 
talk of cows per labourer, okay, so we were probably 10 cows per labourer, now we’re 50. 
(Farm Manager/Owner, Oak Leaf Farm, 23/04/2013) 
One of the farm rules that were continuously stressed is that: 
We employ a family – a husband and the wife, and if they have kids, the kids come and stay 
with them. (Assistant Farm Manager, Oak Leaf Farm, 23/04/2013) 
However, it is strictly the men who are full-time employees on a permanent basis (see Photo 
4.1). Women may be brought in to work on weekends or when seasonal or casual labour is 
needed on the farm. However, the oldest employee who was born and raised on the farm, 
working there since the 1980s, claimed: 
I live with my wife and grandchild…No [referring to his wife]…she has never worked here. 
(Farm Worker Oak Leaf Farm, 23/04/2013) 
 
The staff members are all housed in the farm compound, which is about 600m from the main 
(farmer’s) house. Another important farm rule is that only staff members (and immediate 
family) are allowed to live in the compounds: 
They [dwellers] come in and I’ve gotta kick them out and keep turfing them out. You know 
you’ve got the odd…sister…who, like, arrived from nowhere…you’ve  just gotta keep 
control all the time. But…basically, I’d like to say ‘No’, but the odd one does sneak in and I 
catch them and I say ‘listen, it’s not the farm rule’ and then they’ve gotta leave. (Farm 
Manager/Owner, Oak Leaf Farm, 23/04/2013) 
Worker housing on the farm is in good condition and services such as running water and 
electricity are provided. The housing is equivalent to urban housing built under the 
Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP). The arrangement in which the site of 
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production and site of reproduction are not spatially separated (with farm labourers living on 
the farm) however has its fair share of negative implications which affects the working 
relationship, both between workers themselves and between workers and management: 
It’s totally different on farms than it is in town – in town, they can go home and  one lives on 
this side of town and another lives on the other side of town so they don’t have to share their 
personal space beyond work. These people live with each other all the time; it’s a totally 
different set up. (Farm Manager/Owner, Oak Leaf Farm, 23/04/2013) 
It’s because of issues at home that they bring into the workplace. So we’ve got to solve those 
issues, we can’t separate them because they live and work together. (Farm Manager/Owner, 
Oak Leaf Farm, 23/04/2013) 
One worker elaborated on this: 
People are different…other people have a rude temperament at home [i.e. they talk down to 
their wife] and even here at work those traits reveal themselves. We have to withstand it. 
(Farm Worker, Oak Leaf Farm, 23/04/2013) 
 
Production in the dairy industry is typically intense as milking is done on a daily basis; 
however, there are times such as July to October where there are peak workloads. During this 
period, seasonal labour (who are mostly women as noted above) may be employed depending 
on the specific need for it, or other methods of increasing levels of (or intensifying) work 
production may be pursued and implemented. 
 
Photo 4.1: Oak Leaf Farm – Two Workers Getting Ready for a Typical Work Day  
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4.2.2.2 Varnam Farm, Grahamstown 
Varnam Farm is a second-generation farm in Belmont Valley, roughly 10km from 
Grahamstown, Eastern Cape. The owner of Varnam farm has two plots of land, which are 
about 230ha each, alongside each other. The farm was previously a mixed farm, with the 
farmer owning and running cattle on one of the plots on the farm and growing fruit and 
vegetables on the other. However, the cattle proved to be a liability as they would damage the 
property, gaining access into one of the fields and eating the cabbages being grown. 
Vegetables and fruit were more profitable to the farmer and therefore he moved away from 
mixed farming. The farm now only grows these crops (fruit and vegetables) on 80 to 100ha 
of land which is under irrigation (see Photo 4.2). The farm is one of the 12 to 15 producers 
exporting pepper dews through a factory in Grahamstown (called Carara Agro-Processing) to 
Europe.  
 
The picking season is from March until July, and seasonal workers are heavily recruited 
during this period, depending on the workload: 
So what happens is we start picking these peppers in March, gradually the yield increases and 
then they peak about six weeks after that; and it peaks because we stagger our plantings, it 
peaks for about three or four weeks and then it gradually tails off. And what we find is that 
we hire and then …we hire more and increase until we’ve got enough to get around the farm 
within 10 days to pick everything. (Farm Manager, Varnam Farm, 30/04/2013) 
In addition, in the “off-season”, the farm rotates the 100ha of land with cabbages (see Photo 
4.3), olives, butternut, beetroot and pecan nuts which are all sold in the local markets. Their 
clientele involves local supermarkets such as Pick ‘n Pay and Fruit and Veg City; however, 
hawkers and traders also generally come onto the farm to buy vegetables for their stock.  
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Photo 4.2: Varnam Fruit and Vegetable Farm 
    
               
 (Clockwise from top left) (1) a farm worker’s house in the distance, (2) some parts of the 
farm have been planted, while others remain bare, ready for soil testing and more planting in 
November, (3) some of the 230ha of land is unutilised and forms part of the farm’s landscape, 
(4) a house (in better condition) on the farm owned by the farmer. 
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Photo 4.3: Cabbages (in October) at Varnam Farm 
 
          
 
The farm has five permanent staff (four males, one female), and four casual males. All 
seasonal labour, employed during the picking and harvesting seasons, are females. None of 
the staff is foreign to the area, or externally recruited; that is to say, all of the labour is 
absorbed from the Grahamstown township of Joza, where massive unemployment exists. 
Male permanent and casual staff is typically born and raised on the farm or have lived there 
for more than 10 years. In the words of two farm workers: 
He [farmer] never hires people who did not grow [up] here. Sometimes he takes some 
women from town, but simply tells the men [that don’t stay here] that he doesn’t have a job 
for them. (Farm Worker, Varnam Farm, 30/04/2013) 
I arrived on the farm in 1980 and then I started working [for the old man] in 1981. We only 
signed UIF [Unemployment Insurance Fund] in 1994 so in most ways I started working in 
1994. (Farm Worker, Varnam Farm, 30/04/2013) 
There are about nine families who live on the farm, although many people share these houses. 
These houses were not built and provided by the farmer, and workers have to pay for renting 
the plot and electricity: 
We built the houses ourselves…out of mud…and then we pay R80 for it every month…We 
buy it [electricity] from him…[and] we have a [water] pump, plus there are tanks around.. 
(Farm Worker, Varnam Farm, 30/04/2013) 
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4.2.3 Brief Overview 
From these descriptions of the four farm operations, it is evident that different sub-sectors 
within the agricultural industry in South Africa differ and therefore likely experience 
different labour processes based on the specificities of each sub-sector; even, though, within 
each sub-sector there is likely variation as well. As one farm owner in the dairy sector aptly 
summarized: 
You know, I don’t employ much labour…Labour is not a huge part of my expenses compared 
to a citrus or fruit farmer. There their wages…their wage percentage is huge compared to 
ours. So it [the Sectoral Determination] hasn’t really affected us; no, we still farm in the same 
way that we did 10, 20 years ago. (Farm Manager/Owner, Oak Leaf Farm, 23/04/2013) 
Thus, one cannot make homogenous and blanket statements about the industry as a whole 
based on one particular sub-sectoral observation. By and large, however, the evidence from 
the field reveals – as will be shown in this and the following chapter – commonalities within 
commercial agriculture including certain historical changes with reference to the paternalistic 
labour relationship which has traditionally predominated on commercial farms in South 
Africa. The linkage between this historical change and the post-apartheid Sectoral 
Determination for agriculture (particularly Minimum Wage regulations) are explored in this 
thesis. It will become clear that, because of new labour regulations and provisions, 
commercial farmers feel less and less responsible for the livelihoods of their workers. In this 
way, pressure exerted by the government onto the farmer is projected by farmers onto farm 
workers.  
 
This is evident for instance when farmers do away with further ‘privileges’ with each 
increase of the Minimum Wage. As well, there are often unlawful deductions on farm worker 
salaries in order to compensate for the increases. As an illustration of this, one farm excluded 
health benefits in the revised employment contract after the Minimum Wage was increased in 
February 2013: 
We used to provide health benefits, but with the increase of the Minimum Wage, we have had 
to do away with that. (Farm Manager/Owner, Woodburns Estate, 19/04/2013) 
The adherence to Sectoral Determination stipulations is thus an important indicator of the 
extent of government pressure and the farmers’ responses to this pressure. This pressure is in 
turn transmitted onto the worker, thereby releasing the pressure on the farmer. It can be 
argued that the more commitment the farmer has to abiding to the labour legislation, the less 
‘loyalty’ there is to the worker. In addition, the continued position of farm workers as an 
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unorganized sector of the national labour force is crucial in understanding the ways in which 
farm workers respond (or do not respond) to the changing conditions imposed on them by 
commercial farmers. This will become clearer later as we continue the discussion of the four 
studied farms.  
 
4.3 MANAGEMENT AND WORKERS: POWER AND CONTROL 
A farm worker is a person who is employed in farming (which may include ranching, orchard 
or other agricultural operations) and whose principal employment responsibilities consist of 
growing, raising, keeping, cultivating, propagating, harvesting or slaughtering the product of 
farming. In other words, the worker is employed in farming activities and contributes to the 
functioning of the farming operation – in exchange for a wage which, in the case of 
agriculture in South Africa, is not a living or decent wage. Under the Sectoral Determination 
(No. 13), a farm worker includes labourers directly involved in any aspect of agricultural 
operations but it also incorporates the following: (a) a domestic worker employed in a home 
on a farm and (b) a security guard employed to guard a farm or other premises where farming 
activities are conducted, and who is not employed in and by the private security industry 
(Sectoral Determination 13: Farm Worker Sector). This thesis recognizes that these two 
groups full under the Sectoral Determination; however no interviews were conducted in any 
form with these kinds of workers on the four farms. This though does not have any bearing 
on the main outcomes of the study. 
 
The term ‘management’ refers to two features: (i) its form or structure, that is, management 
as a distinct level in the structure of authority on the farm, such that any power attached to a 
manager in fact emanates from his or her structural position; and (ii) management as a 
function or the process of management (Klerck 2008). Farm managers command, control and 
coordinate the labour force. This means that they structure and organise the labour process. 
But, in acting on behalf of the farm owner (insofar as they are non-owning managers), they 
are also subject to controls by the owner (i.e. are managed) and are integrated into the labour 
process on this basis. However, in many instances in commercial agriculture in South Africa, 
the owner is also the manager – hence, there may not be a separate and discrete management 
structure but the managerial function still exists.  
 
Typically, according to labour process theory, managers engage in control and workers 
merely execute. This is particularly the case if capitalism is examined historically, as 
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management ‘wrestled’ with workers and increasingly subordinated workers to managerial 
prerogatives (leading to real subordination). But there is evidence in relation to the four 
farms, at least from the perspective of farm management, that agricultural labourers provide 
input into the decision-making process if only on a consultation basis. In this regard, there is 
invaluable (tacit) skill and experience that is passed down from older farm workers such that 
the current workforce is not necessarily fully de-skilled in the sense portrayed by Braverman. 
As the Varnam manager indicates:  
Very often I look at the soil condition and ask him [farm worker] what he thinks we should do 
– if we need to rip or if we can just ridge and plant. And I usually go with his 
recommendation because he’s been driving [on the farm] for 20 years. (Farm Manager, 
Varnam Farm, 30/04/2013) 
Consequently, the input of workers may hold some weight in the decisions made by farm 
managers/owners. However, beyond any doubt, the authority to make a decision and the 
function of control (and ultimately conceptualisation) remains with the manager.  
 
Thus, the social relationships between manager and worker take place within the context of 
power and control. Managers, because of their structural position, maintain overall control of 
the labour process and exercise control over the rules of the game so to speak (De Jager 
2006). However, pressures placed on farm owners and managers have led to different forms 
of managerial practices. As a general but halting trend, as will be shown, the structure of 
labour control is taking on a more formalized form as the character of commercial farms 
becomes more focused on  ‘business’ pure and simple at the expense of any conception of 
‘farming as a family’. This involves a move from personal and un-formalised forms of 
control to more bureaucratic and less despotic forms of control. Yet this change is 
transitional; it is by no means complete and shows signs of unevenness.  
 
Though the relationship between farm manager and worker on commercial farms in South 
Africa is not officially or legally defined as a master-servant relationship, it certainly has had 
an inherent master-servant dimension: 
One thing appears to be beyond dispute and that is the relation of master and servant cannot 
exist where there is a total absence of the right of supervising and controlling the workman 
under the contract; in other words, unless the master not only has the right to prescribe to the 
workplace what work has to be done, but also the manner in which such work has to be done. 
(van Staden 2003:44) 
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In the case of commercial agriculture in South Africa, the power of management (as master 
over servant seemingly) has existed in a context of acute racial oppression as well as ongoing 
land dispossession. Despite any shifts in the labour control regime (to a more formalised 
model), it does seem that a mind-set of ‘racial or traditional paternalism’ continues to prevail 
on commercial farms in some form, amongst both managers and workers as expressed at 
times in terms of subjective dispositions. In this sense, the past remains alive and is 
embedded in the present and it continues to configure the prevailing power relations on 
farms.  
 
The post-apartheid state, in implementing notably new labour legislation applicable to farms, 
seeks to soften managerial power without necessarily altering the balance of power on farms. 
Due to the labour legislation, at least in theory (or formally), farmers no longer have absolute 
(or unilateral) power over labour and more specifically the employment conditions of farm 
labourers. This restructuring, though, has not been a linear process as tensions arise as a result 
of the – very truncated – redistribution of power. Certainly, the labour legislation of the state 
serves as a nation-wide and centralised control mechanism over labour relations on farms, but 
farm level dynamics cannot be read from national processes. Indeed, there remains some 
jurisdiction exercised by the farmer/manager as the employer has the capacity and flexibility 
to employ workers on his terms in a way which may deviate from national regulations.  
 
At times, this occurs because farm workers are scattered throughout the countryside without 
any understanding of processes beyond the immediate farm environment. As one worker 
declared: 
Because…we are in the rural areas, we generally do not know what’s going on, and the way 
that work has changed…it’s just, there’s no value in this job.” (Farm Worker, Woodburns 
Estate, 19/04/2013) 
Other workers noted a change, arguing that the instigation of labour legislation has to some 
degree protected the fundamental rights of a farm worker as it has become more complicated 
for the farmer to fire or retrench employees: 
If someone does not do their work how they are supposed to…they are likely to be given a 
warning, they are not fired on the spot anymore. (Farm Worker, Oak Leaf Farm, 23/04/2013) 
Given this difficulty, the farmer may rely on the current workforce to recommend someone: 
Firing someone used to be easy in the beginning but now there is a difficulty. When he [the 
owner] wants to hire someone he usually asks us if we know of ‘amaboy’ we could 
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recommend and then we usually  recommend someone we know. (Farm Worker, OakLeaf 
Farm, 23/04/2013) 
In implementing labour legislation on farms, it is the government’s responsibility to inspect 
farms to ensure adherence to the provisions set out in the legislation. Inadequate, or an 
absence of, inspections tips the scales of power in favour of farmers, and it leaves room for 
minimal compliance or even none at all. In terms of compliance, it is regularly the minimal 
wage which remains particularly controversial with regard to farm-level relationships.  
 
4.3.1 Labour Legislation and Farmers’ Control of Labour  
In this sub-section, I discuss the significance of the new labour legislation with particular 
reference to farm-level relations and, in doing so, invariably raise questions around 
compliance and attempts to circumvent the effects of the legislation by farmers. The 
legislation, as indicated, is a social protection measure designed at best to redistribute power 
or at least to minimise the abuse of power on farms. The state, in pursuing the 
implementation of this legislation, presents itself as a mediator between management and 
worker. Though, in the end, it assumes and reaffirms the private property rights of the owner 
and the privatised character of the socio-space of the farm. The shift from a pre-1994 
unilateral authority on commercial farms to a supposedly more enlightened and inclusive 
managerial arrangement does not in real substance exist in practice. For instance, 
decentralised mechanisms such as collective bargaining do not exist on commercial farms in 
South Africa, thereby essentially preserving the control and power of the farmer.  
 
Most workers on the four studied farms spoke about a kind of management practice which 
has been labelled as pseudo-participatory. Pseudo-participation refers to a managerial tactic 
where workers are seemingly included in decisions on the farm, but managers already have a 
clear conceptualisation of agricultural operations and a strategy that they will ultimately 
implement in pursuance of this conceptualisation (Klerck 2008). In this sense, management 
uses participation as a way of persuading workers to accept the decisions they have already 
made. As two workers, on two different farms, noted: 
Yes, it’s management that makes a decision because even if they are under the illusion that 
we have a voice; when you do say how you think things should happen, at the end of the day 
they’ll do what they were suggesting anyway. At the end of the day, it’s their voice that 
matters. (Farm Worker, Woodburns Estate, 19/04/2013) 
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He does have control over us and he overrules us on many issues. He will say ‘I don’t want 
you guys to take this particular route’ without explaining why we couldn’t take that route. 
(Farm Worker, Varnam Farm, 30/04/2013) 
It is only on one farm, Oak Leaf Farm, where a more levelling form of decision-making was 
practiced.  
 
It must also be highlighted that this is the only farm (Oak Leaf) where workers and the farmer 
still considered themselves as a family unit. The workers at this farm expressed a close bond; 
and they engaged in trust and honesty with one another as well as with the manager. This was 
indicated by both workers and the manager: 
In some [decisions we have to make] I have expressed my opinion and in others I do not…It 
all comes down to a vote. If the other workers have more people who support what they have 
to say then my opinion will be overridden. (Farm Worker, Oak Leaf Farm, 23/04/2013) 
Our relationship is more like a father-son relationship…I can go to him [farmer] about 
anything. (Assistant Farm Manager, Oak Leaf Farm, 23/04/2013) 
If I have to be honest with you, we have a civil relationship. If I have a problem, I usually go 
to their [manager’s] office and say ‘I want to talk to you’… If it is a long and complicated 
matter, he will tell me to close the door and grab a chair so that we can discuss the matter in 
detail. Before I leave he will always ask me ‘are you satisfied?’ (Assistant Farm Manager, 
Oak Leaf Farm, 23/04/2013) 
The Sectoral Determination, in and of itself, officially erodes unilateral powers of the 
employer and redistributes power to the state and to workers. This though should not be 
understood in some sort of zero-sum theory of power such that labour legislation, in 
empowering the state and workers, undermines the power of the farm owner/manager to an 
equivalent extent.  
 
Ultimately, the power of the state vis-à-vis labour relations on commercial farms is dependent 
upon the legitimation of this power through ongoing enactment of it (otherwise, it simply 
exists as a potentiality and not as an actuality). This ultimately requires farm-level inspections 
and audits by the Department of Labour. In this regard, it is important to recognise that labour 
legislation designed to ensure basic employment conditions on farms (the Basic Conditions of 
Employment Act) allows for regulated flexibility – that is, state regulation of core rights (or 
basic conditions) while allowing employers considerable flexibility within broad parameters 
set by the state. This further complicates the power relations between the state and farm 
owners.  
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The instigation of the Sectoral Determination in 2003 started with a two-tier wage system in 
which the payment of wages was differentiated on a geographical basis (with Area A and 
Area B). This distinction (between Area A and Area B) was eliminated as of 1 March 2008 
such that all farms, irrespective of their locality, are now governed by a single wage system. 
Naidoo, Klerck and Manganeng (2007) claim, at least during the time they were writing, that 
a Minimum Wage of R1,000 per month could undercut 17.6% (or 158,000) of the existing 
full-time jobs in the agricultural sector. They argued that, subsequent to 1994, farmers have 
regularly – in response to wage increases – shifted away from full-time employment to casual 
employment and/or increasingly mechanised their agricultural operations where possible. As 
it stands, the Minimum Wage is set at R2,273.52 per month and the sheer size of the 
agricultural labour force has continued to decrease. The move away from full-time 
employment, and the prospects of this happening on a particular farm, weighs heavily on the 
minds of farm workers and inhibits their capacity to mount any serious challenge to any 
despotic managerial practices.  
 
Before the incorporation of agriculture into labour legislation, farmers exercised 
unchallengeable authority and it is precisely this managerial control which has been under the 
political spotlight since the end of apartheid. Compliance by farmers to labour legislation 
suggests an acceptance of labour practices (as defined by the state) and – implicitly – the 
necessity to engage in a negotiation of power between farmers and the state. Insofar as 
farmers maintain significant leeway in managerial practices, and undoubtedly they do, then 
they maintain power at the farm-level in a fundamental sense. Conversely, any violations of 
labour legislation suggest the continued existence of apartheid-style labour processes and 
attempts to retain unmediated direct forms of labour control.   
 
Of the four farms studied, Varnam Farm and Woodburns Estate had in particular a 
continuation of characteristics of old-style management, while Oak Leaf Farm had a more 
progressive managerial control arrangement. The least number of violations, based on 
interviews, in fact took place at Oak Leaf, while Varnam and Woodburns had a notably 
higher level of Sectoral Determination violations. All interviewed farmers indicated some 
form of interaction with the Department of Labour; however the level of violations on the 
farms suggest that these interactions are unreliable and that labour inspections – when they 
occur – are not done thoroughly. The degree to which labour legislation is violated or 
complied with indicates the degree to which labour practices have been formalized in line 
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with state regulations. The existence of violations, including their form and intensity, 
therefore is an indicator of whether legislation as set by the state has fulfilled its status and 
function as a mechanism of control. It would be expected that where labour legislation is 
enacted without hesitation and avoidance or because of the consistent vigilance of labour 
inspectors, then less despotic forms of labour control are emerging on commercial farms in 
South Africa.  
 
Farmers retain extraordinary power at farm-level compared to more regulated sectors of the 
South African economy, despite the post-apartheid state’s attempt to limit or reconfigure this 
power by formalizing labour conditions. My study shows that commercial farms are still 
largely owned and passed down to members of the immediate family. This (positively and 
negatively) contributes to the managerial style on the farm. For instance, while it could be 
beneficial for siblings to be in the same business, there is a risk of them eventually attempting 
to compete for power. As one worker remarked: 
Even if you try to say something and voice yourself, someone [one of the co-owners] will 
come and interject… But no, what we’re talking about is work and this has nothing to do with 
how far in line you are with the inheritance. (Farm Worker, Woodburns Estate, 19/04/2013) 
The running of the farm as a business [with co-owners], none of us get involved there. 
Understandably so, but in terms of how to do the job…we tend to have a bit more experience 
in the field, and so we can get quite active in how to do the job practically and efficiently. 
(Farm Worker, Woodburns Estate, 19/04/2013) 
Again, any input from workers is within very narrowly-defined managerial parameters, 
except perhaps in the case of Oak Leaf Farm. The continuation of the often unchallenged 
power of the farmer is in part facilitated by inadequate labour inspections. Despite efforts to 
regulate conditions on farms, the South African government has largely failed to monitor and 
enforce legal protections guaranteeing wages, benefits, safe working conditions and decent 
housing for workers and dwellers (Human Rights Watch 2011b). In this context, Sectoral 
Determination compliance, devoid of labour inspections, is left at the discretion of the farmer.  
 
Although farmers in my study generally argue that contemporary farming practices are more 
inclusive of the worker in terms of minimising power differentials, ultimate veto power 
clearly remains in their hands. A noted trend, which reiterates the logic of pseudo-
participatory methodologies, was that regular meetings take place where workers are given an 
opportunity to make suggestions and forward complaints; however, in the case of non-
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owning managers, a process of translating worker concerns takes place such that it is 
essentially the voice of the manager which is put forward. As the Woodburns owner/manager 
said: 
Management makes decisions, [but] the worker’s voice is taken into consideration if it works. 
(my emphasis) (Farm Manager/Owner, Woodburns Estate, 19/04/2013) 
If it works, of course, is defined by the owner and/or manager.  
 
One of the critical factors the farm owners take into consideration when determining 
manager/worker relations and when responding to any changes in the Sectoral Determination 
is that the farm must continue to first and foremost operate as a business. This factor is 
fundamental and is the top priority of the farm owners, because farming (particularly in the 
context of significant changes in the costs of inputs purchased and of outputs or commodities 
sold) can be a risky venture. In the end, the cost most easily controlled by farmers is the cost 
of labour. In the case of labour-intensive farming enterprises (such as fruit and vegetable 
farming) even marginal upward adjustments in the Minimum Wage might lead to labour 
force adjustments especially through utilizing more seasonal or casual labour (ECC Report 
2012). In terms of increasing or maintaining adequate levels of production, my study reveals 
that stricter methods of control at work are put into effect as well as more shedding of the 
labour force. As the manager/owner of Woodburns describes it: 
There are some places where I’m cutting jobs and I’m saying ‘ok…you; there’s only two of 
you in here…instead of maybe three or four’. And I’ve done the calculation that it’s 
not…exuberantly…strenuous on them, but they can cope quite comfortably with the 
workload…and if we need more people, we’ll get more people, but to start off with we’ll 
keep it tight and very lean, and try and operate as efficiently as possible…We need to be 
productive and make it work. We’ve got some goals that we’re aiming at, and then we got to 
keep going for those. (Farm Manager/Owner, Woodburns Estate, 19/04/2013) 
 
In some extreme cases, such as that of workers in Sundays River Valley (Eastern Cape), 
farmers resorted to selling off their farms or, to maintain productivity, using alternative 
employment practices such as hiring foreign labourers and deploying labour brokers in order 
to evade labour obligations emanating from the legislation (ECARP Meeting, 25/05/2013). 
As an ECARP Land Rights Facilitator plainly put it: 
It’s not easy because the law says if you can’t carry on with your business then you can 
retrench, but retrenchment is the last resort. But you’ll find out that farmers are claiming that 
their business is suffering as a result of the Minimum Wage, because initially farmers had to 
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produce their financial books if they made such claims. But now the Department of Labour is 
lacking in that because you’ll find that people are getting retrenched without following proper 
procedure. (ECARP Staff, 14/06/2013) 
For farms, such as Oak Leaf Farm, which are not labour-intensive (and do not depend on 
seasonal/casual labour), the Minimum Wage provisions have not seemingly negatively 
affected the running of the farm operation as a business. As seen before, the farmer 
specifically argued that wages do not substantially weigh on his expenses.  
I think it’s very successful [the farm], because I make money [laughs] ….and I continue to 
make money… [I] only [report to] the Bank Manager [laughs] (Farm Owner/Manager, Oak 
Leaf Farm, 23/04/2013) 
 
However, Woodburns explicitly calculated farm labour costs as exceeding R10,000 daily 
which, with every increase in the Minimum Wage, negatively affects the farm business. 
Nevertheless, the farm was considered to be: 
Functional…I can’t really say we are ‘very successful’, we’re still surviving, for instance the 
bank doesn’t own the farm, but we are certainly not extravagant. (Farm Manager/Owner, 
Woodburns Estate, 19/04/2013) 
In light of the labour legislation, he continued to say: 
Hopefully we don’t lose too many jobs and hopefully we don’t lose too many farms. 
…Because there are some farms that are not gonna survive. It’s just unfortunate…a friend of 
mine [referring to Mr Heckland] has just sold his [citrus and sugar cane] farm and…what 
does he do? He’s been a farmer for 20/30 years and…he can only go and manage for someone 
else…if there’s a farm out there that wants him. But he’s kind of just broken even. You know, 
it’s a family farm that’s been sold. And they’ve paid off all the debt basically, so they start 
again. It’s not easy to do that…  (Farm Manager/Owner, Woodburns Estate, 19/04/2013) 
Another manager exclaimed: 
Before…there would be a person employed, and they weren’t quite…up to scratch, they 
weren’t that productive. You almost felt sorry for them, and you say ‘ok, we’ll just leave 
them…and let them…at least they’ve got a job’. Now unfortunately it’s become…you can’t 
carry that person. There are some places where I’m cutting jobs because I have to. (Pack 
House Manager, Carisbrooke Valley Citrus, 18/04/2013) 
The implication of this quotation – from the perspective of the manager – is that if the state 
wants to regulate labour on farms in a more interventionist style, then workers will pay the 
consequence (or price). State intervention, in this regard, has the effect of altering the labour 
process away from paternalism.  
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Compliance to the Sectoral Determination is thus shaped by how it affects the business and 
management responds to the pressures that come from the government on this basis. This also 
sheds light on the labour process as management seeks alternative methods of co-ordinating 
work in order to sustain the business. 
 
4.3.2 Compliance and Violation  
An on-going form of paternal relationship between farmers and workers is one of the factors 
that contribute to a lack of full compliance with the provisions of Minimum Wage regulations 
(Naidoo 2011). In other words, the existing character of the labour process impacts on farmer 
responses to the imposition of state regulations. At the same, this imposition impacts on the 
labour process. This suggests that the relationship between the agricultural labour process and 
the Sectoral Determination is reciprocal in terms of mutual impact. It stands to reason then 
that the degree or form of compliance to labour legislation would result in a change to any 
paternal relationships existing on commercial farms or the labour process more broadly. In 
this regard, a number of factors inhibiting compliance to Minimum Wage regulations have 
been noted by Naidoo (2011). She speaks of the following: the absence of a history of 
institutionalized labour in the agricultural sector; the dependence of farm workers on farmers 
for employment as well as other services (such as housing); and the absence of consistent 
labour inspections and law enforcement on commercial farms (Naidoo 2011: 81). Results 
from my study in fact highlight the significance of these factors in Minimum Wage non-
compliance by farmers.  
 
The lack of knowledge of labour legislation can be, at least in part, attributed to the absence 
of a culture of institutionalized labour in the sector. Farm workers in Varnam Farm, for 
instance, do not know (or understand) the function of a trade union and labour legislation. 
When questioned about union representatives, one worker responded by referring to 
something completely different: 
Yes we do…we do have UIF. (Farm Worker, Varnam Farm, 30/04/2013)  
The ignorance of labour laws on this farm was therefore noted in the terminology used by the 
workers. The Unemployment Insurance Fund (UIF) is one illustration of what the workers 
generally perceive as social protection, such that social protection becomes very narrowly 
understood and defined. This lack of knowledge on legislation makes workers susceptible to 
violations. In factoring this into non-compliance, there appear to be three issues (not 
completely overlapping with Naidoo’s points) underlying the ignorance of labour legislation. 
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First of all, farm workers are not an organized entity. Although they have common concerns, 
they have a mentality of individualism:  
People have a tendency of thinking that as long as it is not them [getting fired] and it is 
someone else, then life can go on. (Farm Worker, Woodburns Estate, 19/04/2013). 
 
Secondly, farm managers/owners are not involved in the process of mediating between 
government and their employees. Although it can be argued that unions should liaise with 
workers and government/employers, in the absence of these representatives in the agricultural 
sector, farmers presumably would be educating their workers if committed to the proper 
implementation of existing legislation. But this is the not the case: 
I would like to see a change in the way that farm workers are educated; that we are given talks 
and workshops alongside our employers, on our rights and a platform for us to express 
ourselves. And also how to manage and treat people, employers should go on that 
course…and the decisions they make, that they can’t just take decisions without thinking 
them through. We don’t have hearings here, we don’t have disciplinary hearings, if he wants 
to fire you – you’re out. (Farm Worker, Woodburns Estate, 19/04/2013) 
What comes across is the attempt by farmers to preserve a secluded ‘old boys club’ where the 
most important thing is that they keep to their end of the bargain (paying the Minimum 
Wage) without any additional concern for the well-being of their employees. As an 
owner/manager proclaimed: 
Look, I just stick to the laws. If they say that’s the Minimum Wage, then that’s what the 
Minimum Wage is gonna be. (Farm Manager/Owner, Oak Leaf Farm, 23/04/2013) 
 
The third issue is the lack in the presence of labour inspectors on farms. A worker from 
Dunbrody farm (with which ECARP works) claimed that although he has lived and worked 
in Sundays River Valley for many years, he had never witnessed labour inspections and this 
made him feel hopeless with regard to the situation on the farms (ECARP Meeting, 
25/05/2013). The significance of the active role of labour inspectors in undertaking farm 
visits is that it indicates some level of cooperation between government and farmers and, by 
extension, farm workers. Ideally, it ensures the adherence to legislation and promotes the 
awareness of violations. Nationally, the Department of Labour however does not have the 
administrative and logistical capacity to conduct rigorous and consistent inspections on all 
farms. And this lack of labour inspector capacity means that the government fails to enforce 
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regulatory protections for workers, thereby allowing for adverse working conditions. The 
extent to which labour inspections take place though is quite uneven across the country. 
 
Pay slips are an important indication of farmer’s compliance with the Minimum Wage 
provisions, as they ought to contain information on wages before as well as after deductions 
(Naidoo 2011). The farms I visited, as well as the observations I conducted, reveal – at a 
general level – a high level of compliance with the provision of properly-completed pay slips 
(and with the Minimum Wage and employment contract regulations generally). However, 
there are a variety of pay-slip violations with regard to the Sectoral Determination which, by 
extension, impact on working conditions. Corrupt labour practices were also revealed in 
Koukamma (Eastern Cape) where some supervisors demand up to R200 from workers with a 
promise of a job. In addition, unlawful deductions existed and these revealed absurd 
requirements such as ‘paying to clock in’ – a familiar practice by farm managers in 
Koukamma. This is where farm managers unlawfully deduct a portion of worker’s wages for 
the number of days they actually attended work.  
 
One of the factors – indicated by owners/managers of Carisbrooke Valley Citrus, Woodburns 
Estate and Oak Leaf Farm – which contributes to the compliance of labour laws, is the open 
communication lines which they claim exists between the Department of Labour (DoL) and 
the farmers. This is through consistent visits by labour inspectors. Farm owners and managers 
stressed how labour inspectors religiously performed audits: 
Once, maybe twice a year. Generally …the Labour Department will come and do an audit and 
see that we do UIF and PAYE and all of those, and contracts are in place. And they’ll also 
speak to the staff and see that they’re happy. And then report back. (Farm Manager, 
Carisbrooke Valley Citrus, 18/04/2013) 
They usually come in and audit about once a year. If there’s a problem, they’ll phone. (Farm 
Owner/Manager, Woodburns Estate, 19/04/2013) 
They’re actually coming next week, they come in here regularly…they come in every two or 
three months. (Farm Owner/Manager, Oak Leaf Farm, 23/04/2013) 
However, these specific incidences of regular inspection visits were overshadowed by 
witness accounts that I heard amongst workers with whom ECARP works, as well as at the 
‘Land, Race and Nation’ conference held in June 2013 in Cape Town which I attended. In 
these gatherings, farm workers from the Eastern Cape as well as the Western Cape shared a 
similar frustration in labour rights violations on farms which are exacerbated by inadequate 
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labour inspections. Farm workers from Koukamma argued that labour inspectors did not 
approach the workers when doing their audit reports; they do not go into the fields (or farm 
residences) to speak to workers but simply met the farm manager in his office. Meetings are 
only carried out with the employer, thereafter, the inspector leaves.  
 
In addition, the peculiar agreement (between the DoL and the national commercial farmers 
union, the AgriSA) for labour inspectors to inform farmers in advance before inspecting 
farms – unless in the case of ‘reactive inspections’ (i.e. inspections with the goal of resolving 
complaints received) – gives way to devious methods of concealing Sectoral Determination 
violations on farms. Some methods that have become common for managers in Koukamma 
include the relocation of farm workers away from the proximity of the labour inspector. 
Workers are forced, for example, to relocate from the farm shed (where they usually have 
their lunch) during break times if inspections are taking place as managers do not want the 
inspectors to see and meet the workers. At times, the workers may even be moved to another 
farm during inspections. Other actions include the instalment of temporary toilets when 
inspections are due to take place (in contrast to the reality of having no toilets in the orchards 
on a daily basis), the ‘coaching’ of farm workers (i.e. telling them what to say to inspectors, 
under threat of losing one’s job) as well as giving the interviewed worker equipment and 
overalls for the day of inspection. These fabrications hide the evidence of mistreatment on 
farms and the violations experienced by workers, thus rendering labour inspectors’ visits 
ineffective. The glossy portrait of farmer-inspector relations and the effectiveness of labour 
inspections, as articulated by the three farm study managers above, should perhaps be 
understood in this light.  
 
Given the discussion so far, it seems clear that a significant portion of commercial farms 
(including the four studied farms) comply in many ways with labour legislation. At the same 
time, insofar as labour inspections are not done widely and consistently, the state’s capacity 
to ensure compliance with labour legislation – and ultimately to protect the rights of farm 
workers – is rather limited on a farm-to-farm basis and cannot be guaranteed. Indeed, 
nationally, non-compliance and/or violations of the Sectoral Determination in the South 
African farming sector is said to be typically high. But, intriguingly, civil society 
representatives indicate that a particular spike occurred recently owing to the most recent 
Minimum Wage increase (in March 2013) which happened in response to the Western Cape 
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farm strikes which took place from November 2012. This demonstrates state incapacity to 
protect the day-to-day rights of farm labourers. As ECARP claims: 
In terms of our intervention…there is a lot of improvement in terms of the Minimum Wage. 
But now, I think things are kind of changing with the current Minimum Wage [from March 
2013]. Because you find out that with this current Minimum Wage…farmers don’t want to 
pay that; what they will do is introduce deductions that may be unlawful or they will deduct 
things they were not deducting before. (ECARP Staff, 14/06/2013) 
One could argue that in order to combat this continued disregard for laws, farm workers 
would need to equip themselves with knowledge of labour legislation. Results from 
respondents on the studied farms show that knowledge of the labour laws was mostly 
restricted to the farm managers/owners. Farm workers tended to be unaware and/or uncertain 
of their labour rights; and only one respondent was relatively conscious about details 
regarding employment conditions as – on his own initiative – he read newspapers, watched 
the news and listened to the radio to keep track of employment conditions and labour 
legislation.  
You see I think that we are at a disadvantage because we are in the rural areas and it’s very 
scarce that Department officials will come in and tell us about our rights as workers. We are 
left in the dark with a lot of things. Even this wage increase, I think that was only 
implemented because the Western Cape farmers made a huge raucous about it. Otherwise 
things like that could easily slip through the cracks… I read the papers so I know (Farm 
Worker, Woodburns Estate, 19/04/2013). 
 
The next sub-section moves away from labour with specific reference to production and goes 
on to look more specifically at social reproduction on commercial farms, namely, the micro-
welfare system which has historically existed as part of the racial paternalist labour system on 
farms. Insofar as the farm as a business, rather than as a family, is increasingly coming to the 
fore in the light of post-apartheid labour legislation, then it is important to examine how this 
impacts on the micro-welfare system.  
 
4.3.3 Micro-Welfare System 
It is widely known that farming areas are fraught with service delivery issues (such as 
education, electricity, water and housing). Service delivery, in terms of South African state 
responsibilities, has been delegated to local municipalities but often without sufficient logistic 
and financial capacity to bring about service delivery. In addition, for rural areas, 
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municipalities often claim that their service delivery function ends at the gate to the farm as 
commercial farms are private property (ECC Report 2012). Historically, because commercial 
farms are private spaces governed by farm owners/managers, the latter have been held 
responsible for delivery of basic facilities and services. In this regard, farmers have typically 
provided some of their workers (at least permanent workers) with additional services 
(sometimes outlined in their employment agreement), including housing and at times small 
plots for crops. Because in the main workers have lived on the farms, this means that the farm 
worker’s dependency on the employer exceeds that of wages and enters into the realm of 
social reproduction. This has been bred and reinforced by paternalistic labour relations and 
forms of control. Solomon and Devereaux (2011), in describing the notion of paternalism on 
South African farms, refer to racial paternalism on farms as constituting a ‘micro-welfare 
system’.  
 
The ‘micro-welfare system’ is a complex and unwritten relationship which amounts to an 
informal social protection system where the farmer substitutes for the state in providing for 
the basic needs of farm workers and farm dwellers (Solomon and Devereaux 2011). As 
pointed out by Du Toit (1993), the farmer’s obligations to his worker are institutionalized in 
the form of a ‘gift relationship’ and are not formalized or enforced in a contract and, 
therefore, result from his generosity and goodness. The responsibility felt by the farmer 
towards his workers is reciprocated by workers and thus there is a set of mutual obligations of 
responsibility and respect that characterise the paternal relations on farms.  
 
However, paternalism is not cast in stone and is “not an unchanging structure” (Du Toit 1993: 
9). One of the ways in which the beginning stages of a ‘revolution’ away from paternalism 
may be happening is in relation to farmers seeking to renege on their roles as welfare 
providers for workers and dwellers, because of the more interventionist stance of the state 
vis-à-vis labour relations on farms (notably, the Sectoral Determination). The general attitude 
amongst farmers is that since one aspect of the farm (namely, labour relations) is under the 
political spotlight, earning heavy criticisms from the state and others, then the state should 
likewise intervene in social reproduction such that welfare services should be rightfully 
relocated and put under the jurisdiction of the government. Therefore what was previously a 
mark of one relationship (paternalism) should be reorganized (and indeed done away with) as 
the foundations of a new farm-worker relationship based on formal and institutionalised 
labour practices. After all, socio-economic development responsibilities have been delegated 
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by the ANC government to local municipalities and hence perhaps municipalities should be 
taking the lead when it comes to social reproduction of farm workers and dwellers.  
 
The right to housing, access to clean and potable water, education, health and so forth are 
(admittedly qualified) rights enshrined in the South African constitution as well as 
international law (Human Rights Watch 2011a). And the responsibility to uphold these rights 
formally remains within the domain of government and not farmers – whose sole 
responsibility, at least increasingly from farmers’ perspective, should be employment. With 
respect to the studied farms in the Eastern Cape and KwaZulu-Natal, farm owners/managers 
felt that there were limitations to their social reproduction and welfare functions. Oak Leaf 
Farm though, as indicated previously, shows differing trends and this is the case once again 
with regard to social reproduction. Farm owners/managers on the other three farms saw their 
roles as caregivers and caretakers in an advisory role only. And even workers maintained that 
only a business (and not a social or paternal) relationship existed on the farm. Any personal 
problems they possibly encountered were reduced by the farmer to monetary issues where 
emphasis was placed on the farmer as the economic provider and not a welfare provider. 
When asked about the farmer’s responsibility beyond the scope of work, for instance, 
workers generally responded in this manner: 
My personal life should not be his responsibility. I don’t think so. (Farm Worker, Woodburns 
Estate, 19/04/2013) 
The responsibility is mine to take care of myself. It’s not his job and it would be unfair for 
him to now care for me beyond work. Yes, there are some responsibilities, in line of work, 
which he is obliged to do; but he doesn’t have to go beyond this. (Farm Worker, Woodburns 
Estate, 19/04/2013) 
However, there were notably other views which differed from the general stream. 
I think management should chip in. I think [it] would be a disgrace if I worked, but was 
unable to take care of my basic responsibilities. That would obviously mean that…clearly, 
something is missing at work, so they would have to chip in. (Pack House Worker, 
Carisbrooke Valley Citrus, 18/04/2013) 
Other sources from my fieldwork reiterated the overall tendency of a shift away from 
welfarism within the realm of social reproduction, claiming that the aspects of personal 
loyalty and reciprocity in particular have been removed from the farm employment 
relationship (ECARP Meeting 25/05/2013). This though may only reinforce insecurity levels 
that are attached to being a farm worker in South Africa, particularly when the post-apartheid 
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state’s attempts to protect the labour and tenure rights of farm workers and dwellers have not 
been particularly successful. 
  
Upward adjustments in Minimum Wage levels without financial compensation for farmers, 
such as subsidies from the state or guaranteed minimum prices for produce, will only reduce 
profitability and therefore lead farmers to find further means of cutting labour or labour-
related costs (ECC Report 2012). The most recent Minimum Wage increase places farmers in 
a position where thinking about the survival of the business supersedes any social 
relationship. As such, the structure of the business necessarily shifts from that which 
seemingly embraced familial ties to a purely economic one. This is not to suggest that farm 
owners/managers respond to wage increases or other rising costs simply by ‘attacking labour’ 
and doing away with social welfarism on farms. 
 
Increasing labour costs have in fact prompted the use of alternative methods of production (or 
at least a search for alternatives), as a supplement to revising or seeking to hold down labour 
costs. Costs of production involve electricity (for pumping and irrigation), fuel/diesel, 
fertiliser, chemicals, and, to a lesser degree, transport to deliver the produce. In Varnam, the 
farm manager has turned to more efficient production methods so as to maintain (or reduce) 
the costs of production for a greater output: 
I think that we’re trying to be more efficient across the board…so in terms of electricity, for 
instance, we’re fitting pumps that are more energy efficient. You know, without getting 
technical, there’s a pump that we’ve installed which has a variable speed drive. So instead of 
running at full revs, it only runs to the area that you are irrigating…it adjusts accordingly, 
automatically. In terms of input costs, we’re trying not to waste chemicals, or fertiliser. We’re 
doing soil sampling, as we always have…I get a recommendation with soil samples and then I 
fertilise accordingly, so there’s no wastage there. And then also in terms of pest control, and 
so on, usually I go according to programmes recommended by the companies that sell the 
stuff (Farm Manager, Varnam Farm, 10/10/2013). 
In terms specifically of the Minimum Wage and its effect on production, it is seemingly seen 
even as positive: 
I think it [the Minimum Wage] has caused us to be more efficient and to plant more…to try 
and push those margins, you know…so [we’ve employed] a tighter crop rotation…so 
basically if you’ve got 1 ha here and you plant peppers in one year, next year you can’t plant 
peppers there, you’ve gotta plant another crop…so that your disease pressures and that sort of 
thing are quite different…so you’re rotating every year so you don’t want ground sitting and 
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going to waste. As you can see, we’ve started planting…come back in a month’s time and 
there will not be any land left unplanted so that we increase production. I think that’s one way 
we’ve managed to combat the increase of labour costs (Farm Manager, Varnam Farm, 
10/10/2013). 
Irrigation sprinklers at Varnam have also been set to adjust power usage at intervals which 
are regulated in accordance with the land under irrigation. This is done in a bid to limit water 
and electricity wastage (Photo 4.4).  
 
Photo 4.4: Sprinklers at Varnam Farm 
 
 
Other production costs emphasised by the farm manager at Varnam Farm are increasingly 
tighter international controls on chemical usage. According to him, this means that they have 
to enforce tighter minimum residue levels and maintain the prescribed levels of residue in the 
fruit that goes overseas. Without seeking to evade these controls, they are trying to find ways 
of minimising the cost implications of this; while simultaneously keeping labour costs down. 
 
The continuation of a mutually-beneficial co-existence (between farmer and worker) 
inclusive of supplementary welfare and paternalistic benefits on the farm may be supported 
by farm owners/managers if the state were to provide farm subsidies or refrain from engaging 
in constant amendments to labour legislation. Or, instead – as some farm managers suggested 
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– a lower rate of adjustments in the Minimum Wage would be appropriate as a basis for 
maintaining some sort of micro-welfare system: 
As a labourer it’s getting quite expensive to carry that person. Whereas before, you actually 
felt…you worked with your heart so you could [employ more people]…because you felt sorry 
[for them] at R60/R70…you still let them carry on. Now there’s a big jump [in Minimum 
Wage rates] between that and…you can’t have all of those people. (Pack House Manager, 
Carisbrooke Valley Citrus, 19/04/2013) 
The labour legislation, among other pressures (such as dependence on the unreliable weather 
conditions in South Africa), corners farmers into reducing their labour force, restructuring 
control mechanisms (including moving away from micro-welfare and paternalism) and – in 
the extreme case – selling their farms in order to pay their debts. For instance, Mr Heckland 
was a commercial farm owner in Nokweja, Ixopo who would have formed part of this study. 
Unfortunately, with the latest Minimum Wage increase, he could no longer afford his labour 
and thus sold his farm to the government as part of the land redistribution programme.  
 
The Government Strategic Plan for Agriculture for 2001 aimed to increase the trade and 
export of agricultural products, thereby cementing the neoliberal stance within the sector. 
However, this move affects the relationship between farmers and farm workers as more 
capitalist-intensive methods are pumped into the industry.  As one farmer commented: 
I think that farmers will fall by the wayside and you’ll have these big multinationals owning 
these big lands…big tracks of land and there’ll be no difference…instead of one person…one 
family farm…owning it, there’ll just be a multinational with no relationship with anybody. 
The black guy who’s got a historical bond with the farm, the white farmer who’s got a 
historical bond with the  farm…none of them will be there, those lands will be just be raped 
and when it’s no longer profitable, they’ll move off. (Farm Manager/Owner, Woodburns 
Estate, 19/04/2013) 
This would entail a complete undermining of any form of paternalistic welfare; rather, a cold 
hard business relationship would prevail with land treated simply as a commodity by all 
(rather than a place of belonging, often for both farmers and workers). In the meantime, 
farmers seek ways to cope with the ever-changing Minimum Wage regulations. Although 
labour legislation violations and shifting away from the micro-welfare system are harsh from 
the standpoint of agricultural labourers, in the light of the above discussion they make sense 
from the perspective of farmers.   
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4.4 CONCLUSION 
This chapter, as the first of two chapters focusing on the four studied farms in KwaZulu-Natal 
and Eastern Cape, has examined a range of pressures being felt by commercial farmers in the 
studied sites, pressures emanating from the state and from neo-liberal restructuring. It is clear, 
on the basis of the evidence examined so far, that something is afoot on these farms which 
seemingly suggest shifts in the kind of labour control regime existing in commercial 
agriculture in South Africa. At the same time, there is no uniform or systematic shift in the 
control regime and, in fact, there is considerable variation across the four farms based on 
their own histories, conditions and specificities. Nevertheless, there is evidence that a less 
paternalistic and more formalised system of control – not matter how incomplete – may be 
emerging, with farmers apparently adopting the position that if the state wishes to regulate 
labour on commercial farms then the necessary consequences must follow: namely, that 
paternalism and the micro-welfare system would be done away with and workers would be 
treated as labour units pure and simple. Though apartheid ended nearly twenty years ago, it is 
clear that a ‘messy’ transitional phase still exists with regard to the agricultural labour process 
and labour control systems on farms, with all four farms displaying (along a spectrum) a 
distinctive hybrid system of labour controls. Ultimately, this means that labour control 
systems are forged and reworked through on-the-farm processes and that practices on the 
ground (or on-farm) are marked by varying degrees of incoherence and fluidity. The next 
chapter furthers the discussion of labour control systems on the four farms and hopefully 
clarifies the changes and continuities in the agricultural labour control regime in post-
apartheid South Africa.  
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CHAPTER FIVE: 
CASE STUDY FARMS – MANAGEMENT CONTROL, EMPLOYMENT 
AND LIVING CONDITIONS  
 
 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter provides a more in-depth discussion of changes and continuities on the four case 
study commercial farms in KwaZulu-Natal and Eastern Cape in relation to the labour process 
and the labour control regime more specifically. On commercial farms, because of the 
production-reproduction nexus, labour control is all-embracing and hence all dimensions of 
the lives of farm labourers are subject to some form of labour control. The chapter is divided 
into two main sections. The first section examines key dimensions of managing labour on the 
commercial farms, and focuses on themes such as categories of employment and 
casualisation, supervision of tasks, recruitment and remuneration. The second section 
examines working and living conditions on the four farms and thus moves into the realm of 
social reproduction of farm labourers and their families. Together, this and the preceding 
chapter (chapter four), provide the basis for coming to conclusions (outlined in chapter six) 
about continuities and changes in labour control systems on commercial farms in South 
Africa.  
 
5.2 MANAGING LABOUR  
Management of farm employees involves co-ordination and control of the tasks they perform 
to fulfil employment contractual obligations, no matter if these obligations are set through 
formal or informal means. Though there are variations between sub-sectors, the South 
African agricultural sector remains largely labour-intensive. Labour shedding is taking place, 
but this refers not only to the loss of jobs, but also to the reorganization of employment 
categories – for instance, the shift from one employment category to another (such as, 
permanent to seasonal/casual labour). A farmer involved in mixed farming pointed out that 
his staff consisted of labour where: 
More or less 100 had become permanent, but [I] shifted about 20 of them to seasonal. We 
might go up to about 130 workers, but still maintaining the 80 permanent. (Farm 
Manager/Owner, Woodburns Estate, 19/04/2013).  
He went on to link this to the Minimum Wage regulations: 
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Considering the Minimum Wage, permanent workers can’t be retained anymore. So, cane-
cutters for example, would have to be seasonally employed. (Farm Manager/Owner, 
Woodburns Estate, 19/04/2013). 
 
The agricultural sector in South Africa has been shedding labour due in part to an increase in 
mechanization since the 1970s (Schirmer 2004, Naidoo 2011). Labour shedding intensified in 
the 1980s, and even more so in the post-1994 era – when agriculture became more and more 
re-regulated (along neo-liberal lines) and incorporated into the global market economy. 
Along with this shedding was increasing casualisation, externalisation and informalisation of 
the permanent agricultural workforce and intensified workloads for remaining staff. This 
widespread restructuring, though seemingly about the labour market alone, was also linked to 
changes in the agricultural labour process and types of management on farms. As the pack 
house manager at Carisbrooke Valley Citrus highlighted: 
You’ve actually got to find money to be able to pay the people, and how do you do that? You 
increase their productivity and you tighten the belt…to make it worthwhile. Otherwise none 
of us have a job, if this place closes…or if the farms fail, we don’t have a job. (Pack House 
Manager, Carisbrooke Valley Citrus, 18/04/2013). 
Increasing productivity therefore has emerged on farms and, with this, tightened forms of 
labour control. 
 
5.2.1 Employment Categories and Casualisation  
How workers on farms are organized on a daily basis is influenced or even constituted by the 
hierarchical order existing on the farm which regularly separates workers on the basis of 
employment categories which relates in many ways to skills, expertise and seniority at the 
workplace (Chambati 2013). The identified types of employment on interviewed farms in this 
study were (i) permanent, where the employee is one who works all year round for an 
indefinite period of time, generally lives on the farm and enjoys the benefits of the farm and 
is entitled to secure monthly remuneration; (ii) seasonal, where the employee is temporarily 
employed (usually for the season, from April to November); (iii) casual, where the employees 
work when they are needed by the farmer, get paid for each hour that they work, but only 
receive their wages fort-nightly (sometimes, such as in the case of picking fruit, the payment 
is incentivised based on level of productivity); and (iv) what I call semi-permanent, in which 
the employee often enjoys the same benefits as a permanently-employed workers (though at 
the discretion of the farmer), but has an annually renewable contract with the farmer. In 
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accordance with the Basic Conditions of Employment Act, the fourth identified category 
(semi-permanent) is officially not entitled to the same benefits as permanent workers and 
effectively falls under non-standard employment.  
 
Casualisation in particular (as a non-standard form of employment) is of particular 
importance with regard to labour control reorganisation: 
I think there have been some changes, because you’d find out that if the farmer was 
employing 5 permanent staff and maybe 10 casuals – you’d find that through the Minimum 
Wage there is now the issue of casualisation. Because when someone is now a casual 
employee, they will work fewer hours, you don’t have to pay the Minimum Wage, and 
benefits are reduced. Then there is the issue of seasonal employment, so I think that in terms 
of the Minimum Wage there are a lot of issues that have arisen because you find that 
employers want to reduce the staff. (ECARP Staff, 14/06/2013) 
Seasonal workers differ from causal workers in that the former worked at periodical seasons 
such as the peak of the harvesting period, while casual employees worked when they were 
needed at any point in the year: 
Our picking season is from March until July, so that’s when we have our peak, but we employ 
casual labour when we need it – to plant cabbages, to pick cabbages, to plant peppers…all 
that sort of thing, throughout the year depending on our needs. (Farm Manager, Varnam 
Farm, 30/04/2013) 
In terms of the number of hours worked and the type of work performed, however, casual and 
seasonal employees tended to be both flexible forms of labour. For instance, in cases where 
responsibilities or duties had to be integrated (such as chemical spraying, weeding and 
picking), it is the casual and seasonal employees – almost as a surplus labour force to be 
drawn upon when necessary – who carry the burden:   
Well, the 20 workers that serve as seasonal labourers are generally flexible, so they move 
around the different operations. We’ve tried to keep the specialised employees as permanent. 
(Farm Manager/Owner, Woodburns Estate, 19/04/2013) 
 
The identification of suitable permanent and non-permanent workers is as important as 
knowing how to maximize the labour they can offer. For the manager (and owner), the best 
employee works consistently at the lowest wage rate. To improve productivity involves 
pushing the level at which the employee can perform. Because motivation for the worker 
usually involves an increase in their wages, this is a popular method of improving 
productivity: 
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Pepper season is absolute madness, and my main driver who does 5 trips to town with peppers 
and 2 with staff at the beginning and end of day…[therefore]…goes 9 times into town…you 
know, he’ll get a bonus at the end of pepper season. (Farm Manager, Varnam Farm, 
30/04/2013) 
And as a yardstick of wages received (even amongst permanent staff), seniority (in terms of 
length of service) becomes quite important: 
I think what’s happened is that the guys who’ve been here for longer have incremented over 
the years so they are naturally higher [in wages] than the other guys. And the guys that have 
come, sort of, last in, are probably on the Minimum Wage. (Farm Manager, Varnam Farm, 
30/04/2013) 
The level of payment serves as an indicator of employment status on the farms, measured for 
example in terms of security of employment (with permanent staff being most highly paid), 
location in the permanent staff hierarchy (such as supervisor), and length of service. But a 
critically important characteristic of employment categories is the gender and ethnicity of the 
employees. While permanent staff members are typically black South African males, atypical 
employment is reserved for women, foreigners, migrants and sometimes children. Although 
technical qualities such as the level of skill remains significant in allocating individuals to 
particular employment categories, these demographic qualities feature in the segmentation of 
the labour force on farms.  
 
The form of training of agricultural workers is one issue altered by non-standard 
employment. In the past, agricultural skills were passed down from one generation of worker 
to the next, based on the previous relative security of farm worker families. In contrast, now 
skills are learned on the job because the workforce is more fluid and unstable. This is also 
linked to increased farm evictions post-1994 and to the move away, on some farms, from on-
farm accommodation (in which the site of social reproduction is on-farm) to off-farm 
accommodation for workers often in informal settlements or nearby townships. Off-farm 
accommodation, leading to dispersal of farm workers off the farm, does not neatly tie 
dependents of farm workers to future work on the farm, such that a new grouping of 
labourers is not now readily available for farmers. As the farm manager for Varnam notes:  
The driver must definitely know how to drive. For the other workers, we just show them how 
to do the job and they learn on the farm. In most  cases they do that…because we do training 
on the spot. We need to teach them how to plant the vegetables, how to top-dress and all that. 
(Farm Manager, Varnam Farm, 30/04/2013) 
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Insofar as this entails a process of deskilling, it means that managers – in moving towards a 
standard farm business model – gain even further control of the agricultural labour process as 
they become less reliant on the tacit skills of agricultural labourers. It also means that 
recruitment and selection of new workers is less tied to the farm worker families traditionally 
living on farms, sometimes over a number of generations. 
 
Management on farms has devised a range of tactics which have been implemented in an 
attempt to maintain productive business practices on commercial farms in light of labour 
legislation. Importantly, with the reduction in the sheer size of the labour force and 
permanent workers more specifically, managers strategically implement a dual internal 
labour market which involves maintaining some highly skilled workers (such as tractor 
drivers) as the core (or permanent) workforce and consequently adding value to these 
positions, while making other positions more flexible and insecure. Of course, the 
permanent/non-permanent divide in some form has always existed on commercial farms in 
South Africa historically (if only because of the seasonal character of agriculture).  
 
But even what were once permanent positions have been at times subject to casualisation or 
externalisation. In the case of Woodburns Estate, for instance, casual workers now typically 
work in all areas of the farm (citrus, sugar cane and timber) and thereby learn the different 
functions of each job and on-the-job. Similarly, the same category of workers at Varnam 
Farm works in multiple divisions of the farm. Managers at these two farms pay these workers 
the Minimum Wage rate but simultaneously extract more labour from them without any work 
benefits emanating from a permanent contract. It was only at Oak Leaf Farm where a fully-
specialised, although small and permanent, labour force existed.  
 
Also, the division of labour on these farms is highly gendered though it does not always map 
neatly onto a permanent male/casual women divide. This division is shown in the photos 
below (Photo 5.1 and 5.2) with regard to Varnam Farm. While women at Varnam carry the 
cabbages from the shed to the truck, men load them for delivery under the watchful eye of the 
manager. This gendered division of labour was also noted, sometimes bluntly, in all visited 
farms. Managers tend to have a patriarchal streamlining of work as some jobs are specifically 
reserved for a certain gender. Oak Leaf Farm boasted a male-dominated working 
environment, while Carisbrooke Citrus was the exact opposite (with a female-dominated 
labour force). 
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Photo 5.1: A Varnam Farm Female Farm Worker on Her Way to the Shed to Load 
Cabbages 
      
 
 
Photo 5.2: Men (at Varnam Farm) Pack Cabbages onto a Truck 
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5.2.2 Supervision and Co-ordination of Tasks 
The formal appointment of foremen and supervisors is a way of distributing control on the 
farm (see Photo 5.3). Traditional corporate positions such as managing assistants, junior 
managers and supervisors were noted while conducting this study on the four farms. 
Although these positions are not completely new to the agricultural scene, contemporary 
agricultural line managers solidify their authority with educational experience as part of a 
process of professionalization linked to the business model of agriculture. All interviewed 
farm managers had a Diploma or Degree in Agriculture, with the exception of one who had a 
Degree in Tourism. Above all, it is this expertise (rather than any paternalistic father role) 
which now legitimizes their influence amongst farm workers and the authority of their 
decisions for and on the farm.  
 
Anyone appointed under the manager seems to claim a glorified title as a manager, such as 
the ‘Junior Manager’ as Carisbrooke Valley Citrus and the ‘Assistant Junior Manager’ at Oak 
Leaf Farm. Aside from the minimal additional responsibilities, these employees are workers 
just as their colleagues in the field. The most important duty of the manager is to ensure that 
the farm makes a profit; thus any decisions made on behalf of the farmer (if the manager is 
not also the owner) are to ensure the success of his business. In all cases in the study, any 
non-owning managers were appointed by the farmer and they played an intermediary role 
between farmers and workers as their duties included reporting any grievances to the farmer 
from the workers, even though a direct line of communication to the farmer was sometimes 
emphasized: 
[So] we’ve got three designated people [of] which Mbulelo is in charge and then Chris also 
does when Mbulelo is off duty. Huli as a manager also does this. But the buck stops at 
Mbulelo, and that’s the same with the udder health [of the cows] – the buck stops with 
Chris….But…they do come to me…the door is always open, they know it. (Farm 
Manager/Owner, Oak Leaf Farm, 23/04/2013) 
 
A clear hierarchal arrangement exists within management on the farms, with line sub-
managers or supervisors being permanent members of staff and relatively privileged vis-à-vis 
even other permanent farm labourers. But it seems that this formalised structure still is in 
tension with paternalistic modes of management, as even low-level farm workers continue to 
approach the farmer directly about farm issues when the opportunity arises.  
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Photo 5.3 Staff/Supervisor Board at Oak Leaf Farm 
 
 
This of course beckons inquiry into the function of a farm manager as overseer of agricultural 
labourers if labourers are freely able to openly express their concerns with the farmer. The 
response in the findings shows that in cases where the manager and farmer was not the same 
person, the manager is supposed to act as an ‘unbiased’ middle-man. He is there to run the 
business and ensure that the work is done without the farmer having to ‘get his hands dirty’. 
In most cases, the farmer goes into the fields once or twice in a week and relied on the 
manager to ensure the day-to-day running of the work. The farm manager at Varnam 
expressed it in this way: 
I think because I don’t live on the farm [so] I don’t see them over the weekend generally, 
unless we’re working over the weekend, so in an odd occasion they might report some 
personal issues or ask advice or something like that. But very seldom. (Farm Manager, 
Varnam Farm, 30/04/2013) 
I think that if they have a grievance, they’ll ask me to set up a meeting with my boss and then 
they’ll meet with him. But generally they’ll just come to me because I’m on the ground – my 
boss has got meetings and he’s all over the place so he’s often not here. So I’m the guy that’s 
around so they do come to me, naturally. (Farm Manager, Varnam Farm, 30/04/2013) 
 
Although control and supervision of work is allocated to managers and supervisors, power 
essentially remains in the hands of the farmer. Most of the farm workers indicated some 
involvement in the decisions made on the farms; however, the authority to veto strategies and 
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practices remained with the manager/owner. The character of supervision identified from 
interviews in the study leans towards ‘direct control’ rather than ‘responsible autonomy’. The 
former speaks to strict discipline and detailed supervision where almost every aspect of the 
worker’s job is tightly controlled and predetermined by management. The latter, ‘responsible 
autonomy’, refers to managers encouraging workers to be creative in their job and are given 
freedom, within limits, to control their own methods and pace of production (Klerck 2008). 
Workers on the farms studied are sometimes involved in some (minor) decisions made on the 
farm; however management has the authority to overrule decisions. Evidence from elsewhere 
indicates even more stringent forms of direct control; for example, farm workers from Fort 
Beaufort maintained that there is a complete absence of communication with managers and 
outright prohibition of engagement with management (ECARP Meeting 25/05/2013). Racial 
despotic management in the past was mainly characterised by direct control but the 
paternalistic component to it implied some sort of softening of the despotic character of direct 
control. As a general tendency, with the possible undercutting of paternalistic relations in 
many instances under the business model, direct control may shift towards a more structured 
form of labour control but the eventual outcome still remains unclear.  
 
Furthermore, my study reveals that core (permanent, fully employed) workers may become 
subject to more responsible autonomy forms of control, while the absence of skills and 
bargaining power of particularly peripheral (casualised) employees makes them more 
susceptible to ongoing direct forms of control. For instance, in the case of casualised workers, 
one of the farm managers argued: 
I think in the past there was a very traditional approach to farm workers where, you know, 
they’ve got to be told every step of the way. But I think now we’ve adopted a situation…like 
my spray guys, I’ll tell them that by the end of the week I want A, B and C done and then 
they go on and do it…I come and check on where they are and how far they’ve gone so that I 
know where I stand, but it’s no longer directly controlled where you have to tell the person 
exactly what to spray and to put so much into the chemicals. (Farm Manager, Varnam Farm, 
30/04/2013) 
Though the farm manager claims that this is not direct control, in reality it is. The change 
pinpointed by the manager is in fact a shift away from paternalism: it implies that the worker 
is no longer treated paternalistically as a child but is recognised – under the business model – 
as an adult with the capacity to work independently of constant supervision. Intense control 
mechanisms though were noted on the Carisbrooke Valley Citrus farm, including workers 
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having to carry a yellow tag that indicates that they are allowed to go to the toilet outside 
allocated break times, and using the security cameras and a two-way radio as a means of 
supervision as well. 
With a machine, you clock in…you can clock in and sit around the corner. I am having to 
tighten,…toilet breaks…because there are people who take chances. So I’m giving a register, 
tea break, when they have their break, that’s their toilet time. If they need to go between that 
time, they report to their supervisor, they log the time so we can see who the person is. If I 
find them, and they’ll have a yellow piece of plastic that indicates they’re allowed to go to the 
toilet, it’s almost like treating them like children…but we have to put those controls in place 
to make it more effective. So those are tools to help the supervisors, because the supervisors 
are quite busy in what they’re doing, they have a role to play…but they’re also there to see 
that the work’s being done. (Pack House Manager, Carisbrooke Valley Citrus, 18/04/2013) 
Though the manager speaks about the toilet break system as treating workers as children, this 
method of control should not be interpreted as a simple hangover from paternalism. It is now 
couched discursively within a business model, to make the farm ‘more effective’.   
 
In fact, a more bureaucratic, profit-driven and professionalised system of farm control may be 
emerging in the context of state interventions around labour in the agricultural industry (and 
quite often particularly in those farms where labour legislation has been religiously and 
rigorously implemented). The emergence of this management system is not linear and it is 
highly uneven across farms. In other words, we are witnessing a transitional period in which 
an old paradigm of managerial control has yet to be replaced by a new paradigm, as owners 
and managers are grappling with developing a control system most suitable to their farm 
dynamics. But certainly there is a general discernible shift away from the farm as a family.  
 
In this regard, farm management reacts to pressures emanating from the state and workers’ 
unions (or other forms of farm-level worker organisation), and this has some influence on 
management controls vis-à-vis particular farms. Should there be no pressure coming from the 
state and unions, it can be assumed that traditional methods of labour control remain the 
foundation of the farm employment relationship. For example, in Sundays River Valley, 
where a high level of Sectoral Determination violations has been articulated by workers, 
decisions are made by the farmers without any regard for the workers. Management was 
alleged to have simply put up notices restricting certain foods on the premises in farm 
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compounds and any changes that occur on the farm are approached in the same manner 
(ECARP Meeting 25/05/2013). 
 
5.2.3 Worker Representation and Farmer Organisation 
Management controls, as indicated, may be conditional on pressures placed on farmers. The 
significance of state pressure has already been highlighted, and in this sub-section I focus on 
worker representation and farmer organisation. The discourse of paternalism tends to reject 
any possibilities of the farmer and worker being systematically opposed in an antagonistic 
relationship (Du Toit 1993). But the representation of farm workers and owners inevitably 
places the two parties with different and conflicting interests, thereby presenting cracks in the 
notion of paternalism. The Western Cape farm strikes brought this clearly to light. 
 
As hired labour, farm workers should be legally represented by trade unions. Being part of a 
trade union would expand and enforce workers conditions by collectively bargaining on their 
behalf and it also may provide farm workers with greater input into day-to-day decisions on 
the farms (Klerck 2008). But unions are conspicuous by their absence on the farms studied: 
No. At this point, we don’t have one [union].Yes, we do need a union because right now there 
is a lot that we go over and over; it would be much better if we had a representative who is 
impartial with respect to the relations on the farm, but simply voiced our concerns based on 
facts and the law. (Farm Worker, Woodburns Estate, 19/04/2013) 
The Sectoral Determination in agriculture implies the absence of worker representation and 
collective bargaining in the agricultural sector and clearly is not a sufficient replacement for 
proper worker representation. The spatially dispersed character of commercial farms and the 
specific nature of the farm (namely, a combination of production and social reproduction) 
makes it very difficult for any union (and particularly those used to organising amongst the 
urban workforce) to mobilise agricultural labourers. The increasing casualisation of the farm 
workforce complicates this even further for trade unions.    
 
Farm worker mobilisation, in many cases, has been driven by non-governmental 
organisations such as ECARP, leading to the formation of Farm Worker Committees (FWCs) 
which include both workers and dwellers and which address labour issues (like a typical 
union) but also land and tenure issues given the farm as a site of social reproduction. Through 
their interventions over a period of a decade, ECARP has formed 67 farm committees in 
various farming communities around Grahamstown, as well as farm area committees. 
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ECARP also recently (in March 2013) formed a social movement. Their work of mobilisation 
has enabled farm workers collectively to advance their struggle for better living and working 
conditions. Evidence of this is found in responses from ‘feedback sessions’ such as the 
meeting hosted by ECARP on 25 May 2013 in Grahamstown.  
 
This meeting highlighted workers’ daily struggles, but also shed light on the growing 
importance of FWCs. For instance, one worker noted that by challenging the unequal power 
on farms, a more respectable relationship could be borne between management and workers 
and the rights of workers could be protected (ECARP Meeting, 25/05/2013). This was 
demonstrated for instance in a work stoppage by Dunbrody Farm workers (on the 16
th
 and 
17
th
 of May 2013) about the following: the absence of proper toilets, the non-issuing of 
gloves for work and a purported unfair dismissal of a colleague. The strength of this new-
found collective power, however, is limited at times by on-farm management discrimination 
experienced by farm workers who are a part of a workers’ committee and by the failure of 
some workers to join the committee leading to a divided workforce. These unaffiliated 
workers frequently act as the management’s transmitter of information; for example, one 
farm worker was told by his foreman (and former close friend) to stop speaking out about the 
conditions on the farm as it would potentially result in him losing his job. None of the four 
farms studied had any form of worker representation.  
 
In the same breath, farmers have a strong voice through employer organisations. These 
organisations enable farmers as a body to lobby the state, but they also have farm-level 
implications for management-worker relations. During this study, I identified (amongst 
others) the Citrus Growers Association (CGA) and Cane Growers Associations as 
representatives for the studied farms. In fact, farmers tended (depending on their crop or 
livestock mix) to be members of more than one farmer association. Farmers, besides being 
part of employers’ organisations, also mingle socially through for example country clubs and 
golf clubs and they are known to discuss labour issues during these encounters. In the face of 
protests, as happened during the Western Cape strike, they can easily come together and take 
a united stance. The collective efforts by farmers contrast dramatically with the often 
individualised responses of unrepresented agricultural labourers. The South African 
constitution – which is the supreme law of the country – guarantees the right to freedom of 
association. Under the law, workers have the right to form and join a trade union, to 
participate in the activities and programmes of a trade union, and to strike (Human Rights 
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Watch 2011a). On farms, however, sometimes the farmer effectively supersedes that of the 
Constitution as workers affiliated with trade unions and other such organisations are 
discriminated against or, in extreme cases, lose their jobs.  
 
Overall, though this study did not seek to address this as a central issue, it is highly likely that 
the differential power existing between management and workers (and the type of labour 
controls existing) is influenced by the presence or absence of worker organisation in the 
context of powerful farmer organisations. Certainly, evidence from farm workers and 
dwellers mobilised by ECARP highlight the significance of farm worker committees in 
defending labour and tenure rights albeit not always successfully. Insofar as this farm-based 
mobilisation does keep a watchful eye on farm management and its practices (including 
preventing violations) it may provide a further push towards a business-type agricultural 
model as an unintended consequence of mobilisation. 
 
The following two sub-sections examine two themes that speak to how workers are ‘fitted 
into’ and organized – with regard to the division of labour – on commercial farms in South 
Africa. The first sub-section observes how recruitment and selection is arranged in placing 
individuals into positions on commercial farms, and the second sub-section considers how 
wages and remuneration packages are structured for groups of employees on farms. This will 
provide a lead-in to the following section (section three) on working and living conditions on 
the four farms. 
 
5.2.4 Recruitment and Selection 
Despite labour shedding, employment still remains significant in the agricultural sector of the 
South African economy (Human Rights Watch 2011a). The form or category of employment 
is clearly closely linked to the level of job security on the farm. A factor that arose with 
regard to the level of employment on farms was the manner in which recruitment and 
selection of employees took place and was administered. The recruitment and selection of 
employees is in fact conducted differently for different categories of workers. There are three 
main approaches that were exposed in this study: (i) “[formal] interview process”, (ii) social 
networks and word-of-mouth, and (iii) third-party agents, i.e. labour brokers. In one case, a 
farmer and the manager of a pack house had a joint agreement on the employment of 
workers. As pack house workers indicated: 
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They [farm and pack house] seem to be working together in all this, so if we need packers 
here now the employer may go into one of the grower’s farms and speak to people instead of 
hiring random people. In my case, Mr Woodburns [of Woodburns Farm] was recruiting 
people for employment here [pack house]. So it’s not like we were blind-sided. They just 
have this…alliance. (Pack House Worker, Carisbrooke Valley Citrus, 19/04/2013) 
I had given my CV to another farm [Woodburns], [but] I was placed here. I was then told I 
would be a packer. (Pack House Worker, Carisbrooke Valley Citrus, 19/04/2013) 
Permanent positions on farms are fast diminishing, being reduced to those that are essential 
for the running of the farm. For example, tractor drivers (see Photo 5.4) are particularly 
valued across the industry, whereas other positions – such as planters, weeders, packers and 
graders – are casualised with these positions easily filled and training minimal.  
 
Photo 5.4: Driver at Varnam Farm Checking Cabbages 
 
The value placed on certain positions directly influences the manner in which prospective 
employees are recruited and selected for the job. In the words of the Woodburns Estates’ 
farmer: 
We’ve tried to keep the specialised employees as permanent….I would do an interview…if 
someone is being employed for permanent; request a CV…and…go through that structure. 
On the seasonal contracts, it’s based on the experience and …expertise that the person has… 
(Farm Manager/Owner, Woodburns Estate, 19/04/2013). 
Similar points are raised by the pack house manager: 
Basically we have our key staff, our supervisors, who we try and keep them on as a 
permanent, semi-permanent kind of operation…Just to retain them…and to keep the core 
people. Then the staff that are [causal]…we do training – some are packers, some are graders, 
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various – so if they’ve been here in the previous season we have an interview session; so if 
you were here last year and you want to work again in this season you bring your ID and you 
sign up. I like to give the people opportunit[ies] that were here first [from the previous 
year]… If you’ve dropped off [during a season because]…you have to go off for maternity 
leave…or whatever…I try and take that into consideration. I request that if you’re leaving 
before the season ends, you let me know if you’re coming back; just so that puts me in the 
picture and I know where we’re going. (Pack House Manager, Carisbrooke Valley Citrus, 
19/04/2013) 
This, coupled with the conditions of employment under the Sectoral Determination (such as 
the provision of a written employment contract), means that a certain level of formality is 
expected at least in the case of permanent workers. Results from the study indeed indicate 
that, due to the expectations of the Sectoral Determination, employee selection for permanent 
vacancies in particular are conducted formally while atypical employees may be employed 
informally.  
 
Employers request curriculum vitae (CV) and conduct semi-formal interviews based on the 
category of employment and the requirements of the job. This has reduced the level at which 
verbal contracts occur, thereby further formalising the employment process: 
Yes, it [contract] has to be signed…we have files of them [permanent employees] on the 
computer. (Farm Manager/Owner, Woodburns Estate, 19/04/2013) 
Despite the increasingly formal selection process of employees that are recruited particularly 
for permanent positions, the recruitment of labour is still largely informal on South African 
farms.  
Generally, we inform the staff [about job openings]…so word of mouth plays a role…and 
they’ll bring people they know and trust. Occasionally, people arrive and they may be 
employed depending on the availability of work – especially if they’re skilled, [for] example 
drivers. Or if we don’t have work, we’ll keep their ID copy and their cell phone number. 
(Farm Manager/Owner, Woodburns Estate, 19/04/2013) 
Other cases depict people approaching farms for employment before the start of the 
agricultural season. But social networking is important, whereby employers announce (to the 
current staff) that they are in need of a certain number of workers for the season and the 
workers, in turn, bring people they know and trust to the farm. As well, employers identify 
groups of labourers (usually seasonal) who then work for them each and every season:  
We’ve got ‘gangs’ [of labourers] that we’ve identified…that have been working here for 
years and years, and we just let word out with the present gang that we’ve got, that we need 
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the other gang, and then word spreads and they come to work….[But] it’s word of mouth, 
mostly. And then… in terms of casual work it’s also pretty much word of mouth. We just say 
we’re hiring and there are 300 people waiting for a job. (Farm Manager, Varnam Farm, 
30/04/2013) 
 
Another farmer even noted that the integrated working and living arrangement (the 
combination of production and reproduction on the farm) also influences recruitment 
patterns: 
My staff do it [recruit]…I don’t do it…because at the end of the day they’ve got to get on with 
that person…they’ve got to live with him (Farm Manager/Owner, Oak Leaf Farm, 
23/04/2013, my emphasis). 
Intriguingly, this farmer reiterated this point time and time again, in stressing the way in 
which the site of social reproduction (where workers and their families stay) can interfere 
detrimentally with production on the farm: 
I will say to them ‘right, guys the driver’s just left…the milker’s just left…we need to replace 
it’; they must find that person for me…because at the end of the day they’ve gotta live with 
that person. If he’s gonna be up to no good with their wives, they mustn’t cry to me. (Farm 
Manager/Owner, Oak Leaf Farm, 23/04/2013). 
 
The migrant labour system also continues to some degree with reference to commercial farms 
in South Africa and it impacts on recruitment. Farm workers, farm committee representatives 
(from farms associated with ECARP) and farm owners identify the purchase of labour from 
both within and across the South African border. Farm workers from the Koukamma area 
were particularly vocal about their experiences with the Minimum Wage in light of their job 
security. They claimed that workers are fired and foreigners or migrant labourers are 
employed in their place. These workers are particularly vulnerable and desperate, making 
them easy targets for marginal wage rates. To transport this migrant labour, a third-party 
agent is usually available to supply the workers to the farmer. One farmer, referring to a 
labour broker and the sourcing of casual labour, said: 
When it comes to casuals, we basically get from Alexandria…from town… But I’ve got a 
contact in Alex who will bring me…he won’t bring someone who is not right…His role 
basically ends when I have the workers on my farm. (Farm Owner/Manager, Oak Leaf Farm, 
23/04/2013) 
In this case, reference is being made to local migrants which involves not the typical rural to 
urban migration but in fact the exact opposite.  
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From the discussion, it would appear that recruitment and selection is associated to a large 
extent with category of employment. Farmers consistently maintained that their recruitment 
approaches were not the same for seasonal or casual workers compared to permanent 
employees. But once employed, there is the possibility of shifts between categories, either a 
promotion or demotion. For instance, a common tactic used by farmers – to avoid legal 
hassles – is shifting a worker from permanent to seasonal status instead of dismissing the 
worker. It was also found, as introduced earlier, that the same group of employees could be 
hired on a seasonal basis on the same farm for many years. There is even a loyalty instilled in 
this uncertain and ambiguous relationship. As one farm owner expressed: 
If someone leaves me, and I hear that they are working for [another farm owner], I won’t 
accept that. I will retrench them [i.e. will not rehire]. (Farm Owner, Woodburns Estate, 
19/04/2013) 
 
Furthermore, there is an indisputable gender-based division of labour that is still prevalent on 
farms with insubstantial logic put forward by farmers for this distinction, such as: 
We can draw on casuals when we need…I mean all the picking is all lady’s work – I don’t 
think men would be very good at that. (Farm Manager, Varnam Farm, 30/04/2013) 
Women farm workers are still in the deep end of the spectrum; and reasons for not hiring 
female workers range from economical to patriarchal. Most gender-based discriminatory 
practices relate in the end to employment categories of men and women, as one farm owner 
admitted exclusively employing males as permanent workers due to: 
The nature of women…because they can’t stop fighting with each other. No, listen, I’ve 
always had women…but I just got to a stage where I was like ‘ek kan nie meer nie’ because 
otherwise they would have killed each other. (Farm Manager/Owner, Oak Leaf Farm, 
23/04/2013) 
This means that the recruitment and selection for employment on farms can be deliberately 
streamlined along gender lines. The same farm owner further urged that I – as the researcher 
– discuss this with employees in order to get a complete perspective on his claim. In doing so, 
he further profiled the job for a woman on the farm: 
You can ask around what it was like, but I do bring them [women] in on weekends; but 
permanently, I’m sorry we’ve had huge problems because then this one’s sleeping around 
with that one’s husband, and that one won’t work with that one…it’s just a problem, and I 
know it’s wrong but we’ve got to keep peace here. (Farm Manager/Owner, Oak Leaf Farm, 
23/04/2013) 
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Another owner insisted that he had a 50/50 gender ratio for his permanent staff; however no 
females were available for interviewing, and neither were they seen on the premises or 
orchards. In fact, the housing (compounds) provided was only for men.  
 
These differentials and inequalities are not restricted to the employment category and the 
manner in which workers are recruited and selected for employment, but extend to the 
benefits aligned to the type of employment. I now turn to this.  
 
5.2.5 Wages and Remuneration 
People working and living on commercial farms in South Africa are the poorest and most 
vulnerable group in the labour market. Wages from their employment in agriculture usually 
constitute their primary, if not only, source of income and therefore play an important part in 
their livelihood strategies. The workers interviewed for this study are not an exception to this, 
as most of their families depend on one salary for their livelihood which is supplemented by 
government grants – mainly, the Child Support Grant and Pensioners Grant.  
 
The introduction of the Sectoral Determination in the agricultural sector was an attempt by 
the South African government to support the labour rights of these workers and positively 
contribute to their livelihoods.  
Previously workers were exploited by farmers, and without government setting a structure for 
them, it would continue down the same path. (Farm Manager/Owner, Oak Leaf Farm, 
23/04/2013) 
As such, Section 6 (in Part B: Minimum Wages) of the 2013 Sectoral Determination outlines 
conditions in terms of which employers should present a statement of their employee’s 
wages. Pay slips are thus a critical way of indicating whether Minimum Wage provisions 
have been violated, as they ought to contain information on wages before and after 
deductions (Naidoo 2011). All interviewed workers indicated that they received pay slips 
which reflected their wage rate, number of hours, earnings, deductions and the actual net 
amount paid to them. Farmers in the study even went as far as discussing deductions reflected 
in the pay slip with their employees: 
Yes, he gives us a pay slip and then tells us that this is how much we have earned and the 
days we have worked. Before the Friday we get paid, we get our pay slips on the Wednesday 
and he tells us to check them so that if there is a problem somewhere it can be rectified in 
time. (Farm Worker, Woodburns Estate, 19/04/2013) 
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Permanent staff members’ wages were rated by the hour, and this was multiplied by the 
number of hours and days they worked to make their monthly wage. Seasonal staff was 
generally task-incentivised; that is, receiving payment in accordance with their personal level 
of production based for instance on a set rate for a crate (for the fruit pickers). Casual 
workers, who were only noted at Varnam Farm, were paid fort-nightly at an hourly rate. 
There were other excluded benefits such as living on the farm premises, though not all 
labourers lived on-site. The method of payment was clearly used as a technique of increasing 
production levels at the peak of the agricultural season. Thus these workers were generally 
paid: 
For work that’s done… [Many] get a …rate of R11.67 per hour but, for example, cane-cutters 
and citrus-pickers can get better than that. Drivers [are paid] much more. So add incentives 
[to this] and you’ve got more production. (Farm Manager/Owner, Woodburns Estate, 
19/04/2013) 
This logic, however, was the reverse for farm workers at Koukamma, where many labour 
violations occurred. Typically, seasonal employees were forced to sign a warning if they are 
unable to meet certain production levels (such as 3.5 crates a day). In addition to this, farm 
managers in Koukamma placed workers in teams, paying them at piece-rates with a team 
target to reach. If workers did not reach the target, they each signed a warning; and if they did 
reach the target, they had to share the day’s wages. Workers from Sundays River Valley 
made similar points claiming that, due to Minimum Wage increases, there were contractual 
violations on their farm, specifically regarding the wage rate. For instance, contracts specify 
that hours of work are 8am to 5pm; however, it is difficult to work on the orchards when it is 
wet, thus work under these conditions usually commences at 10am. As a result, workers are 
paid for the hours they work (10am to 5pm) as opposed to those instructed by the 
employment contract (ECARP Meeting, 25/05/2013). 
 
There are further conditions set by the Sectoral Determination with regard to hours of work, 
and these reiterate the logic that the level at which workers receives wages is also dependent 
on their type of employment. Ordinary hours of work, under labour legislation, refers to 
workers who work (a) 45 hours in any week, (b) nine hours in any day if the employee works 
for five days or fewer in a week; or (c) eight hours in any day if the employee works on more 
than five days in a week (Basic Conditions of Employment Act 1997). Any work performed 
in excess of the ordinary hours is referred to as ‘overtime work’ and should be agreed upon 
by both parties (manager and worker) as well as respectfully compensated in accordance with 
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relevant labour legislation and regulations. Furthermore, the Sectoral Determination permits 
an extension of ordinary hours for farm workers; dependent on mutual consent. Agriculture 
as an industry is notorious for long and even socially-unhealthy hours. The existing state 
regulations are thus in accordance with health and safety guidelines and seek to enforce the 
rights of employees. Consent, however, is still a foreign concept on the farm as one worker 
claimed: 
Saying no to overtime work is like saying you don’t need your job anymore (Farm Worker, 
Woodburns Estate, 19/04/2013) 
Although such dependency on work (and the housing that often goes with it) is still prevalent, 
the same farm worker continued to say: 
But, then again, who would say no [to overtime work] anyway? (Farm Worker, Woodburns
 Estate, 19/04/2013) 
 
Overall, as mentioned, farmers (at least those studied) tend to comply with the Sectoral 
Determination. However, even those who do comply on a regular basis have violated the 
legislation in some form at some time. Overtime work and/or pay in particular proved to be 
an infringement which was quite common. For instance, workers argued that:  
 He [manager] would act as though he is writing it [overtime hours] down, meanwhile he isn’t 
so then when it’s pay day, we realize that our money is short. (Farm Worker, Woodburns 
Estate, 19/04/2013) 
It’s [knock-off] supposed to be 5pm. But sometimes we finish after 5 (like something to 6). 
Actually, now that I think of it that has been one of the things I have been vocal about. I went 
to him and I said, ‘my time ends at 5…whose time am I working beyond that’? He would 
surprise us with [supplying us] things like winter jackets just to compensate for the extra 
hours we sometimes put in. (Farm Worker, Oak Leaf Farm, 23/04/2013) 
Farmers insisted that workers could follow a formal chain of managerial command to relay 
their grievances or even directly approach them: 
Definitely, they definitely express their grievances to management. They’re always shouting 
and swearing at us [laughs] they freely express their issue(s) (Farm Manager/Owner, 
Woodburns Estate, 19/04/2013) 
Invariably they will talk amongst each other – that’s natural – people will naturally, if they 
have a problem, find someone who will listen to their problem and share their concerns. But, 
yes they do come to me, definitely…the door is always open, they know it. They do come 
in…often. (Farm Manager/Owner, Oak Leaf Farm, 23/04/2013) 
111 
  
But farm workers find it very difficult to confront the farmer-worker power relations at the 
farm level (in part because of their often individualised responses). Because of the 
vulnerability of their jobs, and without any hope of alternative employment, their dependency 
on the employer exceeds their day-to-day on-farm existence.  
 
The Sectoral Determination applies to the employment of farm workers in all farming 
activities in South Africa. And the conditions of the farm Minimum Wage are extended to 
workers who work at least 45 ordinary hours for the employer. In working with this 
arrangement, farmers shape and mould wages for farm workers in a hierarchical fashion – 
depending on the category of employment (permanent or seasonal) and the conceptualisation 
of skills (and the extent to which skills are valuable to the farm). In determining levels of 
skills existing on farms, the experience one has acquired on the job plays a crucial part. 
Because there is usually no formal education or training that is required, skills tend to be 
passed from one employee to the next or on-the-job training takes place. Workers refer to the 
history of involvement in labouring on a farm and how this has acted as a training ground for 
future work: 
When we [were] growing up, we occasionally took ‘i-piece jobs’ here on the farm (Farm 
Worker, Varrnam Farm, 30/04/2013) 
Sometimes, the nature of job training is in the form of ‘shadowing’ a senior employee or 
manager: 
Well we show them…we don’t take them for formal training or anything, I’ll just show 
him…you know, I’ve been trained to use a chain saw so I’ll pass that on. (Farm Manager, 
Varnam Farm, 30/04/2013) 
 
With respect to skills and their significance with regard to wage levels, one farm manager 
remarked: 
 I think drivers and the guys who operate the spraying machine behind the tractor…that’s a 
skill that is invaluable to us. And then I think, you know, just the guy who operates the chain 
saw he’s got a skill there, we don’t just give it to anyone (Farm Manager, Varnam Farm, 
30/04/2013). 
Besides skill levels, wages are also based on worker experience and time on the farm: 
I can assure you that no one gets Minimum Wage on this farm…well, maybe one or two – 
and those are the real youngsters – but the older guys, a lot of them are double the Minimum 
Wage. So, I always wanna be well ahead of the Minimum Wage. I wanna be the farm where 
people wanna work. That’s me. (Farm Manager/Owner, Oak Leaf Farm, 23/04/2013) 
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These responses are in line with the claim that farmers regard prescribed Minimum Wages as 
the entry level for new workers though there is some evidence that Minimum Wages for 
some farmers are also considered maximum wages (ECC Report 2012). However, as my 
research indicates, this needs to be qualified by the type of employment (casual or 
permanent) in order to clarify who in fact receives at least the Minimum Wage. That is to say, 
a newly-employed casual or seasonal worker would not receive a Minimum Wage rate 
simply because these categories of employed are not covered by the Sectoral Determination. 
 
Farmers speak glowingly about a range of wage (and non-wage) benefits that supplement 
workers’ regular wages. As previously noted, some of these benefits also serve as a way of 
compelling workers to increase levels of production. These benefits include bonuses, a 
thirteenth cheque and food parcels, though such benefits are spread unevenly across 
employment categories. In addition, a distinction needs to be drawn between benefits and 
payment-in-kind (PIK) as farmers and workers may understand remuneration in different 
ways. PIK refers to any payment made in kind and should be mutually agreed upon before 
the employee begins work. This serves to eliminate any confusion about the classification 
under which such remuneration falls, and it ensures that the employment contract serves as a 
vital source of reference. A case in point in this confusion is where employers consider 
something as a ‘benefit’, while workers consider it a ‘deduction’. On Oak Leaf Farm, for 
instance, the farmer considered the provision of 4 litres of milk to his employees as a benefit: 
Well, look, being on a dairy farm we give milk. I give 4 litres of milk to the workers…I don’t 
ever want to hear someone saying they are out of milk because that’s an insult to me – yes, 
it’s part of their wage package…obviously I deduct the milk although it’s an added thing; you 
add and deduct (Farm Owner/Manager, Oak Leaf Farm, 30/04/2013) 
In contrast, his employees viewed it strictly as a deduction: 
Yes [we get deducted]. The house we live in, milk and UIF government fund [are all 
deductions] (Farm Worker, Oak Leaf Farm, 30/04/2013) 
But the assistant farm manager continues to dispute this: 
It actually used to be a hidden cost; like here we have the housing allowance, milk, meat – at 
first that was a hidden cost, but now the pay slips show that. (Assistant Farm Manager, Oak 
Leaf Farm, 30/04/2013)  
 
Payment-in-kind can be a vital source of maintaining paternalistic relations as it binds the 
employee to the employer (Naidoo, Klerck and Manganeng 2007) and hence its on-going 
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prevalence raises questions about the extent of labour relations formalisation on commercial 
farms. It follows that, in attempting to formalize the sector, payments made in kind should 
not factor into the agricultural employment relationship. Its continued existence, and 
particularly its acceptance even within the Sectoral Determination (along as it does not 
exceed 10% of the Minimum Wage) illustrates a system that is still in transition from 
paternalistic arrangements between owners and workers to formalised relationships between 
employers and employees that are regulated in practice by the government. This on-going 
paternalism is particularly prevalent on Oak Leaf Farm: 
So, they certainly get milk, they do get meat over Christmas. And, you can’t really call it 
anything, but when one of my animals die…I don’t burn them and throw them away, they 
certainly get that. If they don’t want them, I will throw them away, but that doesn’t happen. 
(Farm Manager/Owner, Oak Leaf Farm, 23/04/2013) 
The PIK system is gradually declining though, as farmers reduce payment made in kind in the 
light of an upturn in Minimum Wages. Other than workers at Oak Leaf Farm, no other 
workers received benefits exceeding their wages. A worker in Woodburns Estate reminisced, 
saying: 
Before 1994, there were cases where you may get a sack of oranges and maybe firewood, and 
meat when they still had meat…and that was our bonus maybe in December. (Farm Worker, 
Woodburns Estate, 19/04/2013) 
This is a further indication of the broad but awkward shift towards a more formalised system 
of labour on commercial farms, which does away with key components of racial paternalism.   
 
5.3 WORKING AND LIVING ARRANGEMENTS  
Naidoo (2011:79) argues that, in relation to the implementation of legislation on farms, 
“emphasis has been on regulating conditions at the site of production to the neglect of the 
conditions of social reproduction”. Paternal relations in the past extended beyond the labour-
wage nexus due to the constitution of farms as a site of both economic production and social 
reproduction. The current labour legislation, including the Sectoral Determination, invariably 
affects both the production and reproduction dimensions of the farmer-farm worker 
relationship, particularly with the shift to a more business model of agriculture based on 
purely economic relations. A widespread example in the case of the studied farms in 
KwaZulu-Natal and the Eastern Cape alike is the parameters that are now set in place for 
‘favours’ and services previously provided freely by the farmer. These parameters have 
emerged as a result of Minimum Wage increases: 
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We used to provide health benefits, but with the increase of the Minimum Wage, we have 
had to do away with that. We provide housing for people that aren’t from the area. And if 
someone has had a tragedy and needs a loan – provided they are trustworthy, they would get a 
loan (own emphasis). (Farm Manager/Owner, Woodburns Estate, 19/04/2013) 
Although the paternalistic element pertaining to economic production and social reproduction 
has not disappeared completely, there clearly is a shift away from it – with farmers being 
much more circumvent (for instance, ‘provided they are trustworthy’ or dependable) in 
assisting farm workers beyond what is expected of a typical employer. Thus the instigation of 
labour legislation, especially with much of it concentrated on work and working conditions, 
is undermining the notion of the farm as a community or family. Indeed, many farmers have 
sought to separate out production and social reproduction by ensuring that workers no longer 
live on-site but nearby within travelling distance to the farm.  
 
5.3.1 Terms and Conditions of Employment 
The Sectoral Determination stipulates conditions of employment to which farmers should 
adhere. Their compliance though is dependent on the capacity and competence of the labour 
inspectors attached to the Department of Labour (DoL). Besides Minimum Wages, the 
Determination sets out hours of work, leave, prohibition of child labour and forced labour as 
well as termination of employment procedures. These issues, with the exception of the child 
labour and forced labour, are discussed below in the light of my farm-based studies in the two 
provinces. 
 
Upon entering an employment relationship, a contract of employment becomes into effect. 
The contract of employment is a voluntary agreement between two parties in terms of which 
one party (the employee) places his or her personal services (labour power or potential) at the 
disposal and under the control of the other party (the employer) in exchange for some form of 
remuneration which may include money and/or payments in kind (Erasmus 2013). Since 
1997, the Basic Conditions of Employment Act (BCEA) recognizes a written employment 
contract in the exchange of labour potential and wages. This is indicated in the quotations 
from farm workers below: 
When I started [in the 1980s], this contract thing was not popular...and we got our wages in an 
envelope (Farm Worker, Oak Leaf Farm, 30/04/2013) 
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I started here in 1987, so that’s when I started working here, but we only got registered [and 
started getting contracts] at the start of 1996. So that’s when we ‘officially’ started, but I’ve 
been here for a while now. (Farm Worker, Woodburns Estate, 19/04/2013) 
Indeed. The contract thing was not as prevalent when I started. We used to get our wages in 
an envelope and our income has increased slightly. (Farm Worker, Oak leaf Farm, 
30/04/2013) 
Written contracts result in significantly lower rates of violation of the Sectoral Determination 
than do verbal or non-written contracts (Bhorat, Kanbur and Mayet 2011). All interviewed 
workers, if employed for a year or more (permanent or semi-permanent), signed contracts 
with their employers. However the significance of contracts to limiting the infringement of 
SD provisions is still questionable as some farmers simply go through the motions: 
Look, we have contracts because we must have them, but I’m a big verbal guy. But we have 
them because we must have them, so yes they are there [written contracts]. (Farm 
Manager/Owner, Oak Leaf Farm, 30/04/2013) 
 
Subordination is an integral part of the employment contract as the labour potential of the 
worker is at the disposal and under the control of another (employer). Klerck (2008) puts 
forward a crucial argument in reflecting upon the failure of the employment contract to 
express the realities of the employment relationship. More specifically, understanding the 
employment relationship purely on the basis of the contract is to imply that employees are 
consenting parties to hierarchy and subordination in the workplace (Klerck 2008). Though 
the contractual arrangement is voluntary and seemingly consensual, underlying it are 
relations of power and subordination to which workers submit mainly on grounds of 
compliance. The very structure of the farm, involving hierarchy and order, is a part of the 
employment arrangement to which the worker agrees to surrender. As one owner/farmer 
stressed: 
I expect utmost respect from someone I pay. (Farm Manager/Owner, Woodburns Estate,   
19/04/2013) 
The pack house manager reiterated this: 
I think, look…there’s a certain degree of level of authority that goes with it [my position], and 
decision making and that. I don’t have a problem if they question what I’ve done or why I do 
it. But I think they need to respect my decisions…that are made...and that’s why we agree 
before they sign the contract, we go through everything. ‘This is  what’s required of you’, we 
need to know where our boundaries are so that they know what’s required…and there will be 
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consequences if you don’t operate within that function. (Pack House Manager, Carisbrooke 
Valley Citrus, 18/04/2013) 
The form of control and subordination is also often dependent on the character of 
employment; for example, highly skilled workers regularly are subject to less coercive forms 
of control (Erasmus 2013). The BCEA in fact establishes employment categories, other than 
those fully-employed on a permanent basis, which relates to (but does not completely map 
onto) the categories I identified on the studied farms. These are as follows: (i) part-time, 
where the employee is permanently employed but only works part of a working day or 
working week, (ii) casual, where the employee is employed on a short-term basis but only 
works part of a working week and (iii) temporary (often referred to as a ‘fixed-term 
contract’), where the employee is not permanently employed but only works for a specific 
length of time or until a specific job is completed. 
 
In the conducted study, farmers notably streamlined the adherence of legislation according to 
the type of employment on farms. For instance, permanent staff not only enjoyed benefits 
favoured by the Basic Conditions of Employment Act, but additionally received medical care, 
better housing and participation (although, arguably ‘pseudo-participation’) in the running of 
the farm. Seasonal staff, as temporary labour, were typically viewed as easily replaceable 
and, therefore, insignificant. Farmers claimed to have records of these workers, although no 
written contract was engaged: 
Well a permanent [employee] is obviously someone who has a permanent job there and who 
knows he’s gonna be there next month and the next month, obviously if everything goes 
well…whereas a casual their job can be over tomorrow morning. (Farm Manager/ Owner, 
Oak Leaf Farm, 23/04/2013) 
Permanent [employees are] paid monthly, live on the farm and enjoy the benefits of the farm. 
Whereas a seasonal or casual employee gets paid per hour, but paid fort-nightly but per hour 
that they work; or incentivised during picking…like now we’re picking these peppers…they 
get paid per crate. (Farm Manager, Varnam Farm, 30/04/2013) 
In addition, the core, permanent and securer workers receive protective gear, UIF protection 
and a retirement plan which is covered in their employment contract. On the farm, the end of 
an agricultural season usually implies the end of employment for most workers, though there 
is the prospect of future employment on the same farm. Since only permanent workers 
specifically, or at least in the main, received a written contract of employment, this gave 
room for the termination of employment for seasonal workers to be one-sided: 
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We hire more and increase until we’ve got enough to get around the farm within 10 days to 
pick everything. And then because of the natural yield of the farm they start tailing off and 
then people lose interest in picking (Farm Manager, Varnam Farm, 30/04/2013) 
 
The conditions for termination of employment require prior notice by one party. In the 
abovementioned case (of Varnam), the gradual descent of the harvest is proportional to that 
of employees – whether initiated by the farmer or workers. However, there are cases in which 
farm workers speak about the sale of a farm – and consequent loss of their jobs – without any 
notice being given to the employees. For example, a farm was recently sold in Sundays River 
Valley (Eastern Cape) without informing employees about the sale (they were only told when 
they received their wages); as a result 16 workers are now unemployed in that area (ECARP 
Meeting 25/05/2013). 
 
The reaction of the state in such cases reflects the poor level of farm worker representation. 
Often, farm workers are left with no choice but to seek political solutions to their everyday 
concerns and struggles. In fact one could even argue that it has become common for poor 
people in South Africa to be listened to only when they embark in dramatic and sometimes 
violent protest activities (ECARP 2012), as took place in the Western Cape farm strikes. By 
and large, this is not limited to issues around employment. Farm workers (especially 
permanent workers) typically live and work on the farm, thus to lose their job is to lose their 
home. The conditions under which they live – and are permitted (or agree) to live – are 
placed under scrutiny in the following sub-section. 
 
5.3.2 Housing and Living Conditions  
The Sectoral Determination stipulates that when employers deduct wages for accommodation 
on farms, the housing must meet certain basic conditions (Human Rights Watch 2011b). If 
they deduct a farm worker’s wages for accommodation, farmers must ensure that housing is 
at least 30 square metres in size and that it has a durable, waterproof roof; glass windows 
exist that can be opened; and there is electricity (if it exists on the farm), safe water inside the 
house or in close proximity, and a flush toilet or pit latrine inside or in close proximity 
(Sectoral Determination 13: Farm Worker Sector).  
 
This study found evidence on how the type or category of employment influences access to 
housing and impacts on tenure conditions. For instance, in the dairy farm in Alexandria, 
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where the hiring of seasonal employees was significantly lower than in the citrus and 
vegetable farms, the permanently employed staff lived in block houses with running water 
and electricity – a luxury that is not afforded to a typical farm worker in South Africa: 
They are as big as an RDP house…so it’s a living room, a kitchen and two bedrooms…[with 
a toilet]… in the house. And then we have our own furniture, and metered electricity and 
water. (Assistant Farm Manager, Oak Leaf Farm, 23/04/2013) 
On this farm, seasonal workers – in the minimal cases when they are employed – did not have 
access to housing at all and are expected to return to town at the end of the working day. The 
same can be said about Varnam Farm where permanent employees live on the farm, albeit in 
mud-houses with one communal tap (between nine families consisting of 40 to 50 people) 
which they pay for and metered electricity; while casual/seasonal employees are transported 
to and from town by the farm manager every day. As a permanent worker at Varnam 
mentions:  
No, we do not talk to anyone about issues pertaining to our houses because we built the 
houses ourselves…out of mud…and then we pay R80 for it every month. (Farm Worker, 
Varnam Farm, 30/04/2013). 
 
An exception to the farm dweller rule (anything less than permanent worker status translates 
into non-dweller status) is made to seasonal workers who were born and raised on the farm. 
There are no toilets at all for workers (and dwellers) living in Varnam Farm, meaning that 
they have to dig a hole in the ground when they need to relieve themselves. Workers claimed 
that they could not speak meaningfully to the owner about their living conditions as he was 
more concerned about the running of the farm. The relationship they have with him is purely 
business as they effectively rent the land and buy electricity from him. Any additional 
accommodation-related requirements they need are supposed to come from their own 
pockets. Although this type of attitude on the part of farmers was often linked to Minimum 
Wage increases, the workers in the case of Varnam claim that their accommodation (and 
social reproduction) challenges simply reflect the character of the current owner of Varnam 
Farm.  
 
At the Woodburns Estate, housing is only provided to employees who are not from the 
Nokweja area. Employees come from as far as Umtata (+/- 400kms), while others are from 
Hlokozi (+/- 60kms) and Umzimkulu (+/- 10kms). Employees who are from Nokweja 
(permanent staff and, especially, seasonal workers) walk the +/- 5km distance to and from 
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work each day in the off-season, having to hire transport during the harvesting season. Since 
Woodburns do not provide staff transport, they were then required to provide lodging: 
We provide housing for people that aren’t from the area…from areas such as Mzimkhulu, 
Umtata, Highflats and Harding…they can’t travel every day (Farm Owner/Manager, 
Woodburns Estate, 19/04/2013). 
There is still a tendency, by the state and municipalities in particular, of delegating service 
delivery in farming areas such as education, electricity, water and housing to land owners 
(ECC Report 2012).  
 
One of the interviewed farm owners calculated a labour expenditure of over R10,000 per day 
in accordance with Minimum Wage regulations, with the exclusion of bonuses and incentives 
or rewards. This figure excludes other labour costs – such as transportation (to a lesser 
degree), accommodation, uniforms, etc. – as well as the general running of the business. As a 
result, farmers felt that: 
The higher wage we pay them [workers], the less responsible we feel. (Farm Owner/Manager, 
Woodburns Estate, 19/04/2013) 
With the political spotlight weighing heavy on farm labour and accommodation conditions, 
farmers have responded by advocating a reallocation of service delivery issues. As one 
farmer pointed out: 
If they [government] should have a say, they should have a say in everything... I think 
government should be fair (Farm Owner/Manager, Woodburns Estate, 19/04/2013) 
This response therefore asserts and advocates that government should be solely responsible 
for the provision of service delivery such as the maintenance of housing, water, electricity 
and transport on farms. While the persistence of uninhabitable housing on farms can be 
attributed to this contest between farmers and the state, bestowing the responsibility on 
government departments could be futile because of concerns about local state (municipal) 
capacity. Additionally, the Human Rights Watch (2011a) noted a lack of clarity and indeed 
confusion regarding the respective responsibilities of different spheres and tiers of 
government, which likely exacerbates the state’s failure to protect farm worker (and dweller) 
rights. The government has continuously failed to ensure improved on-farm housing or to 
prevent and assist evicted farm dwellers (Human Rights Watch 2011a). Thus farm workers 
are in a vulnerable position, and farmers manipulate this situation by withholding services for 
the worker on the justification that Minimum Wage increases relieves them of such 
responsibilities.  
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5.4 CONCLUSION  
Like the previous chapter, this current chapter examines a labour control system on 
commercial farms in South Africa which is clearly ‘in transition’. A coherent post-apartheid 
labour control regime has not arisen on commercial farms, and there remain clear continuities 
with the past as well as signs of change. Any substantial change to the apartheid labour 
control system would entail a significant shift away from paternalism and the micro-welfare 
system. Though there are indications that this is being chipped away at by commercial 
farmers, there is no clear and decisive signal that it is being undermined as such. Further, 
under the weight of the new labour legislation, it seems that farmers are seeking a more 
formalised and structured system of control, yet this is sitting uncomfortably with ongoing 
despotism. Additionally, important forms of labour restructuring and reorganisation are 
taking place on the studied farms, notably with regard to categories of employment and 
casualisation; and it may be that labour control systems on commercial farms will become 
increasingly category-specific particularly with respect to the distinction between permanent 
and non-permanent agricultural labourers. Labour control restructuring is in flux on these 
farms and the end-point remains unclear. The final chapter to this thesis seeks to bring some 
coherence to labour control restructuring on commercial farms in South Africa, but without 
fitting (or forcing) this restructuring into pre-defined and fixed categories.  
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CHAPTER SIX: 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
This thesis focuses on the agricultural labour process on commercial farms in South Africa 
with a specific focus on the systems of labour control, given the significance of control to the 
labour process. In particular, it sought to identify, examine and understand any changes and 
continuities to the system of labour control on commercial farms since the end of apartheid in 
1994. And it did so by reference to four commercial farms, in KwaZulu-Natal and Eastern 
Cape provinces.  
 
This concluding chapter provides a summary and synthesis of the thesis, and it is divided into 
two main sections for this purpose. The following section (section two) presents a summary 
of the thesis and, in the ensuing section (section three) I provide an overall synthesis as well 
as theoretical lessons about analysing labour processes under capitalism.   
 
6.2 THESIS SUMMARY 
There are two main contextual chapters to this thesis, chapters two and three. In chapter two, 
I analysed the capitalist labour process and, more specifically, the agricultural labour process. 
Central to the labour process is labour control (as a managerial function), as the labour power 
of labourers needs to be transformed into actual labour in a manner which maximises 
efficiency, productivity and profitability. The capitalist labour process and labour control 
systems though are subject to historical and spatial variation, and control systems within 
particular economic sectors (or branches of production) regularly have their own specificities. 
The agricultural labour process in capitalist or commercial farming has been regularly 
marked by the combined presence of sites of economic production and social reproduction 
on-farm, such that farm owners become responsible not only for questions pertaining to 
production but also for the social reproduction of farmers and their families. The fact that 
labour processes, and forms of labour control, change over time implies that labour control 
systems in commercial agriculture are not static but may be reconfigured under certain social 
conditions. Historically, a paternalistic despotism (or domestic government) has often 
characterised agricultural labour processes, involving highly privatised, personalised and 
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direct forms of labour control, all of which are manifestations of the privatised agrarian space 
which constitutes capitalist farms.  
 
Chapter three examined commercial farming in South Africa, with a particular focus on post-
apartheid South Africa and the labour control system within commercial agriculture. 
Historically, commercial farming (specifically white commercial farming) was heavily 
subsidised and supported unequivocally by the segregationist and apartheid states in terms of 
commodity markets but labour control was left unregulated by the state. This led to a highly 
privatised, paternalistic, informal and despotic labour regime (or a racialised and paternalistic 
despotism). Neo-liberal restructuring, with predated the end of apartheid, has brought about a 
process of state de-regulation with the withdrawal of significant state support for commercial 
farmers. At the same time, as part of a redistributive thrust, the post-apartheid state has 
sought to regulate labour relations within commercial agriculture (most notably, though the 
farm sectoral determination) and to enhance tenure security for farm workers and dwellers. 
Commercial farmers have responded to these multiple pressures in a variety of ways, 
including labour shedding, mechanisation, farm evictions, causalisation of the labour force 
and de-linking the production-reproduction nexus. The available literature on commercial 
agriculture in South Africa is suggestive of certain changes taking place in the labour control 
system on farms, away from the racialised-paternalistic despotism.  
 
Chapters four and five, based on the four studied farms, sought to identify and understand 
possible changes and continuities in the labour control systems on these four farms and, in so 
doing, these chapters examined a diverse range of themes pertinent to the agricultural process 
on commercial farms in South Africa.  
 
Combined, these chapters examine responses (from management) to the state’s Sectoral 
Determination for agriculture and labour legislation more broadly, as well as to neo-liberal 
restructuring. In this regard, I highlight three points. One critical issue is the personalised 
bond of paternalism on farms emanating from the production-reproduction nexus and 
manifested in the micro-welfarism which has existed historically on South African 
commercial farms. Due to the labour legislation, which essentially stipulates the conditions 
under which farmers should conduct their employment practices, there is evidence of a 
possible shift away from paternalism as farmers feel less inclined to be held directly 
responsible for the social reproduction needs of their workers and families. In other words, 
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farmers may no longer feel obligated to ‘indulge’ workers beyond the parameters of their 
contractually-defined work relationship. Secondly, though, there is added pressure on farmers 
in the form of neo-liberal restructuring, leading farmers to maintain production and profit 
levels by reducing (or maintaining levels of) expenditure in order to remain competitive in 
the national and/or global market. In this sense, any changes to the agricultural labour process 
cannot be reduced to the effects of labour legislation, though clearly the latter is extremely 
important in this regard. For instance, the significance of labour legislation is apparent in the 
hostility sometimes evidenced amongst farmers to sectoral determinations and as expressed 
through violations of the Sectoral Determination or the strategies used to combat the 
consequences of legislation (for example, through reducing benefits once provided to farm 
workers). The third point is that there is an increasing bias by farmers towards a core 
permanent workforce compared to casual and seasonable labourers. An evident response to 
legislation (and Minimum Wage increases) is the casualisation of workers and, more 
specifically, the shifting from one employment category to another (mainly permanent to 
casual/seasonal). The core group of employees seem to receive – and increasingly so – more 
benefits linked to the new labour legislation and sectoral determination, and are also being 
managed and controlled differently than non-standard farm labourers. Though this is not a 
universal trend on the four farms, such a shift would be to the disadvantage of specifically 
female farm workers.   
 
6.3 SYNTHESIS 
No labour process as such exists. It is absolutely critical to be sensitive to the specificities of 
particular labour processes and the different kinds of labour control systems which exist. 
Even in the case of the agricultural labour process in contemporary post-apartheid South 
Africa, I argued – on the basis of the four studied farms – that I would not be in a strong 
position to come to broad sweeping claims about changes and continuities in the agricultural 
labour process nationally. This has in fact been borne out in the study of the four case studies 
themselves, as there are clear differences between the farms in terms of labour control 
restructuring. It is clear for instance that Oak Leaf Farm has experienced minimal change 
away from a racial despotism in large part because the farm is capital-intensive such that 
Minimum Wage increases do not significant impact on the cost structure of the farm. At the 
other extreme, the pack house (Carisbooke) seems to be furthest away from the past labour 
control system, presumably because historically its workforce has lived off-site; it therefore 
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finds it easier to adjust to the effects of the new labour legislation. The other two farms 
(Varnam and Woodburns) are somewhere in-between these two extremes.  
 
This is an important conclusion which needs to be emphasised. It implies that understanding 
changes and continues with regard to the agricultural labour process on capitalist farms in 
South Africa needs to be case-specific or at least sector-specific. Any broad claims made 
about labour control restructuring on South African commercial farms must be approached 
cautiously and with reservation. Thus, the question of ‘space’ (if I can use this term to 
designate farm specificities) is an important key variable when seeking to identify and 
understand changes and continuities.  
 
A second key factor is ‘time’. The agricultural labour process on commercial farms in South 
Africa, and particularly the labour control system, is undergoing change over an extended 
period. It is, as I have argued, in a state ‘of transition’ broadly speaking. Because of this, it is 
difficult – though I have used the term at times – to speak about the existence of a labour 
control ‘regime’ (or even ‘system’) insofar as the term ‘regime’ tends to imply unity and 
coherence. Rather, there are a very diverse number of tendencies taking place on commercial 
farms related to labour controls and these tendencies do not amount to a new comprehensive 
and totalising labour control system. The system is fractured and tension-riddled, as farmers – 
under a range of pressures – almost fumble their way through devising a sense and practice of 
coherence to labour controls. Making this claim is not at attempt on my part to ‘cop out’ (so 
to speak) by not coming to any conclusive claims about the post-apartheid labour control 
system on commercial farms. It is a rather a recognition that on-the-farm realities are 
complex and messy, and it would be theoretically unwise and empirically insensitive to 
impose neat and tidy categories onto a fluid social process. In this sense, labour process 
theory must be used in a flexible and nuanced manner as a guide into reality rather than as an 
imposition onto reality. 
 
With the qualifiers of time and space in mind, it is nevertheless possible to identify one key 
overall trend highlighted in the thesis. Farmers are ‘projecting’ their problems onto farm 
workers and their families, as they seek to respond to the various pressures impacting on 
productivity and profitability. This response takes on a variety of forms: doing away with 
certain privileges and perks with each increase in the Minimum Wage, enacting unlawful 
deductions to wages, violating provisions of the sectoral determination, reducing social 
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reproduction commitments, labour shedding, and casualisation. To highlight, this is simply a 
trend or a tendency, and it is a halting and uneven tendency. Certainly, though, if the trend 
were to continue, it would lead to a more formal employment relationship between farmer 
and worker and to more de-personalised, structured, and business-like forms of labour control 
and thereby undermine paternalism. But it may still remain in part despotic insofar as the 
South African state does not intervene more strongly in regulating farm labour relations. 
Changes (and continuities) to the labour control systems on commercial farms in post-South 
Africa need to be subject to ongoing study and research on a farm-by-farm basis if a nuanced 
and fuller understanding of labour control is to be forthcoming.  
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APPENDICES 
APPENDIX 1: INTERVIEW GUIDELINE (FARM OWNERS/MANAGERS) 
Background Information 
 Name, Age, Race and Level of Education. 
 Please give a brief description of your farm (i.e. the history of the farm, what is your 
business, how big is the farm, how successful would you say your farm is, etc) 
 Are you the farm manager/ owner/ co-owner? (Is there anyone you report to regarding 
the production levels of the farm)?  
 How long have you managed/owned the farm?  
 
Perceptions on Authoritative Role 
 Are workers involved in any decisions on the farm (or, for instance, management 
makes decisions and workers have to adhere to them)? If so, how is this administered? 
 Would you say the decisions you make, as management, are for the benefit of the 
farm as a whole or just the farm as a business? 
 Do you think your workers feel comfortable coming to management with their work-
related issues (e.g. wages, working/living conditions, etc)? 
 Do workers tell management of their personal issues?  
 What do employees refer to you as (e.g. “baas”/ “boss”, “Sir”, “<name>”)? 
 To what extent do you think workers should respect you (e.g. submissive – they 
should be wholly obedient, assertive – they should be confident and question 
authority’s decisions)? 
 What is the procedure for grievances on the farm? 
 
Labour Legislation Awareness/Government Influence 
 Are your workers permitted to join any farm organisations or trade unions? 
 Are any of them associated with any organisations? 
 Do you liaise with government officials (i.e. labour inspectors)? If so, how often? 
 How much knowledge would you say you have on labour legislation on farms (i.e. 
Sectoral Deermination: Farm Sector) – immense, adequate, nothing? 
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 Do you believe that government should have a say in how farm workers are managed 
on the farms? 
 Do you believe that government adequately represents farm workers in labour 
legislation? 
 Are you a part of a Farmer Organisation? 
 
Perceptions on MW and Employment Benefits 
 Do you believe it is your responsibility to take care of farm workers beyond the scope 
of work (e.g. provide housing, basic education, etc)? 
 Do you believe that the setting of a Minimum Wage for farm workers has helped the 
progression of the sector? Why/ Why not? 
 In your opinion, what would be the implications (good or bad) of a cancellation of the 
Sectoral Determination in the sector? 
 How do you categorise wages and remuneration packages on the farm (e.g. by gender, 
employment category, employment level – i.e. supervisor <> employee)?  
 What is the standard remuneration package that comes with the job (for seasonal and 
permanent employees)?  
 Are there any ‘unconventional’ methods of remuneration added in your workers’ 
package (e.g. food parcels)? 
 Are there any deductions on employee wages (please provide examples of these, if 
so)? 
 
Employment Protocol 
 What is the difference between a "permanent" and a "seasonal" and/or “casual” farm 
worker? 
 How do you recruit employees for employment on the farm?  
 Is it the recruitment method the same for all categories of employees (i.e. seasonal, 
casual, permanent)? 
 Once agreed upon, is there a contract signed by farmer and worker – or is the 
employment agreement and conditions a verbal one? 
 Do you keep regular records of all your farm employees? 
 How many workers are employed on the farm? 
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 How many of your workers are employed on a permanent basis? How many do you 
generally employ on a temporary (seasonal/casual) basis? 
 Do you have any workers who also live on the farm? 
 Do you have any people (other than workers) living on the farm (i.e. farm dwellers)? 
 Are there any written or verbal rules and regulations for the farm? Please mention a 
few. 
 Should an employee violate any of these rules, what is the disciplinary procedure? 
Is the procedure the same for all transgressions? 
 
Production 
 What are your costs of production, e.g. labour, fuel, raw materials, etc.? 
 Has this cost (production) been influenced by the increased labour costs (Minimum 
Wage)? 
If it has not, did you employ methods (possibly before the gazetting of the Sectoral 
Determination) to ensure that production costs would not be affected? 
If it has, are there any methods you are considering any methods to maintain or 
reduce production costs? 
 Has the implementation of a Minimum Wage affected production output on the farm? 
If it has not, did you employ methods (possibly before the gazetting of the Sectoral 
Determination) to ensure that production would not be affected? 
If it has, are there any methods you are considering any methods to maintain or 
increase production output?  
 When is your “peak season” (i.e. when you need more labour on the farm)? 
 What methods do you employ in increasing levels of production on the farm (e.g. 
longer working hours, more labour, etc)? 
 What kind of machinery do you use for production? Do you depend on it extensively 
as opposed to labour? 
 How is labour organised (i.e. do you have one manager/owner and the workers or do 
you have supervisors who are also workers; is there work that is strictly for 
men/women)? Please elaborate on this point. 
 Does your farm require workers to have extensive skills, or skills tailored for the farm 
(e.g. how to handle animals; in game farms)? 
 Should they not possess these skills, do farmers provide the necessary training? 
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 Do farm workers need protective gear on your farm? If so, is this included in the 
employment agreement? 
 Do you believe that your farm is very successful? Why/ Why not? 
 Who are your customers? So who do you sell your products to locally and/or 
internationally? 
 Are there other influences (e.g. economic pressures) which have contributed to a 
change in production patterns? 
 Do you employ any foreign labour (e.g. Zimbabweans)?  
 What costs do your employees bear for the housing (and, conversely, costs the 
employer covers) i.e. rent, water and electricity? 
 What other employment benefits do your workers enjoy, e.g. maternity leave, UIF, 
etc.?  
 Have you (your family) ever had any farm dwellers (i.e. people living on the farm, but 
not working for the farm)? 
If so, what happened to them? Were they evicted? 
If not, what do you think contributes to this (as most farms in South Africa are also 
homes to workers and their families)? 
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APPENDIX 2: INTERVIEW GUIDELINE (FARM WORKERS) 
Background Information 
 Name, Age, Race and Level of Education  
 How long have you worked on the farm? 
 Do you also live on the farm? 
 If so, do you live with any family members? 
 If not, how far is your home from the farm and how do you travel to the farm?  
 Are there other members of your family that have worked on the farm before/ 
currently? 
Conditions of Employment 
 What category of employment do you fall in (i.e. temporary/casual, seasonal or 
permanent)? 
 How were you recruited for employment on the farm? 
 When employed, did you sign a contract or was it a verbal agreement? 
 Do you know your conditions of employment and are you happy with them (e.g. 
period of employment, working hours)? 
 How do you get paid (i.e. weekly, fort-nightly, monthly)? 
 How do you receive payment (i.e. cash, cheque, bank transfer)? 
 How is your payment measured (e.g. production level, hours of work, etc)? 
 What wage bracket do you fall into (MW set at R2273.52 pm as from 1 March 2013)? 
 > R500 pm/ > R150 pw/ > R25 a day 
 R500 – R1000 pm/ R150 – R300 pw/ R25 – R50 a day 
 R1000 – R1500 pm/ R300 – R450 pw/ R50 – R75 a day 
 R1500 – R2000 pm/ R450 – R600 pw/ R75 – R100 a day 
 R2000 – R2500 pm 
 Above? 
 Other than your wages, is there anything your employer gives you as part of your 
remuneration package (e.g. food parcels)? 
 Do you receive a pay slip with your wages? 
 Are there any deductions made on your wages (e.g. UIF, pension fund)? 
 Do you think you can have a decent living with your pay? 
 How many people benefit from your salary? 
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 Please describe your typical day on the farm (e.g. clock in at 7am, work, tea break, 
etc)? 
 How long is your average working day on the farm? 
 Is there a time when you work longer hours than usual? When is this? 
 Do you receive additional pay for longer hours (i.e. overtime)? 
 
Housing and Living Conditions 
 Please describe the type of housing provided to your employees: 
 Size (of the compound, or number of rooms) 
 Access to water (Is it running water? Is there a tank nearby? How far are 
workers from the source?) 
 Electricity (Is there electricity? Is it prepaid?)  
 Toilets (Do your employees have flush toilets or pit latrines? Do they share or 
does each compound/employee have a toilet? 
Interaction 
 How would you describe your relationship with the farmer/farm manager (e.g. 
paternal, unapproachable, mutual respect, etc)? 
 How often do you interact with management (socially or professionally)? 
 How would you describe your relationship with other workers? 
 When you have a problem regarding issues with your work, what do you do? Who do 
you report to? 
 Do you feel comfortable reporting to this individual? 
 Do you feel that your problems are solved quickly and fairly? 
 If the issue cannot be resolved, are you given an explanation? 
 Do you think farmers genuinely care about your issues (work and/or personal)? 
 Do you believe that management is fair in decisions made about workers (e.g. in 
discipline)? 
 Do you feel that it is the responsibility of the farmer to take care of you beyond the 
scope of work? 
 
Worker Collectivisation and Participation 
 Are you part of any Farm Worker Organisation or a trade union? Why/ Why not?  
 Are you ever involved in decisions that have to do with the farm and how production 
takes place? To what extent? 
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Level of Expertise 
 Do you feel you have the necessary skills to work on this farm? If so, how did you 
acquire these skills? 
 Do you have any formal training to be employed on this farm? 
 Do you feel safe on your farm (i.e. are there any concerns with inappropriate 
behaviour by colleagues/management)? 
 What does your job entail? 
 
Labour Legislation Perception and/or Awareness 
 Do you feel you know enough about labour legislation on farms (i.e. Sectoral 
Determination: Farming Sector)? 
 Do you think it is easy to hire/fire farm workers? Why/ Why not?  
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APPENDIX 3: INTERVIEW GUIDELINE (ECARP STAFF) 
Background Information 
 How long have you worked with ECARP? 
 What is your position at ECARP? 
 Please describe the most recent study conducted on farmers and workers on citrus 
farms. 
 What methods do you employ when gathering data (e.g. focus groups, in-depth 
interviews, questionnaires, etc)? 
 
Interacting with Farm Workers 
 Do you believe that farmers (and workers) are honest (*loosely) in their responses 
when ECARP does research on farms?  
 What programmes has ECARP been involved in the working and living conditions of 
farm workers (i.e. what role do you play, as an organisation, in bettering these 
conditions)? 
 How are you generally received by farmers and workers when you approach them for 
research? 
Perception on Legislation 
 How is Minimum Wage compliance and general adherence to labour legislation on 
the citrus farms that you have researched in the Eastern Cape? 
 Do you think that post-apartheid land and labour policies have a positive effect on 
building organisation on citrus farms?  
 Have you found responses of the Minimum Wage to change the way employment is 
recruited/maintained on citrus farms? 
 Has the implementation of a Minimum Wage affected the attitudes of farmers? 
 How evident/blatant is the triangular relationship (farmer, broker, worker) in the 
research you have conducted? 
 Based on your research, do you believe farm workers have sufficient information 
about labour legislation? 
 Do you feel that farm workers are adequately represented in labour legislation? 
 In what ways do farmers commonly violate SD requirements (e.g. unlawful 
deductions, incorrect payslips, no leave)? 
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 How is recruitment and selection done on the citrus farms you have studied 
(formal/informal)? Is it the same across the board (i.e. for all employees)? 
 
NGO Intervention 
 Do you feel that labour inspectors and law enforcement are actively involved in 
commercial farms?  
 Do you believe that it is necessary for such organisations to intervene / has your 
intervention motivated a more active role from the DoL (in the Eastern Cape)? 
 
Workers and Management in the Field 
 What is the general structure of employment do you witness on the field (i.e. 
bureaucratic organisation of workers, along gender lines, etc)? 
 How evident is the gender specificity of work?  
 Are farmers genuinely concerned about the livelihoods of the workers? 
 Do farmers tend to care for their workers beyond the scope of work? 
 Are there any expectations, from the workers’ side, of the farmers? 
 Do you believe that farmers and workers interact socially or is their relationship 
restricted to business? 
 What production methods are commonly implemented during ‘peak seasons’? 
 Do you find that workers are involved in decisions made on the farm – in terms of 
freedom to do their job as they see fit, as well as express their concerns about the 
farm? 
 How much leeway are farm workers given in performing their duties (do they 
constantly have to report to management, or are they allowed to do the job as they see 
it)? 
 What methods of supervision (and control) are employed on the (citrus) farms you 
have investigated? 
 Do farm managers generally have qualifications? 
 How are employees typically trained for the job?  
 
